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THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS
CHALLENGE OF OUR TIMES



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TORONTO

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE OF OUR TIMES

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT:
REVERENCE FOR PERSONALITY

BY

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New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1911

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PREFACE

As its double title indicates, this book seeks to enable the thoughtful reader to orient himself morally and religiously, with reference to all the main features of the modern world; and to give him, at the same time, a guiding clue in that orientation. The aim involves a wide survey; but the changes of our time have been so large and so significant, that it seems particularly worth while to attempt their comprehensive review. In our thinking, in our living, and in our working—in all alike—we need not only intelligent acquaintance with the world conditions in the midst of which we are, but thoughtful understanding of them. And this holds for the nation as well as for the individual. Our problems are not those of any other time. We need to know just what they are, what peculiar difficulties are involved, and what special helps are available.

There have been here undertaken, therefore, a somewhat detailed statement of the outstanding characteristics of both the external and inner world of our time, and a definite estimate of their

moral and religious bearings,—whether taken singly or collectively. In the study of these movements of our age, the guiding and determining nature of the principle of reverence for personality repeatedly appears; and this result is confirmed by a review of the trend of the centuries of Western civilization. In the light of this entire survey it is then sought to make clear the particular demands of the times upon our own national life and in international relations.

The book had its nucleus in a paper, read before the Religious Educational Association, upon *The Future of Religious Education*; and its problem was constantly in mind, in a year of travel and study and lecturing in India, China, and Japan; while much of the substance of the book was given in the Earl Lectures of the Pacific Theological Seminary, at Berkeley, California, in 1910. But the material of these chapters has been entirely restudied, and the treatment much extended, in order to deal somewhat more adequately with the wide range of questions necessarily raised. I can only hope that I have not quite failed to do justice to the greatness of my theme. The present days are certainly challenging days; and I cannot help wishing that this book may aid some, not only to better individual living, but to a more discerning

and vital patriotism, and to sharing more intelligently and more unselfishly in the world-life.

How great one's indebtedness must be in a world survey, needs no telling! and my indebtedness extends not to books only, but to a long list of friends — American, English, Indian, Chinese and Japanese — who in my journey around the world shared with me their best, and helped me to understand that there are great likenesses as well as great differences between the East and the West, and gave me a new sense of the growing unity of the world.

HENRY CHURCHILL KING.

OBERLIN COLLEGE,

September 19, 1911.



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THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS
CHALLENGE OF OUR TIMES



THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE OF OUR TIMES

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: REVERENCE FOR PERSONALITY

CHAPTER I

REVERENCE FOR PERSONALITY — THE MEANING OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE

THE writer has come to believe that the principle of reverence for personality is the ruling principle in ethics, and in religion; that it constitutes, therefore, the truest and highest test of either an individual or a civilization; that it has been, even unconsciously, the guiding and determining principle in all human progress; and that, in its religious interpretation, it is, indeed, the one faith that keeps meaning and value for life. If this is true, this principle of reverence for personality should be the best key for man's discernment of himself, for the interpretation of history, and for the understanding of God in all his relations to

men. When the principle is correctly conceived, and its implications definitely grasped, it should then be able to give the surest guidance in the multiplex problems of the present — personal, social, economic, political, international, and religious — and in the forecast of the future of human development.

The fundamental and fruitful nature of this thought of reverence for the person as such, gradually forces itself upon one, in many connections and in varied lines of inquiry — psychological, ethical, sociological, historical, religious, and theological. There has been no attempt to force the principle upon the material of this book. In fact, in the book's original planning, there was no special thought of a single underlying principle. It has been only as the peculiarly significant nature of this idea has come out again and again in the course of the inquiry, that it has been recognized as so completely determining; though there are, of course, many subsidiary factors and principles. In one aspect, the spirit of reverence for personality is the characteristic that most clearly distinguishes the modern world from the ancient, the most modern from the mediæval, and the Occident from the Orient. It, thus, vitally con-

cerns our own present, and should definitely help to conscious, intelligent coöperation in facing present-day problems.

Because, then, the principle of reverence for personality comes out so repeatedly in the course of our inquiry, and because it is believed to be so truly determining — though it is not to be used in *a priori* fashion — it is of peculiar importance that the meaning to be given to the principle should be clearly understood from the start. We need to see how fundamental it is in its nature, and how fruitful in its applications. This can be best and most quickly discerned, perhaps, in a brief study of its significance in the individual human life.¹ We shall then be better prepared to see and understand its varied bearings and applications, in our larger inquiry as to moral and religious development as a world problem.

The incident, in John's Gospel, of the woman taken in adultery, in which it is said of Jesus, that he "stooped down and with his finger wrote on the ground," illustrates, in a single case, the response of Jesus to this basic and eternal principle of reverence for the person. For it is hardly

¹ For a fuller discussion see the author's *Rational Living*, pp. 236 ff.; and *The Laws of Friendship*, Chap. XVIII.

possible to misinterpret this action of Jesus, as he thus stoops down and writes upon the ground. Any one, who has ever felt the intolerable sense of shame that arises, when he has been made an unwilling spectator of the needless public humiliation and breaking down of the self-respect of a servant, a child, a wife, or a fellow man, — will know what the feeling of Jesus must have been. He would not share, though unwillingly, in the cruel, brutal, needless humiliation of even a sinful woman, by adding to her load of shame, so much as the weight of his pitying look. She is no *thing* that she should be thus bandied about of men, but a *person*, herself made in the image of the Eternal God. He could not bear that the sanctities of her inner person should be thus brutally laid open to the brazen gaze of men, though she be an open sinner. And the conduct here ascribed to Jesus in this interpolated incident in the Gospel of John — the present position of which no critic defends, but the inimitable truth of which none denies — is characteristic of his attitude throughout his ministry. As I have elsewhere said, “Jesus seems constantly to be standing, with a kind of moral shudder, between the spirit of contempt in the Pharisees and Sadducees, and the outraged personality of

the common people, even of the publicans and sinners; he feels the contempt, even for these least, as a blow in his own face."

I

A FUNDAMENTAL MORAL PRINCIPLE

Now, the principle, so illustrated in the spirit and ministry of Jesus, we may not forget, is a fundamental moral principle. For there must be for every man, in Howison's language, "that recognition and reverence for the personal initiative of other minds, which is at once the sign and test of the true person." It is this principle which Kant affirms in his Practical Imperative: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." Hegel reiterates the thought in his maxim: "Be a person, and respect the personality of others." It is blindness to this same respect for the person, too, of which Professor James writes so piquantly in his essay, *On a Certain Blindness in Human Nature*. This sense of reverence for personality, indeed, Lotze believes, has been, even unconsciously, the guiding principle in all the moral development of the race.

He finds illustrations of it at many points, and says: "The deeper our insight into human destiny becomes, the more sacred does every individual human being seem to us, and the more unconditionally do we refuse to take the measure of his relative worth. . . . The spirit of civilization has set upon human personality that seal of inviolability which the perversity of a state of Nature sometimes sets upon external objects; and wherever our conduct is not actuated by this sentiment, wherever Law and Society still treat individuals as though they were *things*, there our civilization is marred by a remnant of barbarism, and there we have not succeeded in vanquishing the principle of barbarism altogether." ¹

Royce thus applies the principle in the personal life: "Let one look over the range of his bare acquaintanceship; let him leave out his friends, and the people in whom he takes a special personal interest; let him regard the rest of his world of fellow-men, — his butcher, his grocer, the policeman that patrols his street, the newsboy, the servant in his kitchen, his business rivals. Are they not one and all to him *ways of behavior* toward himself or other people, outwardly effective beings,

¹ *The Microcosmus*, Vol. II, pp. 58, 59.

rather than realized masses of genuine inner sentiment, of love or of felt desire? Does he not naturally think of each of them rather as a way of outward action than as a way of inner volition? His butcher, his newsboy, his servant, — are they not for him industrious or lazy, honest or deceitful, polite or uncivil, useful or useless people, rather than self-conscious people? Is each one of these alive for him in the full sense, — sentient, emotional and otherwise like himself, as perhaps his own son, or his own mother or wife, seems to him to be? Is it not rather their being for him, not for themselves, that he considers in all his ordinary life? Not their inner volitional nature is realized, but their manner of outward activity. Such is the nature and ground of the illusion of selfishness." President Hyde hardly overstates the matter when he says that this passage "lays bare the source of the greater part of the social immorality in the world, and accounts for nine-tenths of all the world's trouble."¹ The principle of reverence for personality is certainly a fundamental and inescapable moral principle.

¹ *The College Man and the College Woman*, p. 53.

II

A BASIC CHRISTIAN ASSUMPTION

At the same time it may not be forgotten that this demand for reverence for the person as such is only another way of stating Christianity's own fundamental assumption of the essential and inestimable worth of man. In Harnack's language, "Jesus Christ was the first to bring the value of every human soul to light, and what he did no one can any more undo." And Wundt adds, to the same purport: "Humanity in this highest sense was brought into the world by Christianity. Although many of the features of Christianity have here also been anticipated in Judaism, still the Jewish virtue of compassion never shook off the chains of tribal feeling while Christianity enjoins the love of all mankind as a duty which stands above all other duties, excepting only those toward God himself." This is that Christian "enthusiasm of humanity" of which *Ecce Homo* speaks: "Being a reverence for human beings *as such*, and not for the good qualities they may exhibit, it embraces the bad as well as the good, and as it contemplates human beings in their ideal — that is, in what they might be — it desires not the apparent, but

the real and highest welfare of each; lastly, it includes the person himself who feels it, and, loving self too only in the ideal, differs as much as possible from selfishness, being associated with self-respect, humility, and independence, as selfishness is allied with self-contempt, with arrogance, and with vanity.”¹

Here, then, in this principle of reverence for the person as a person, we have both a fundamental moral principle, and one belonging to the very essence of Christianity. We have, thus, we may be sure, one of the inescapable laws of life — the supreme condition, indeed, of fine personal relations; and that means the supreme condition of character, of influence, and of happiness. To fail here we may not forget is to fail at the center of life, to sap our best endeavors, to cut ourselves off as individuals, as a nation, as a civilization, from the highest achievement. For the supreme test of individual, or nation, or civilization is this test of reverence for the person as such, our own and others. And reverence for the person involves first, genuine self-respect; second, a like genuine respect for the liberty of others; and, third, respect for the inner worth and personality of others.

¹ *Ecce Homo*, p. 345.

III

WHAT THE PRINCIPLE DEMANDS

No more serious blow, in the first place, can be given to the growth of child or man or race than to break down *self-respect*. This insures, in each case alike, lack of self-control, without which no worthy achievement along any line is possible. Self-respect is neither self-depreciation nor self-conceit. In humble reverence the man of self-respect sees himself, as he sees every other, as a member of the divinely ordained organic body of society. He may believe, therefore, that, like every other, he has his own unique indispensable place and function. In the light of the much that he must receive from others, and in the light of the divine ideal for himself, he cannot be self-conceited; but, in faith in his divine and unique calling, he cannot be self-depreciative. The man who has no reverence for his God-intended destiny, as indicated in his peculiar individuality, — who has no belief that he is called thus to a work singularly his own, will gird himself for no high task. The only measure of other men, too, that one possesses, is himself. One can interpret the Golden Rule itself, and the measure of his obliga-

tion to others, only in terms of his own claim on life. To put that claim low, to despise one's self, to turn one's back on one's divinely given task, is to end with a like contempt of others, and to surrender the very basis of character.

Ultimately, too, a man's sole gift to men or to God is himself. If he does not value himself, but falls into mere imitation of others, he has no contribution to make. In Browning's poem of *The Boy and the Angel*, it will be remembered that even the archangel could not take the boy's place. "I miss," God said, "I miss my little human praise." The greatest discovery of life, thus, for man or for race, next to the discovery of God — and the two discoveries are likely to be coincident — is finding one's self, what Emerson calls one's "net experience." And in loyalty to this true self lies one's chief happiness, too. It is vain, therefore, to expect either character or influence or happiness in either a man or a race without basic self-respect. And no man can keep a genuine self-respect, it must be added, while he is seeking to degrade others. As Booker Washington has put it, "We are fast learning in every part of America, that one man cannot hold another man down in the ditch without remaining in the ditch with him."

Nor, in the second place, is it possible to keep one's own character without fundamental *respect for the liberty of others*. We can never escape the truth of Fichte's old contention, that he becomes a slave who treats another as a slave. Character deteriorates inevitably and steadily wherever the attitude of simple domination — the spirit of the "boss" — comes in. There is nothing in the universe of God so damning as this bossing spirit of contempt. We are but feebly alive to its corroding power upon the boss himself — whether man or race. Arbitrary power is perilous to the character of him who exercises it. It was even more imperative for the moral life of Georgia, that the chain gang be abolished, than for the direct victims of the system. The system contradicted the spirit essential to any even decent civilization.

Equally impossible is it, to be truly influential with others, to make a good or useful child or man or people, without that respect for their liberty, that means the calling out of their own will — the explicit eliciting of their purpose. There is no such thing as laying character upon men from without. Like rest, it cannot be pasted upon a man; it must be an active achievement. We are following an utterly abandoned psychology and pedagogy, if

we dream of so lifting, even into serviceableness, any child or man or people. You cannot have intelligent help without developing intelligence, and you cannot have trustworthy help without developing trustworthiness; and that means eliciting the will.

And, once more, there is thrust on every thoughtful student of civilization, and of the evolution of refining personal relations, the conviction that the very flower of character is to be found in a delicate *recognition of the inestimable value and sacredness of the individual person*. Wherever that respect for the person is replaced in any degree by the willingness to use the person as a thing, as means only, as a mere convenience, and not as an end in itself; wherever the spirit of contempt is allowed to come in, — there, character deteriorates; there, all true influence over others is surrendered; there, all the happiness of really fine personal relations has vanished. The cynic can be neither a good man, nor a good leader, nor a happy human being.

Let us, then, make it forever clear to ourselves that, whether we are thinking of our own growth, or of any possible help of others, we cannot evade or escape the reach of this principle of reverence for the person, any more than we may escape the omnipresence of God. We may not heedlessly set

aside the supreme moral counsel of the race, and not suffer the consequences. We cannot repudiate the reverent spirit and method of Jesus for the contempt of the Pharisees, and remain truly Christian. Many admit unhesitatingly the full authority of the principle of reverence for the person in individual relations, but deny its applicability in the relations of nations. But it is not to be forgotten, that no small part of the recent moral progress of the race is due precisely to the discernment that moral obligations of the same kind as hold for individuals, hold for associated groups of individuals, for business houses, for corporations, for classes, for municipal governments, for states, and for nations. The very meaning is taken out of the social consciousness of our time if this is denied.

It is such considerations as these, therefore, that lead one to say that, whether as individuals, or as a nation, or as partakers in a world civilization, no problem confronts us so serious as just this, of our inner spirit of reverence for personality. Its varied applications and demands will become increasingly clear, as we turn to a more detailed study of the new external conditions and the new inner world of our time, and of the historical trend of the centuries of Western civilization.

CHAPTER II

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE OF PRESENT EXTERNAL CONDITIONS I: THE NEW EXTERNAL CONDITIONS AND THEIR INDIVIDUAL CHALLENGE

INTELLIGENT prevision of the future world civilization can only be based upon the discernment of present needs and trends, and of the larger trend of the centuries. From these we must infer the probable lines of future development. The consideration of present needs and trends would call for facing, particularly, the demands of the new external world, and of the new inner world of thought; and both require a review of certain somewhat familiar facts. The immense range and multiplicity of interests of the present day particularly demand such a thoughtful survey of the whole, if the inquiry is not to end in confusion, and in either vague enthusiasm or vague depression. Never before has it been so necessary to make one's survey of human conditions complete. We are to attempt, therefore, to study the problem of human development in its entirety, — as a world problem.

I

THE MAIN MOVEMENTS OF THE TIME

When one turns, in the first place, to a study of the changed external conditions of our present civilization, certain facts stand out unavoidably: the progressive conquest over the forces of nature; the resulting stupendous economic development; the world-wide economic solidarity; the consequent enormous increase of wealth; the extension of the policy of the national conservation and development of natural resources; the inevitable growth of great cities; the far finer division of labor; the indefinitely closer connections of men, the world over, through improved methods of transportation, commerce, communication, and the press; the resulting increasing association of the races; the rapidly extending application of scientific discoveries for the betterment of human life; the adoption of universal education by all the more enlightened nations, and such adoption increasingly recognized as the necessary ideal in all nations; the movement for the advancement of women; the great foreign missionary movement of the last century; and swift and revolutionary changes among many nations.

Kidd hardly overstates the significance of these changes, though his statement is not confined to the external conditions, when he says: "In inventions, in commerce, in the arts of civilized life, in most of the theoretical and applied sciences, and in nearly every department of investigation and research, the progress of Western knowledge and equipment during the period in question has been striking beyond comparison. In many directions it has been so great that it undoubtedly exceeds in this brief period the sum of all the previous advances made by the race. A significant feature, too, is that the process of change and progress has continued and still continues to grow in intensity. The results obtained, for instance, during the nineteenth century, altogether exceed in range and magnitude those achieved during the eighteenth. The results of the second half of the nineteenth century similarly surpass in importance those of the first half. And yet never before has the expectancy with which the world waits on the future been so intense as in the time at which we have arrived. There is scarcely an important department of practical or of speculative knowledge which is not pregnant with possibilities greater than any that have already been achieved. Such

is the nature of existing Western conditions, that there is scarcely any appliance of civilization, however well established; scarcely any invention, however all-embracing its hold on the world, which the well-informed mind is not prepared to see entirely superseded within a comparatively brief period in the future."

Now it is impossible to face such an array of facts as these, and not see that their demand upon the moral and religious forces must be vast and far reaching.

1. And, first, at the basis of all these changes there plainly lies *the progressive conquest over the forces of nature*. This conquest over the forces of nature, obviously, has taken place only through the progress and inventive application of natural science. Man is the "tool-using animal." The first club of primitive man, as Drummond suggests, was the father of all succeeding clubs of whatever kind, and the promise of continued conquest. Just because man is the tool-using animal, the progress of natural science gives him absolutely limitless scope. Through natural science the laws governing the use of nature's forces have been discovered, and the involved conditions made known; and by fulfillment of these conditions

man has gained control of these unmeasured forces, and has thus been able to harness them to his own ends. This has given the modern man an unexampled sense of power. There is no feeling that he is limited to the power of his own muscle, or even to that of the simpler machines. He feels that he can draw on nature's exhaustless energies. It is difficult to measure the interval that thus separates him from primitive man, or from the present-day savage. Here belong all the illustrations of man's victory over land and water and air. Immense sources of power, kept hidden from previous generations, have been opened to the present age.

Now, this situation inevitably provokes the question: Is this generation prepared for the wise use of such enormous power? Have the secrets of power been kept for us as their worthy recipients, or is their revelation premature? For the possibility of such limitless power clearly demands, on man's part, preëminent self-control.

2. From this progressive conquest over the forces of nature, in the second place, *the stupendous economic development* of the present day, most intense of all in the United States, has plainly resulted. It has been made possible only by the

extending use of nature's forces through machinery and through the multitudinous applications of steam and electricity, and the consequent possibility of an unprecedented development of natural resources everywhere.

The question is, thus, again forced upon us: Are we to be adequate to so stupendous a trust? Are our educational and religious forces fitting the coming generation for their inevitable economic inheritance?

3. The present enormous economic development naturally tends also toward a *world-wide economic solidarity*. It is already practically true that the economic isolation of any people is no longer possible. In Bryce's words, "it is hardly too much to say that for economic purposes all mankind is fast becoming one people, in which the hitherto backward nations are taking a place analogous to that which the unskilled workers have held in each one of the civilized nations. Such an event opens a new stage in world history, a stage whose significance has, perhaps, been as yet scarcely realized either by the thinker or the man of action."¹ Every commercial enterprise, at all capable of such extension, tends to-day to

¹ Quoted by Cairnes, *Christianity in the Modern World*, p. 252.

become world-wide. The way in which coal oil and corrugated iron are spreading over the world is an illustration of a universal tendency. Everywhere the commercially more developed or enterprising nations are pressing in on the less developed peoples, and searching out opportunities for business or industrial extension.

It is evident that in such a situation there is great danger of a purely selfish exploitation that may both work great injustice to the more backward peoples and react disastrously on the higher life of the exploiting nations. This condition, therefore, once again, plainly asks from the more advanced nations for a self-control that can be made possible only by the dominion of the highest ideals, and by interest in the world-wide enterprises of the moral and religious advancement of the race. And it asks from the more developed nations, not less, for steady practice of the Golden Rule, and of the principle of reverence for personality, in relation to the backward peoples. At the same time, these towering commercial ambitions call for clear discernment of the fact that, even should this commercial exploitation become complete and absolute, if it were counted the whole of life, life would be empty of meaning.

This final insufficiency, of the commercial enterprise, however great, to satisfy man's thirst for life, is only hidden from man, for the time being, by the engrossing energy demanded by the immense sweep of the economic undertakings of the present day.

4. Out of all these movements, now, has come that *enormous increase of wealth* that so characterizes our generation. It has been estimated that the wealth of the world has increased as much in the last one hundred years as in all the preceding centuries. Ninety-three per cent of the wealth of the United States "has been created and accumulated since 1850"; and the daily increase in the nation's wealth during the first four years of the twentieth century was twice that during the last decade of the nineteenth.¹

The questions raised, too, by the stupendous private fortunes and aggregations of fortunes of these later days, with their attendant power, are serious enough. A comment, like that of Kidd, is almost forced from the thoughtful observer: "The inherent and elemental barbarism of conditions — even when due allowance is made for services rendered to society, in the first stages in

¹ See Josiah Strong, *The Challenge of the City*, p. 12.

the organization of industry — under which a private citizen is able to accumulate out of what must ultimately be the ‘enforced disadvantage’ of the community, a fortune tending to equal in capital amount the annual revenue of the United States or Great Britain, begins to deeply impress the general imagination.”¹ This enormous and marvelously rapid increase of wealth has inevitably affected, for all, the standards of comfort and luxury, and brought a new, and either intoxicating or depressing sense, as the case may be, of the tremendous power of money for good and for evil. Upon no generation, since the world began, has there ever come such a flood of material possessions. Can we stand this material pressure, and wisely direct these material forces? Is this generation equal to the moral demand involved? Are education and religion steadily disciplining men for tasks so tremendous, and against temptations so insidious? For the possession of such staggering resources of wealth and of power over nature, plainly requires, once more, and in superlative degree, self-control, severely disciplined powers. For how can we master such staggering resources without preëminent self-mastery? How can we

¹ *Principles of Western Civilization*, p. 434.

make certain that we shall own our possessions, and not simply be owned by them?

Because this self-mastery cannot be merely negative, the possession of these astounding resources means, at this point also, intelligent insight, and the necessity of ideals and enterprises high enough and great enough to dominate the lower and selfish interests. This is, at once, an appeal for strenuous moral and religious training, for the highest religious ideals, and for the surpassing enterprises of the Kingdom of God. We need, thus, clearly to see that the economic achievements of our time make religion not less, but far more, necessary to the life of man.

5. The steady extension of the policy of *national conservation of natural resources*, characteristic of our time, is both an illustration of economic development and an attempt to insure permanent national and not merely individual wealth. The policy, indeed, has been thrust upon the nations in no small degree, by the perception of the way in which immense private fortunes have been built up by a selfish exploitation of natural resources, with slight regard to the needs of future generations, or to the interests of the nation as a whole. It has become unmistakably plain, that a mere

let-alone policy here results in enormous wastes. Germany, Switzerland, and Japan have been notably successful in conservation work; and they are by no means alone in such endeavor. The necessity of conservation, indeed, is becoming recognized all over the world. The national conservation of natural resources means, then, as has been well said, three things: the prevention of waste, the assertion of national control, and the attempt to insure that all the people shall share in such national resources.

This movement, that is, demands that we should see the problem of the use of the natural resources of the country, from the point of view of all its citizens; that we should be willing, therefore, to subordinate selfish and class interests to the interests of all, and to act also in clear view of future generations; and yet that, at the same time, we should keep the full value of individual initiative and individual enterprise. For, in the pursuit of national conservation, the nation must make certain that it does not go back to a merely communal point of view; and it must, therefore, be willing to pay the necessary price for constantly securing individual initiative and enterprise. The highest good of all requires that a

nation should not lose the ingenious initiative or the ablest service of any one of its members. This implies that the general good is best insured by the frank bestowal of special rewards for special services. The point to be scrupulously safeguarded is, that there are to be no *unearned* special privileges, and that the sole justification of extraordinary rewards is an equally extraordinary service to the nation, and that, when the service ceases, the reward also ceases.

6. *The inevitable growth of the cities*, too, brings to the moral and religious forces what Dr. Josiah Strong has justly called "the challenge of the city." And he makes it perfectly clear that there is no way by which our civilization may evade this challenge. The causes of the movement toward the city, as he says, "are permanent, and indicate that this movement will be permanent." The great bulk of the people cannot live by agriculture. "Simply bearing in mind that the world's capacity to consume food is limited will throw not a little light on economic conditions, both present and future. It means that only a limited number of persons can get a living by agriculture, and that when the supply of food has reached the limit of demand, agriculture can increase only

as population increases." Moreover, improved methods in agriculture tend to "limit it to an ever-decreasing proportion of the population, which, of course, means that an ever-increasing proportion will live in cities." It is also to be noted, that, while there is a natural limit to the world's capacity to consume food, there is, on the other hand, "no such limit to its capacity to use the products of the mechanical arts," and this steadily tends to shift the population "from agriculture to manufactures and mechanical pursuits, or, in other words, from country to city."¹ The inevitable trend of population, therefore, is toward the city, and none of the various devices for scattering people to the country can prevent the continued growth of great cities; though there are undoubted elements of value in these movements. With the distribution, too, of electrical power, and with increasing ease of transportation and communication, decided gain can be made for country populations; but no one nor all of these things can largely check the movement toward the city. The figures of the last census show how rapidly this movement has been going on in the United States, and the same tendency is to be seen, practically, all over

¹ Strong, *The Challenge of the City*, pp. 22, 24, 26.

the world. As Dr. Strong says, "the sudden expansion of the city marks a profound change in civilization, the results of which will grow more and more obvious."¹

This inevitable growth of the cities means great congestion of population, with its accompanying dangers; enormous enhancing of land values; the putting of tremendous resources to be expended in the hands of city authorities, involving the no less tremendous problems and possibilities of corruption on the one hand, or of high service to all on the other. These phenomena are illustrated in almost any one of our great cities. It is unspeakably depressing to see the sheep-like way in which some of these cities have allowed the forces of corruption to rule. It is highly inspiring, on the other hand, to see some of the victories that have been won for health, for decency, for rational enjoyment, and for righteousness. A recent illustration is found in the splendid fight of Chicago's health officer for pure air.

The moral and religious challenge of the city is seen most clearly in the fact that the city, just because of its enormous possibilities for good and evil, is, probably, the severest test of democratic

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

institutions, — the point at which hitherto they seem to have been least successful, but where, nevertheless, some gratifying progress has been recently made. The city brings the challenge of the necessity, on the one hand, of defeating unscrupulous wealth and of securing better distribution of wealth; and the equal necessity, on the other hand, of defeating a materialistic, unscrupulous democracy that would empty life of all its higher meaning. The city has the possibility and, therefore, the persistent problem of bringing the genuinely best within easy reach of all. But it demands, in peculiar degree, unselfish, patient, intelligent, far-sighted leadership, and loyal response to that leadership on the part of an honest, self-respecting people that have ideals and are willing to sacrifice something for them. It requires, especially, business men that can see beyond the immediate contents of their pocket-books, and have brains to understand that rotten moral conditions and persistent failure of justice cannot constitute good foundations for a city's fame, or for its permanent prosperity.

7. The extent to which the *division of labor*, also, has been carried in the last fifty years is, as it has been often noted, one of the most marked

of the economic features of our time. Such increasing division of labor is clearly involved in the incoming of machinery, and it makes necessary an interdependence of individuals and of communities, of which the older world could not dream. It involves, also, the tendency toward a certain seemingly inevitable separation of work and happiness, and of work and growth; though there has been some gain at this point in our best factories, through cultivating the *esprit de corps* of the whole body of employees, and through interesting each in the success of the whole. Ultimately, too, the division of labor should mean greater leisure on the part of the individual.

Have we, now, the qualities necessary for the close coöperation, here required both by the nature of the conditions directly resulting, and for the cure of the involved disadvantages of such a division of labor? And, so far as greater leisure results from this division of labor, is our civilization developing in men capacities for using such leisure wisely? Here lies a peculiarly significant opportunity for education.

8. Still more notable among the phenomena of the present are the *indefinitely closer connections of men the world over*, through improved methods of

transportation, commerce, communication, and the press. It would have been impossible for the world of even fifty years ago to understand the extent to which the improved methods of transportation, commerce, communication, and publication have made complex and sensitively one the whole life of the world. It is difficult now to realize the earlier conditions, — to think what is involved, for example, in the fact that the first railroad in the United States was completed only eighty-one years ago, and that it took weeks where it now takes hours, for tidings of a presidential election to spread over the country. It required a journey of thirty days for President Jackson to go from his home near Nashville to the nation's capital. The contrast between the older world and the new may be illustrated, also, in the fact that the railroad mileage of India — which one is inclined to think of as quite outside the range of Western civilization — now exceeds that of either Great Britain and Ireland or Austria Hungary or France, and is nearly double that of Australia. In 1908 India had 30,578 miles of railway, and its railways carried in that single year three hundred and thirty million passengers — an increase of more than one hundred millions in

five years. How obviously there is reflected here the conditions of a new world!

When one thinks, too, of the rapidity with which the knowledge of any great event or calamity now permeates the world's life, he sees that this unification of the world means that, in no small degree, men are thinking and acting together, as never before, in the light of the same facts and ideals. Superficially this has immensely multiplied events, and given a speed to life that affects us everywhere. This, itself, brings a tendency to hurry and shallowness of life, and so becomes a fresh call for life's deepening, through a more thoughtful moral and religious training. But, even more important than this, these changes have unified the world, as has just been pointed out, in a way which it is impossible for education longer to ignore. Education has the consequent task to-day, as never before, of preparing men to enter intelligently and unselfishly into a *world* life, and not merely into the life of community or state or nation. The modern educator, that is, needs to be able to give to his pupils a world consciousness, and capacity for sympathetically sharing in the world's life. And this requires high moral and religious qualities, as well as intellectual insight.

9. The same influences have actually *associated the different races* of the earth, to an unparalleled extent, and will continue still further to mingle these races in the years just ahead. Are we adjusting thought and conduct, with any reasonable adequacy, to this inescapable future? When one recalls, for example, the significance of the problem of immigration in the United States,¹ in Canada, in Australia, in South Africa, in the Tropics, in Manchuria and Formosa; — when one recalls the tremendous reach of the negro problem alone in the United States and in South Africa, and the significance of the other unavoidable race and caste problems involved in the commercial, diplomatic, police, sanitary, intellectual, philanthropic, and religious relations of the races; he cannot shut his eyes to the deep seriousness of the challenge, which is brought to the civilization of the present day, by this enormously increased association of

¹ “It is computed that over eight millions in all entered between 1900 and the end of 1909, and that over twenty-seven millions have entered in the years between 1840 and 1910, twice what the total white population in the United States was in the former year.” “There were in the United States only forty-eight millions of white people, when the ten millions from Central and Southern Europe who have arrived since 1885 began to enter, an addition to the nation such as no nation ever received before.” — BRYCE, *The American Commonwealth*, new edition, pp. 470, 481.

the races. Imperialistic national policies, the ambition for a world-wide commerce, and successful colonization, — all depend, in no small degree, upon careful study of racial characteristics and willingness to adjust to race differences; and they are seriously jeopardized by the contemptuous attitude toward other peoples. All this is certain to be increasingly true in the immediate future. But the present imperialistic policies invite dangerous race conflicts in a double way. "On the one hand, the white man has begun to refuse to allow colored men of any description to enter his countries in large numbers; on the other hand, he continues to rule as conqueror immense areas of the world, the soil of which nourishes autochthonous populations having little or nothing in common with him, and therefore regarding his dominion with a natural and growing aversion."¹ It may help the white races to some diminution of their arrogance and to some greater consideration for other races, to remember that the world is not a white man's world, but that the numbers of the colored races — black, brown, and yellow — are practically double those of the white races of the globe, and that considerably more than half of the

¹ Weale, *The Conflict of Color*, p. 99.

colored population of Asia is not at all subject to white races. The Asiatic races are increasingly and justly resenting the contemptuous attitude on the part of many of the white race. Mr. Melville E. Stone, of the Associated Press, is certainly justified in the deliberate judgment expressive of his own observation in the East: "We shall never meet the problems growing out of our relation with the Far East unless we absolutely and once for all put away race prejudice. I believe the European snob in Asia is distinctly the enemy of the civilized West."

As to immigration, a selfish national policy of exclusion of all immigrants of certain races can hardly justify itself permanently. But it may have a relative justification for the time being, where the civilization excluded is of a markedly different type, and where, in consequence, it would be practically certain to depress the standard of living for the working classes. The progress of the race is so intimately connected with a rising standard of living, that a nation which has succeeded in appreciably pushing up that standard for its least favored classes has both the right and the duty to preserve this raised standard, not only for its own sake, but also for the sake of the world

civilization. Immigrants from a markedly different racial stock or type of civilization, also, are more difficult successfully to assimilate into the national life. Both these reasons may well justify Western nations in placing, at least, a temporary limitation, for example, upon oriental immigration. And such a limitation need imply no denial of the achievements or high quality of the oriental racial stocks. But it is peculiarly easy to be selfishly short-sighted at this point and to magnify the dangers of a reasonably restricted immigration, and so to withhold opportunities that we could well give, not only without loss, but with real gain. America's experience with immigration, on the whole, does not justify a selfishly exclusive policy, where genuine assimilation may reasonably be expected. It cannot be denied that, at just this point, for the present at least, oriental immigration presents peculiar difficulties. The extent and seriousness of America's negro problem, too, might well excuse it from undertaking another difficult race problem at once.¹

For the rest, this increasing association of the races will call for such reverence for personality as will, first of all, help the immigrant to keep the

¹ Cf. Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power*, pp. 74 ff.

best of his ancestral inheritance as he comes into the new national life; as will, second, insure, in other race contacts, such self-respect and respect for others as will refuse mere domination over another race, even where easily possible; and as will bring, thus, the only final peace, — the peace of justice, for that can come only from recognizing every man according to his worth. That is, at every point in this far closer association of the races, there is demanded the conquest of race prejudice, through sympathetic understanding and reverent insight. That, and that alone, will help us to see great underlying likenesses, where now we see only divisive differences. This has been the underlying aim of the Universal Races Congress recently held in London.

10. The present has been characterized, also, by the *rapidly extending application of scientific discoveries for the betterment of human life*. For concrete even if homely illustration, undertakings like the attempt to prevent the spread of contagious diseases by the abolition of public spitting, of mosquitoes, of flies, and of rats, are as certain to be increasingly demanded as science is certain to progress. Whenever, as in the case of consumption, malaria, yellow fever, bubonic plague, typhoid

fever, the connection between the disease and its cause has been scientifically made out, the demand must follow for a combined attempt upon the part of the community to do away with the cause. This demand will be made, in spite of the fact that the attempt will require a far greater degree of coöperation, on the part of the members of the community, than has ever been attempted before. Few, probably, realize the immense change of sentiment that has taken place at this point within recent years. The truth seems to be that a degree of individual and community coöperation is now counted reasonable, and voluntarily taken on, that would have been scouted as ridiculous, even fifteen years ago. Such coöperation for the scientific improvement of human life will not be confined to the prevention of disease, but is certain to be applied increasingly to all discoverable cases of social maladjustment. It is of the very essence of that combination of the scientific and of the social spirit, which is the finest characteristic of our time, not fatalistically to permit maladjustment as a part of the nature of things, but to insist in all these cases on knowing the exact facts, and the precise conditions for their cure, and then to press for the fulfillment of these conditions on the

part of the entire community. Our time rationally believes that great gains are possible through a scientifically directed coöperation, in dealing with even some of the oldest of human ills.

The moral demand here is plainly for the qualities which are needed for such voluntary and continuously extended coöperation. This calls for steady training in enlightened public spirit, through school and church, through the press, through a wise official propaganda, and through careful scientific presentation of needs and remedies.

II. In the very first rank of the external phenomena of our time, obviously, must be placed *the rapid extension of education*, though it plainly connects itself as well with the inner world of thought. The movement may be accurately stated, by saying that education is rapidly extending to all in the more enlightened nations, and that such universal education is increasingly recognized as the necessary ideal in all nations. In all democratic forms of government it seems inevitable that universal education should be counted practically essential to the nation's life. America is, thus, abundantly right in putting the aim for universal education at the basis of its entire policy in the Philippines. But in any nation, it may not be

forgotten, widely extended education must mean that there cannot be finally ignorant, stolid content on the part of the masses of the people with unsatisfactory conditions, but in such circumstances unrest will necessarily result. Such extension of education will mean, also, that there will be, on the part of the entire population, at least some insight into the issues involved in governmental action, and, therefore, the danger of class struggles and demagogical agitation. Even intentional agitators, it should be noted, may be, at least, partly justified, because the appetite for better things on the part of the more depressed has always in some measure to be created. But the cure for unrest, whether stirred by agitation or not, provided conditions are essentially just, is not less education, but more and better education; for, "the wounds of knowledge can be healed only by knowledge." All self-control and self-government must ultimately root in knowledge of the laws of life and in obedience to them. Ignorance can, therefore, be no safe foundation for any nation.

Our entire survey of the external conditions of our time should make it clear as sunlight, that, if this mighty movement for universal education is

to insure the real progress of civilization, the education cannot be one-sidedly intellectual, but must be all-round, and scientifically adapted to develop a self-controlled, self-supporting, self-governing, high-souled people, prepared to enter intelligently and unselfishly into the world life. Every circumstance of our day is reiterating that the supreme interests are those of character; but these interests demand not only the righteous intent, but rational discernment of the laws of life.

12. Among these external phenomena of our time, *the movement for the advancement of women* also demands recognition; though it, too, has plain connections with the inner world of thought. This century has been called, not unjustly, the woman's century. To this last century the higher education of women belongs; and the later years especially have been marked by a much fairer recognition of the equality of women before the law. Nearly all the greater countries, for example, now recognize the equality of women in their marriage laws. There is also a plain trend toward the recognition of women's essential equality with men everywhere; though there is difference of opinion as to what that essential equality should mean in particulars, and there seems to be some

danger of making the mistake of overlooking the valuable individuality of the sexes.

It is one of the most puzzling phenomena of the history of the Christian nations, that the just human rights of women should have been so slowly recognized, in the face of the plain implications of the essential teachings of Christ. And no thoughtful observer of the Orient can fail to see the obvious great need of uplifting women in India,¹ in China, and even in Japan. A race cannot rise a half at a time; and no race can achieve what it ought while its wives and mothers are in any degree degraded. Whether in Occident or Orient, whatever is required to enable woman to come to her fullest and highest development must be unhesitatingly granted, not only for her sake, but for that of the whole race. It is obvious that the movement for the advancement of women challenges this generation to make sure that it fall no whit short of the full implications of the Christian spirit in its treatment of women at any point; and, for that very reason, that it do not forget the individuality of the sexes, and the special and indispensable contribution which each sex has to

¹ In 1901, only two and one half per cent of the female population of school-going age was receiving even primary education.

make to the higher civilization of the race. A true reverence for personality will guard both points.

It may well be asked, also, whether there is not a grave and curiously paradoxical danger in much of our American life, and at various stages of financial prosperity, moreover, of making many women into a new, idle, selfish aristocracy, that does not fairly share in the cares and struggles of the men. A genuine, rational, and ethical democracy cannot ultimately justify that untoward result of American chivalry. There are few uglier features in modern American life than some of the grosser manifestations of the new feminine aristocracy, — the daily record of the idle, selfish, gambling, self-indulgent woman. Is there any rational, ethical defense possible for the modern bridge craze? How long is it since it has become safe and wise for a people steadily and studiously to cultivate the gambling spirit in its own homes, and through the medium of its wives and mothers?

13. Side by side with the movements for the rapid extension of education, and for the advancement of women, should be placed the great *foreign missionary movement* of the last century.

Its ethical significance is indicated by Wundt, our most distinguished historian of morals. After

speaking of "humanity," in its highest sense, as having been "brought into the world by Christianity," he mentions as its first manifestation, the care of the sick, and then adds: "The second great expression of Christian humanity is the establishment of missions. . . . The example of unselfish devotion to an ideal task produces the most profound effect." The foreign missionary movement, in truth, roots in the simple necessity, on the part of the morally awakened, of unselfishly and reverently sharing their best with other peoples. The reverent attitude toward the inner life of other peoples, doubtless, has not sufficiently characterized the missionary movement; but, as far as it has failed here, it has been unfaithful to the highest Christian ideal. The present extent and recent growth of the movement indicate that it appeals to thoughtful men as never before. Here is a movement that involves the Roman Catholic, Greek, and Protestant communions, and all the leading nations of Western civilization; that has expressed itself through some hundreds of definitely organized agencies; and whose efforts are now put forth among every people on the globe. It is a movement that unselfishly and self-sacrificingly seeks the good of those to whom it goes, and it is

attempting a world conquest. The World Missionary Conference of 1910, with its catholic representation, its searching and comprehensive survey of conditions, and its far-reaching plans, belongs in the list of the greatest gatherings of the centuries, and had untold significance for the progress of the race. No attempt to study moral and religious development, as a world-problem, could fail to attach to the foreign missionary movement epochal importance. Its recent growth is illustrated in the widespread Laymen's Movement, and in its increasing endorsement by the ablest leaders. "Man grows with greatness of his purposes," and no greater ideal task has ever presented itself to the imagination of men than the present foreign missionary movement when rightly conceived.

And the challenge of the foreign missionary movement is, on the one hand, to shake off prejudice, — to have eyes to see the greatness of this ideal enterprise; and, on the other hand, to keep scrupulously the most delicate spirit of reverence for personality in dealing with the inner life of other peoples, and yet to throw ourselves wholeheartedly into this highest undertaking of our time. For their own life and growth in ideals,

Western nations need imperatively just such an unselfish girding of their powers as foreign missions require.

II

RESULTING CHANGES AMONG THE NATIONS

Justice cannot be done to the consideration of the changed external conditions of our time, without taking account further of the marvelously rapid and revolutionary changes that have taken place in many of the nations. Let one recall, for example, the way in which Japan has forged to a place among the chief nations and to leadership among oriental peoples; the marvelous accomplishment of a comparatively peaceful revolution in Turkey, accompanied at the same time with an almost unmatched self-restraint on the part of the revolutionary leaders; in line with these outstanding changes in the Far and Near East, many similar changes, that are all a part of a general national movement all over the world; the "rise of the native" in many dependencies; the manifest democratic trend everywhere; the widespread Socialistic and Nihilistic movements; the increasing commercial pressure on political and diplomatic action; the growing exercise of police power

and responsibility on the part of the stronger nations; the greater influence of international criticism; the progress of international arbitration and the peace movement, in spite of growing armaments; the pressure of the Far-Eastern Question; and rapidly rising moral standards in business, industrial, and political life in America; — let one recall, I say, what is involved in such a bare catalogue of national phenomena as these, and it is hardly possible for him to fail to recognize the fact that moral and religious education on a world-wide scale is now going on, and that the changes already made demand a still greater moral and religious enlightenment, and a still severer moral and religious discipline.

These national phenomena, thus summarily indicated, deserve a brief review that we may see exactly their significance in our modern world-life.

1. After all allowance for exaggeration, it must be admitted that the *rise of Japan* stands almost alone among these national phenomena, as a relatively swift and unique change in civilization, though forced from without and directly depending upon the leadership of the educated few who had been in touch with Western teachers. This rise of Japan, as seen especially in her triumph

over Russia, has profoundly affected the imagination of the dark-skinned races, the world over, even, it is said, to the very center of darkest Africa. Japan, also, has pointed the way that must be followed by all the larger oriental nations, and especially by China, if they do not wish simply to be absorbed or exploited, or both.

Japan's rapid progress rightly demands from other nations a just and understanding insight into her problems, without exaggerated blame or praise. There should be no jealousy, no bitterness, no cynical attacks, and, certainly, no fanning of the war spirit; for of Japan's honest desire for peace with America there can be no doubt. At the same time there should be no merely selfish commercialism in our attitude, and no intolerant exclusiveness.¹ That is, not only for Japan's

¹ Though, as has been already implied, it may fairly be said that there is justification for, at least, a temporary somewhat different treatment of oriental immigrants, in view of marked racial differences, and of their prevailingly communal type of civilization. In Japan's case, account has to be taken of an intensity of patriotism that seems to make it well-nigh impossible for the Japanese truly to enter into the life of the people to whom they come. Moreover, Japan cannot consistently object to exclusion of Japanese laborers, since she herself exercises a corresponding right as expressed in an Imperial Ordinance of 1899. (See Millard, *America and the Far Eastern Question*, pp. 53 ff., 572-574.) "Pro-

sake, but for the sake of all, there should be, on the part of other nations, a fair, just, broad, self-respecting and other-respecting, friendly, peace-making spirit; but there should not fail at the same time a steady demand for like justice for Korea and China, as previously for Japan. The Far-Eastern situation is made much more difficult by Japan's seeming unwillingness that China should have the chance which she herself has had.

vided that in the case of laborers they cannot reside or carry on their business outside the former Settlements or mixed residential districts unless under the special permission of the administrative authorities." And "laborers" are defined, as "men engaged in labor in agricultural, fishing, mining, civil engineering work, architectural, manufacturing, transporting, carting, stevedoring, and other miscellaneous work." The broad scope of this is notable. Under this ordinance Japan has excluded hundreds of Chinese. And with this ordinance should be connected the careful judgment of a well-known German, long resident in Japan, and happily married to a Japanese lady: "Everything seems to point to the fact that Japanese policy is directed toward closing the country to foreigners, so far at least as permanent residence is concerned, by creating a condition which will make it unprofitable for foreigners to live and carry on business" (*op. cit.*, p. 121). Now, in all this, I believe that Japan is exercising its clear right, and, under the present circumstances of its national life, is probably fully justified in such action. Japan means to make perfectly certain that it is not to be exploited by foreigners. But this being its own position, it cannot object to immigration limitations by other nations.

2. *Turkey's marvelous peaceful revolution* stands out in the nearer East much as Japan's rise stands out in the farther East; but in Turkey the revolution came from within and was not merely forced from without; though here, too, it plainly goes back to leaders educated into Western ideals. This revolution in Turkey affects the greatest plague spot of the nearer East. It naturally incites desire for similar revolution in other absolute autocracies, and suggests at the same time the true method for such revolution, and inspires hope of success.

So far as other nations are here concerned, Turkey's movement calls for warm sympathy and long patience, and yet a demand for justice for the different peoples involved and for all Turkish dependencies, in harmony with Turkey's own just aspirations for herself. It is particularly to be hoped that the European powers will not longer continue to checkmate each other in these righteous demands, through the desire for selfish commercial advantage in Turkey itself.

3. In line with these outstanding changes in Japan and Turkey, there have occurred many similar *national changes*, which all form part of a general trend toward national individualism all over the world. The spirit of Western civiliza-

tion seems to be at work in all these changes. These national movements include two of special importance: the granting of constitutional government, however imperfect, in Russia, — a break in the one great Western autocracy; and the rise of China in the Far East. In the line of Japan's change, China is attempting to take on Western education, in order to get rid of foreign domination and exploitation; and she is seeking to develop a truer and more unified and more constitutional national life of her own. Her great weakness, of course, is lack of national unity. In the near East, revolution in Persia has moved in the line of Turkey's change, but with much less inner preparedness.

4. Nor can there be left out of account, what Sir Harry Johnston has called "*the rise of the native*" throughout the world, seen in a great variety of movements in numerous dependencies of all degrees, as, for example: Ireland, India, the Philippines, Finland, Crete, Egypt, Madagascar, various other parts of Africa, Formosa, and Korea. The conditions in these dependencies are varied enough; but, back of whatever unrest there may be — hopeful or hopeless — lies the feeling that the people of a dependency cannot be contented not to have a certain life of their own, some true

autonomy, some measure of genuinely significant political life. They cannot be contented to be a simple dependency of another nation. Mere gains in efficiency of government are not enough. It is plain that this feeling is only a manifestation of the spirit that underlies the whole of Western civilization. As the ideals of Western civilization, therefore, spread over the world, it must be more and more demanded, that the genuine welfare of the people of a dependency should itself be the absolutely dominating consideration in the entire treatment of the dependency.

It cannot be claimed that that condition now exists. On the contrary, it is evident that the present imperialistic tendencies of the leading nations constantly tempt to wanton disregard of the just rights of dependencies and of the countries in which commercial advantage is sought. A ruthless policy of expansion seems to be the order of the day. In Coolidge's words, "suddenly, without warning, the nations entered upon a wild scramble for land wherever it was not strongly held or protected by competing interests. The conquests of Alexander the Great or of the caliphs did not equal in territorial magnitude the changes which the last twenty years have wit-

nessed.”¹ Such immense changes can hardly have taken place without invasion of the rights of weaker states, and of aboriginal peoples. It is quite too likely to be true, as Reinsch says, that “the men who, as civilization pushes forward its outposts, come in contact with the savages, usually have no ability or desire to understand them, cruel methods of conquest and subjection are pursued, and most of these races would be happier if they had never seen their civilizers.”² The present-day position, indeed, as Weale says, “is entirely illogical from the point of view of Asiatics, as well as all other enlightened colored peoples; for whilst the white man now proclaims the reign of justice and the equality of men, in alien lands he still rigidly adheres, in everything that concerns his own interests, to results achieved under very different laws. And it is important to note that where logic ceases, brute force and passion are apt magically to appear. Inevitably must it follow that the world of non-whites will make the position of the white races beyond their own boundaries more and more precarious.”³

¹ *The United States as a World Power*, p. 4.

² *World Politics*, p. 43.

³ *The Conflict of Color*, p. 100.

But, nevertheless, the present desire of ambitious nations to expand their territories, and the asserted need to unify national life, are both made to justify the most unwarranted aggressions. France's relentless aggressions upon Madagascar illustrate the former motive. Germany's treatment of Prussian Poland, and Russia's dealing with Finland are examples of the kind of national conduct that is excused by the latter motive. The policy of Russia in Finland, in the language of another, is "one of those inconceivable follies which makes her [Russia's] best friends despair;" and it seems almost intended to fulfill the prophecy of Monsieur de Witte: "Harsh, drastic expedients may easily loosen the threads that have begun to be tied; foster national hate; nurse mutual distrust and suspicion and lead to results the reverse of those aimed at." In spite of the obvious necessity for Japan to intervene in Korea, and in spite of all the enterprise that Japan has certainly there shown, and the services she has rendered, and with the most cordial desire to give Japan the benefit of the doubt, it seems hardly possible to question that the interests of the Koreans have by no means been, to the degree they ought, the prime consideration in Japan's treatment of

Korea.¹ Even so admirable a colonizing power as Great Britain, with her splendid record of achievement in colonization, is not without her temptations and dangers at this point, as the *English Review of Reviews* says: "The sin which doth so easily beset John Bull in his administration of subject races is a readiness to resort to force, and in his impatience of irritating and disorderly opposition, to trample under foot all the safeguards which love for liberty and justice has erected against the abuse of arbitrary power." It is difficult for outsiders to see, too, why Great Britain should refuse so doggedly to grant to Ireland that measure of self-government which has unhesitatingly been granted to Scotland and Wales — not to mention the full freedom given to Canada and Australia. And it may be counted inevitable that political unrest and agitation must continue in India, in spite of the magnificent services that Great Britain has there rendered, until through gradual training and extension of privilege, the Indians, themselves, have gained at least some power to determine the policies of the central

¹ Cf. Millard, *America and the Far Eastern Question*, pp. 128 ff.; Weale, *The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia*, pp. 504 ff.; Harrison, *Peace or War, East of Baikal*, pp. 367 ff.

government. King George may reasonably be expected to favor such a policy. Mr. Stead says of him: "He has been much impressed by the reconciliation of the French Canadians, which he rightly declared to be the chief glory of British policy in the Dominion. Everywhere he has seen the same liberal policy of self-government and trust in the people, followed by the same fruits of loyalty, peace, and prosperity."

It is quite true that a corrupt, inefficient, unsanitary state, incapable of self-government, has no right to continue to be a menace and obstacle to progress for all the states about it. But neither is such a condition to be taken as warrant for wanton aggression. The principle of reverence for the person must rule in all these relations to dependent states. Just as no person may be used as mere means by another, but must be recognized as an end in himself, so, too, no people may ever be considered as mere means for the benefit of another people. And there ought to be persistent effort to help the dependent peoples to increasing self-government. In Mr. Blakeslee's words, "the Western powers have been school-teachers to the East for over four hundred years, but the United States is the first and only nation

school-teacher to found a school in which a race-child may look definitely forward to graduation — to a time when its school days shall be over. This policy of developing the Filipinos by granting them a continually greater share in their own government, has, in the main, been honestly and rapidly carried out. The United States to-day permits the Filipinos to hold — and in the great majority of cases to hold by popular election — all the local town offices, two-thirds of the provincial offices, the vast majority of the judicial, and over sixty per cent of the civil service positions, and now that a national assembly has been organized, it gives them one-half of the full legislative power in the islands.”¹ America’s policy in the treatment of the Philippines and in the treatment of Cuba and Porto Rico must be more and more recognized as the true policy toward all dependent or potentially dependent states; and to that policy the United States must be absolutely loyal, if it is to face the enlightened judgment of the present era of the world’s civilization.

5. And it is impossible, also, to fail to see that, in practically all states, there is an *increasing democratic trend*. This is to be discerned, even in

¹ *China and the Far East*, p. xviii.

Germany, the most autocratic, next to Russia, of European powers. To this class of phenomena belong, also, the successful attempt to reform the House of Lords in England, — in order that the nation need not have virtually a single Chamber half the time; England's very free policy towards her colonies; and the marvelous Union of South Africa, most remarkable as to the relations between the Britons and the Boers, but with its own ominous problem of relations to the Blacks and to the Indians. Here belongs, also, the struggle for more truly constitutional government everywhere. "Twenty-one years ago, not a single state in Asia had any form of constitution: to-day, with the insignificant exception of Siam and Afghanistan, every country on the continent either has a constitution, or has decreed the establishment of one."¹ In the United States the increasing democratic trend has been shown most wholesomely, in the recent rapidly growing sense of the responsibility of the nation's representatives to the whole people, and not merely to local constituencies and to corporate interests. One particularly significant aspect of this democratic trend is the increasing sense of respon-

¹ Blakeslee, *China and the Far East*, p. xv.

sibility, on the part of national governments, for the economic and social welfare of the least favored classes of the nation. All these democratic movements look to closer relations of the government with the entire people, and to fuller consideration for the interests of all.

6. Even the widespread *Socialistic and Nihilistic movements* probably deserve to be named side by side with these democratic tendencies, because Socialism and Nihilism have risen out of the belief that, in the conditions protested against, anything like a true democracy has not been attained. The thoughtful observer cannot fail to be impressed by the *world* ideals of whole armies of Socialistic laborers. These armies are profoundly convinced, that labor has not had its fair share in the distribution of the wealth of the nations, and have, therefore, in the interests of the great mass of humanity, risen to the perception of ideals that seek a world-wide sway. And it is not unnatural that, under still harder conditions, there should have been developed in Russia, among the Nihilistic leaders, a persistent, widespread spirit of self-sacrifice, well-nigh religious in its intensity, under which delicate women have unhesitatingly risked everything of value in life for the furtherance of a

cause that they at least believed was the cause of justice and humanity.

The world cannot afford to ignore the conditions out of which these two great movements have grown. Socialism and Nihilism rightly demand from the rest of us at least a like world-wide vision, and a like spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice. They call, not less, for some sympathetic understanding of the ideals, for which these movements intend to stand, and so for some understanding of what, in the last analysis, they really mean. It is vain simply to decry their ideals and methods. It is our business rather to show how better to meet the really worthy ends, — so far as there are such — that these movements seek, and at the same time, to avoid the danger of rejection, by unthinking, materialistic masses of men, of the inner life of culture and of religion.

7. It is not possible to doubt, either, that among the national phenomena of the time, there must be recognized the fact of *increasing commercial pressure on political and diplomatic action*. This is the natural result of imperialistic policies, and of the intenser economic rivalry that has set in, with the world-wide spread of commerce. Its

effects are clearly to be seen in India, China, and Africa, — to mention only the most important cases. Investors in any of the less developed countries are more and more inclined to appeal to their own nation, to demand conditions that will make their investments secure and profitable; and the whole consular system tends to become chiefly a minister to financial interests. Where other interests are taken on, they are quite too often used only as a pretext for securing territorial expansion, or some commercial advantage. France has repeatedly thus used its asserted protectorate over Roman Catholic missions. Great combinations of capital, too, are clearly making their influence strongly felt not only in national, but also in international affairs.¹ The inevitableness of the commercial pressure is further to be recognized in the weighty fact, that ability to borrow money is now the final factor in any great war.

This increasing power of money in political and diplomatic action is both a help and a danger. It may, obviously, help to discourage foolish antagonisms that would be commercially unprofitable; and since commerce brings, on the whole, mutual

¹ Cf. Kidd, *Principles of Western Civilization*, pp. 351 ff., 433 ff.

good to the peoples concerned, this aspect of commercial pressure is in general likely to be in the interests of righteousness and of the welfare of all. On the other hand, great financial interests are practically certain to be class interests; and, where they attempt to affect political and legislative action, they dangerously threaten the interests of the people as a whole. And in international affairs, wherever there is common exploitation on the part of many powers of another people, as is now the case in China, it is plain that commercial interests might be used to prevent a righteous and vigorous protest on behalf of justice, on account of fear of pecuniary loss. A diplomacy that is commercially dominated is quite too likely to be timid in its stand for international justice, though in the long run such international justice is practically certain to be also commercially profitable.

8. So, too, the *growing sense of responsibility and the growing exercise of police power on the part of the stronger nations* hold both great encouragement and some danger. It means much for the world that there should be growing upon the greater nations some sense of moral responsibility for peace and good order and justice among all

peoples. The general trend of the action of England in Egypt, and of the United States in Cuba, Panama, and Liberia, the intervention of the Powers in the Congo State, and many similar phenomena belong, on the whole, to the encouraging events of our time. But it is obvious that, in this exercise of police power, there is constant danger, on the part of the stronger nation, of using minor disorders as mere pretext for aggression, and so of simply overriding the lesser state. Against this danger all the stronger nations need to be continually on their guard. The colonial and commercial expansion of the recent years have some disgraceful illustrations of such abuse of national police power.

9. The developing sense of responsibility on the part of the stronger nations is naturally allied also to the *increasing influence of international criticism*. Japan has wisely shown itself peculiarly sensitive to this influence, as has been repeatedly illustrated in its history, and as is shown, especially, in the establishment of its "Oriental Information Agency" in New York City. It is true that this sensitiveness to international criticism may go so far as to lead to the covering up of facts, rather than to the setting of matters right. Even with this dis-

count, however, the growing influence of international criticism is to be hailed as one of the most hopeful indications of our time, and as containing the assurance of some steady progress. Many illustrations might be given. The influence of international opinion, for example, was distinctly felt at the siege of Paris in 1870, and undoubtedly affected Prussia's action at that time. It was definitely in mind, in Japan's statement of her case, in entering upon the war with Russia. And it probably had a determining effect in the conclusions reached by the recent International Seal Fur Conference between the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan.

10. It is, indeed, this influence of international criticism which is, perhaps, to be regarded as a main factor in *the progress of international arbitration and of the peace movement*, in spite of growing armaments. Aside from arbitrations by the Hague Tribunal, established in 1899, twenty-six important cases, involving all the great nations, have been settled by arbitration since 1857, twelve of them since 1885. The increasing and expected use of the Hague Tribunal, in really important cases between leading nations, is a fact of the greatest significance and promise. The United States,

Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and Venezuela have all entrusted cases to the Tribunal. Refusal to use the Tribunal in any reasonable case would tend disadvantageously to isolate the nation so refusing. It seems impossible that the mere existence of this court, even in its present form, should not gradually and greatly diminish the sphere of war, and, in time, secure to the nations by mutual agreement relief from the present intolerable burden of enormous armaments. Kidd's conclusions seem warranted: "We live in the presence of colossal national armaments, and in a world, therefore, in which we are continually met with the taunt that force is still everywhere omnipotent. It may be perceived, however, that beneath all outward appearances a vast change has been taking place. In the ancient civilizations the tendency to conquest was an inherent principle in the life of the military state. It is no longer an inherent principle in the modern state. The right of conquest is indeed still acknowledged in the international law of civilized states, but it may be observed to be a right more and more impracticable among the more advanced peoples. Reflection, moreover, recalls the fact that the right of conquest is tending to

become impracticable and impossible, not, as is often supposed, because of the huge armaments of resistance with which it might be opposed, but because the sense of social responsibility has been so deepened in our civilization that it is almost impossible that one nation should attempt to conquer and subdue another after the manner of the ancient world. It would be regarded as so great an outrage that it would undoubtedly prove to be one of the maddest and one of the most unprofitable adventures in which a civilized state could engage. Militarism, it may be distinguished, is becoming mainly defensive amongst the more advanced nations. Like the civil power within the state, it is tending to represent, rather, the organized means of resistance to the methods of force should these methods be invoked by others temporarily or permanently under the influence of less evolved standards of conduct.”¹

The proposed universal arbitration treaties between the United States and Great Britain, and the United States and France, seem likely to be only the forerunners of many treaties of the kind, and their undertaking is an event of great moment in international relations, and in the progress of

¹ Kidd, art. "Sociology," *Enc. Brit.*

the race. The proposal has itself already effected a change in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and bids fair, ultimately, to bring far greater assurance into the relations of the United States and Japan. In any case, the considerations which show that Japan cannot desire war with the United States are decisive. Her present enormous burden of taxation, the difficulty of borrowing money for a war with America, the certainty that such a war would block her commercial and industrial progress, and, moreover, the like certainty that China and Russia would surely take advantage of the situation to break down her leadership in the Orient — all make it clear that Japan, as little as the United States, could desire war.¹ Nevertheless, a definite treaty of arbitration with Japan would be a decided gain for both nations, and for the assurance of the world's peace.

II. No survey of present national phenomena can fail to take account also of *the pressure of the Far-Eastern Question*. It is, indeed, the largest question in the world politics of to-day. To put the matter in the briefest compass — China's im-

¹ Cf. J. W. Jenks, "The Japanese in Manchuria," *The Outlook*, March 11, 1911; Hon. J. W. Foster, "The Japanese War Scare," in *International Conciliation*, October, 1910.

mense population and enormous potential wealth, the comparative openness of some of her richest land in Manchuria, and the ease with which Mongolia can be overrun, when coupled with her present military weakness and lack of national unity, constitute the constant lure for gain and for conquest. The other chief factors in the Far-Eastern Question are these: Japan's natural ambition for oriental leadership, her military prestige, her enormous army and navy program, and her scarcely concealed intention practically to annex south Manchuria;¹ Russia's continued aggressive pressure on the north, and the Russo-Japanese agreement in which Japan and Russia compose their own quarrel in an agreement to help each other in mutual aggressions on China; England's tacit consent to all this program of her ally, Japan; the general provocative attitude of the other nations concerned towards China; China's undoubted awakening, and rapid progress toward Western civilization; and the declared oriental policy of the United States. Under these circumstances, Manchuria becomes naturally the region

¹ See art. by Adachi Kinnosuki, *World's Work*, June, 1910; cf. Millard, *America and the Far Eastern Question*, pp. 176 ff.; Harrison, *Peace or War, East of Baikal*, pp. 248 ff.

of the greatest possible commercial development, the center of the keenest commercial interest and competition, and the special scene of the political aspects, also, of the Far-Eastern Question.

The diplomatic position of the United States in the Far East declared by John Hay, and illustrated in President Taft's avowed policy in the Philippines, involves the three principles of no selfish exploitation of dependencies, of the "open door" in China, and of respect for China's integrity. This position of America is just and right (except so far as the policy of the "open door" in China might conceivably infringe China's rights), and has been accepted in theory by all the Powers involved, and was reaffirmed in the Russo-Japanese War Treaty. Ultimately, it is the only position that can make for righteous peace. Japan cannot fairly object to China's following her example, in adopting Western education and organization, and so taking her deserved place among the chief nations, and China is naturally somewhat surprised at what she feels to be Japan's attitude of opposition. China's present reform movement is undoubtedly genuine and is making fair progress. Under the circumstances, the other Powers are

certainly bound to encourage and to help China in this remaking of her national life. In the end, that must prove the most profitable policy, even commercially, for all the powers concerned, that do not seek the absolute dismemberment of the Chinese Empire. For, as Secretary Taft said, at Shanghai, "a trade which depends for its profit on the backwardness of a people in developing their own resources, and upon their inability to value at the proper relative prices that which they have to sell, and that which they have to buy, is not one which can be counted upon as stable or permanent. . . . For the reasons I have given, it does not seem to me that the cry of 'China for the Chinese' should frighten any one. All that is meant by that is that China should devote her energies to the development of her immense resources, to the elevation of her industrious people, to the enlargement of her trade, and to the administrative reform of the Empire, as a great national government. Changes of this kind would only increase our trade with her. Our greatest export trade is with the countries most advanced in business methods and in the development of their particular resources. In the Philippines we have learned that the policy which is best for the

Filipinos is best in the long run for the countries who would do business with the Islands.”¹

But one is reluctantly led to fear that Japan's whole diplomatic and governmental policy is not guided by real sympathy with any of the three aims of America's diplomatic position in the Far East. She seems unwilling, in either Korea or Formosa, to take the full attitude of freedom from selfish exploitation which the United States has avowedly taken in the Philippines; not to be genuinely favorable to the “open door” policy in Manchuria; and not to intend truly to respect China's integrity, or her administration in Manchuria. In all this, as much as one may regret it, it is not difficult to see the matter from Japan's point of view, with her asserted need of outlet for her population, with her very natural desire for leadership in the Orient, and with the vision she has of an awakening China. This, it may be suspected, is the real point of contention between the United States and Japan, and nothing else, and just here lies, also, the nub of the Far-Eastern Question in all its aspects.² There will be no Far-Eastern Question, in its present form, that need involve

¹ Quoted by Millard, *America and the Far Eastern Question*, p. 376.

² Cf. Millard, *op. cit.*, pp. 57 ff.

any serious unpleasantness, if the open door policy is honestly maintained, and if simple justice is done to China. Professor Jenks's conclusion, in his singularly just discussion of *The Japanese in Manchuria*,¹ seems wholly warranted. "The permanent stability not only of trade interests but also of political interests and the maintenance of peace seem, on the whole, more likely with Manchuria ultimately in the political control of China than in that of Japan, and doubtless the Japanese statesmen (for, after all, the events of the last few years show that there are no more far-sighted statesmen than the Japanese) recognize this fact. Indeed, in an interview mentioned in the *Japan Times* of June 21, 1910, Viscount Hayashi said that the chief object of the Franco-Japanese Treaty was 'to respect the sovereignty of China,' which he characterized as 'the very keynote of oriental peace,' an expression which seems to me as wise as it is happily put." It is to be hoped that other Japanese statesmen share this view; for, in the long run, it is hardly to be doubted that Japan's own good, as well as the interests of all concerned, will be best served if Japan scrupulously carries out her own earlier and repeated

¹ *The Outlook*, March 11, 1911.

promises concerning Manchuria. The other policy, to which she is evidently tempted, would tend in the end dangerously to isolate her, and to provoke general ill-will.

In the meantime, China is undoubtedly moving forward in educational, military, judicial, and governmental development, and has back of her enormous resources of wealth, of numbers, and of native ability. Her greatest weakness is her lack of national unity and of a strong central administration.¹ Both grow out of her besetting fault of suspicion and distrust of all strong leadership. There are many possible points of criticism in her reforming attempts, but considering the shortness of the time in which they have been operative, and the high native ability of the Chinese, I cannot believe that a despondent view is justified. There is reason to believe that China will not always remain unable to prevent unjust aggression and exploitation, though it will be by no Boxer revolution. She is bound, I think, to take her place peacefully among the leading nations of the modern world, and her entrance upon that estate will be an even greater event than Japan's

¹ See the rather pessimistic views of *The Future of China*, by C. D. Jameson and George Kennan, *The Outlook*, July 15, 1911.

similar achievement, and will affect more manifestly the whole life of the world.

12. Finally, among these significant national changes should be mentioned the *rapidly rising moral standards in the United States* in business, industrial, and political life. These deserve particular mention, for the movement of Western civilization is nowhere more rapid or intense than in the United States. There can be no doubt that in the business world methods are now repudiated that were common practice twenty-five years ago and were regarded as quite legitimate. In the whole range of industrial life a new moral sensitiveness to the demand for essential justice is manifest, even where it is plain that the evils are not yet cured. In political life, while very much remains to be achieved, in harmony with a world-wide movement, the acquisition of wealth through political position has come to be regarded as disgraceful, and — what is still more hopeful — there has come in that growing sense of responsibility to the whole people, that has been already mentioned. The significant element in the revolt against "Cannonism" lies just here. It is the repudiation of the old theory that legislation is to be the outcome of a compromise of various cor-

porate or local interests, instead of being determined by a clear view of the interests of the people as a whole. There is a manifest increasing determination that financial or corporate interests, however great, are not to dominate the national life.

If American life is to reap the full fruit of these rising moral standards, there must be, on the part of the mass of the people, some real insight into their significance, and intelligent sympathy and coöperation; for none of these can be regarded, as yet, as fully assured. Many men are yielding perforce to the new standards, it is to be feared, who would rejoice in their overthrow.

13. As a whole, all these national movements indicate some growing, even if half unconscious, sense that the old opposition between an atomic, nihilistic individualism and a swamping socialism is out of date and should be transcended. Neither is adequate. Both newly conceived and in conjunction are necessary. This growing consciousness is likely greatly to affect party alignments in the years just ahead. These movements rather bear witness, then, to the fact that there must be, ultimately, such reverence for personality as shall insure both coöperation or state action and individual initiative at every stage, and both under

ethical guidance. Coöperative action through the state and in other ways will be employed, not to set aside individual initiative, but more perfectly to secure it, — sedulously to preserve for the life of community and nation the full contribution of each personality. This should make certain that, on the one hand, there shall be no tyranny of force, of wealth, of religion, of majority, or even of the whole, over the sacred rights of the individual; and that, on the other hand, the individual shall constantly recognize his social obligation. Political and social life would be no longer a matter of balance or barter between interests all belonging to the present, or all material. The determining consideration would be, not the policy of selfish or material profit, but absolute loyalty to the principle of reverence for personality, as a rightly dominant moral and religious conviction, that alone can insure the developing individual in the developing society.

CHAPTER III

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE OF PRESENT EXTERNAL CONDITIONS II: THE COMPREHENSIVE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW EXTERNAL CONDITIONS

THESE, then, may be regarded as the outstanding external conditions of our time: the progressive conquest over the forces of nature; the resulting enormous economic development; the world-wide economic solidarity; the consequent stupendous increase of wealth; the extending policy of national conservation of natural resources; the inevitable growth of great cities; the far finer division of labor; the indefinitely closer connections of men the world over, through improved methods of transportation, commerce, communication, and the press; the resulting increasing association of the races; the rapidly advancing application of scientific discoveries for the betterment of human life; the trend toward universal education; the movement for the advancement of women; the modern foreign missionary move-

ment; and the swift and revolutionary changes among many nations. The most notable of these national changes are: the rise of Japan; the peaceful revolution in Turkey; the granting of constitutional government in Russia; the adoption of Western education in China; the similar national movements in Persia and in many other states; the "rise of the native" in dependencies; the increasing democratic trend throughout the world; the widespread Socialistic and Nihilistic movements; the commercial pressure on political and diplomatic action; the growing exercise of police power and responsibility on the part of the stronger nations; the greater influence of international criticism; the progress of international arbitration and the peace movement; the pressure of the Far-Eastern Question; the rising moral standards in American business, industrial, and political life; and the growing sense of the necessity of rising above both mere atomic individualism and swamping socialism. All these new external conditions of our day, we have seen, demand at every point, not only intellectual insight, but higher moral development and larger religious ideals, if they are not to prove disintegrating and degrading rather than elevating.

These conditions, thus, even singly, constitute a challenge to the educational and religious forces the world over, to every individual and to every nation; for at bottom all these problems are moral and religious. But before we leave them there will be decided gain in considering them in their entirety, to get a more comprehensive sense of the challenge they bring to our generation.

Looking, then, at the external conditions as a whole, let us ask what their meaning is? what the dangers and problems involved? what the qualities demanded? and what the elements of encouragement they contain?

I

THEIR MEANING

1. In the first place, the conquest of nature's forces, the enormous economic development, the world-wide economic solidarity, the stupendous increase of wealth, the conservation of natural resources, and the growth of great cities — all manifestly mean that to this generation are committed *staggering resources* of power and of wealth. They show the human race coming into a far greater fullness of its inheritance on the material side

than ever before; though the resources cannot be regarded, as yet, as equitably distributed.

2. The same conditions, coupled with the trend toward universal education, mean, in the second place, generally *increased comfort and ease of life*; though here too, while there has been gain for practically all the people, there has not been due distribution of the comfort and ease that should follow from increased power and wealth. This very comfort and ease, too, have obvious moral dangers.

3. There is involved, again, in these same material gains and in the increasing division of labor the *possibility, at least, of greater leisure* for the higher ends of life. For the gains through machinery, the reduction of working hours, the movement for a general six days' working week, and increased production, should all make drudgery less necessary. The possible high significance of such greater leisure for the growth and happiness of the individual, and for the advancement of society, is never to be overlooked. But it is not to be forgotten that the sense of leisure, as well as leisure itself, must be, in no small part, a conquest by each individual, especially through simplicity of life and the refusal to be dominated

by things and conventions. Still more must the wise use of leisure be our individual achievement. Even a socialist writer can say: "I believe that, for scientific evolution, we must 'go slow.' Humanity has not yet learnt how to use its leisure reasonably; it wants longer discipline under the slavery of class."¹

4. The material gains, once more, when taken with the closer connections of men, through improved methods of transportation, commerce, communication, and the press, and the increasing association of the races, show, too, that men are placed in far larger, more numerous, and *more complex relations* than ever before, — the whole world virtually contributing to every man. This possible sudden unifying of the feeling of an entire people, for example, through the press, it may be noted, may carry with it, at times, something very like the mob spirit, that has its own plain dangers.

5. These larger, more numerous, and more complex relations imply, in turn, that in increasing degree *forced interdependence and coöperation* on an unparalleled scale are necessary, if society is to go on at all. This will require ultimately some

¹ Constable in *The Socialist Review*.

deeper spiritual unity, and bears witness here, too, to the peculiar religious need of our time.¹

6. At the same time, these new external conditions present the advance of *universal education*, with all that that involves; and indicate that moral and religious development on a prodigious scale is already going on, as manifested in some of the *greatest ideal enterprises* that the world has ever seen — like the comprehensive aim of the scientific betterment of human life, the movement for the advancement of women, the modern foreign missionary movement, the general democratic trend in national development, and the advance toward considerate relations among the nations and universal peace — all this side by side with dangerous antagonistic tendencies.

This, then, in a word, is the meaning of the new external world : staggering resources, increased comfort and ease of life, the possibility of greater leisure, far larger and more complex relations, forced interdependence on an unparalleled scale, the advance of universal education, and the evidence of a prodigious moral and religious development as already going on, though retarded at many points.

¹ Cf. Eucken, *The Meaning and Value of Life*, pp. 68, 129.

II

THE DANGERS AND PROBLEMS INVOLVED

It is impossible thoughtfully to review the external conditions of our generation, without being impressed, as we have already seen, not only with the changed meaning of our age, but also with the serious dangers and problems which it involves. It is particularly worth while to try to bring these special problems into a comprehensive survey, if we are to face them intelligently and successfully. First of all, in the light of the enormous material development of our generation, the problem of the better distribution of wealth is steadily more and more pressing. The too frequent separation of work and happiness, too, confronts us. As a whole and throughout these external conditions, there is to be descried, also, the peril of the lower attainment, — the danger of domination by the lesser goods. And, as characteristic of our time, there must be recognized, not only the prevalent “passion for material comfort,” as John Rae calls it, but also the insane rush of life; the sense of the complexity of life and of its conflicting ideals; the consequent lack of the sense of law in the moral and spiritual world; and the

powerful influence of race prejudices and antagonisms. Each of these problems deserves a somewhat fuller statement.

1. Many characteristic phenomena reveal, in the first place, the pressure of *the problem of the better distribution of wealth*. The incredible increase of wealth that has come in our time, and the extent to which financial control of vast national interests has been concentrated in the hands of small groups of men, especially in America, have fairly compelled the nation to recognize the present imperative nature of this problem. Existing conditions simply cannot continue. The pressure of this problem is reflected in the whole present-day work of charity; in the relations of labor and capital; in the socialistic movement; in such schemes for taxation as were embodied in the recent English Budget, with its certain world-wide influence; in the growing demand for national control of corporations; and as one of the main factors in the movement for national control of natural resources.

The problem is much too difficult to be solved by blind antagonisms. It demands unbiased scientific study, and an insight that can recognize the widely different new conditions, and that can

see that at this point our ethical and religious principles have been all too little brought to bear. An ultimate financial oligarchy the nations cannot bear — a republic least of all. But the economic trend toward great combinations of capital has been practically inevitable, and is not the result of mere selfish scheming. The problem in its present proportions is comparatively new for rich and poor alike, and will not be solved by mutual recriminations. Its solution is likely to show, as so often at critical points in the history of civilization, the voluntary extension of privileges on the part of the privileged to those without them. But the problem is not to be settled, either by the mere demand of overwhelming numbers, on the one hand — power in the hands of the many, or by the power of money combination, on the other hand — wealth in the hands of the few; though it is plain that this very situation contains peculiar danger, especially for a republic. This problem, therefore, is rightly securing the earnest study and efforts of some of the ablest of modern leaders. The solution of the problem requires, too, not pity, primarily; not patronizing, still less; but first of all, self-respecting and other-respecting justice, in the light of a thorough

study of all the facts in their farthest and deepest bearings. After that, it will be time enough to talk about pity and benevolence; for benevolence angers where justice is refused. This critical problem plainly needs not only clear intellectual analysis, but moral insight and determination.

2. The problem of the *separation of work and happiness*, also, is peculiarly forced upon this generation. Its pressure is to be seen in the amusement-madness of the rich and idle, that cannot help provoking comparisons that threaten the peace of society; in the fact that happiness is too largely absent from the work of the common laborer and mechanic; and that the rich, too, especially of the second generation, seldom have any work worth doing; and in the further fact that the poor and rich alike know too little how to use their leisure wisely. That wise use of leisure cannot come to either poor or rich without the possession of better and larger ideals and interests.

3. The *peril of the lower attainment*, the danger of domination by the lesser goods, is particularly great for our time, just because the tasks and resources involved in our modern material development are so stupendous. "Our own age," as Eucken says, "is anything but feeble and idle, it

throbs with a glowing vitality which inspires it to undertake the most strenuous work — work rich in great achievements. It is deeply passionate, unwearyingly progressive, and essentially revolutionary in spirit. And if all the individual successes which have been won along specialized lines do not issue in any general result affecting the whole condition of humanity, if our profoundly complicated existence prove to have nothing at the heart of it, the incongruity of the situation is more than can be borne with composure.”¹ And yet this is just the outcome to which we are exposed. Men have girded themselves in so many directions for world-tasks, and their work has taken on, therefore, so titanic a quality, that they easily forget that success in these merely material schemes is, after all, only building “greater barns,” not necessarily greater lives. The men of our generation, therefore, are especially tempted to stop *in* their work, and to allow the purely relative goods to slip into the place of the absolute good, to their own ultimate undoing. Only a deeper spirituality, once more, can meet the modern need.

4. It is natural, too, that this period of prodigious material development should be accom-

¹ *The Meaning and Value of Life*, p. 66.

panied with the prevalent *passion for material comfort*, involved in the domination of the lesser goods. It is not strange that men should have become dizzy-headed, overwhelmed for the time, with the modern onrush of the material; and should feel that, whatever else is lost, an abundant supply of the comforts that money can buy must be had. Professor James noted, as a single indication of this spirit, "the abject fear of poverty on the part of the educated." And one is reminded of Matthew Arnold's somewhat cynical division of the English people into frivolous upper classes, materialized middle classes, and brutalized lower classes. Enormous increase of material possessions was sure to bring this danger.

5. Closely connected with this passion for material comfort, as well as with the quickened pulse and complexity of modern life, is *the insane rush of our times*. This manifests itself in the prevalent lack of the sense of leisure, even for the enjoyment and appreciation of the material goods themselves — to say nothing of ideal values — and in the even more ominous lack of thought, for the mastery of the problems of our time, and for the mastery of our individual lives. For without leisure and without thought, emptiness of life must result.

6. It is plain, too, that these new external conditions, upon which we have been dwelling, have necessarily brought to men a new *sense of the complexity of life*. Economic development, division of labor, the press, and all that these involve, have complicated existence for every son of man to-day. There is, consequently, more and more borne in upon the consciousness of the thoughtful, at least, the necessity of some way to greater simplicity.¹

7. This sense of the complexity of life is revealed in the accompanying *sense of the conflicting ideals of our time*, and in the feeling, therefore, that none are authoritative. It has been often pointed out that in those places, like port-cities, where various civilizations mingle and various conflicting ideals are manifested, the sense of the authority of the moral greatly suffers. Just because of the unity of the world of our day and of the universal diffusion of all ideals, the whole world now is much in this situation of the port-city; and the present is therefore, for practically all men, a time of dangerous transition. Our generation needs, as no generation has ever needed, the sense of absolutely ruling ideals. And that is a deep religious need.

¹ Cf. Eucken, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

8. Out of the sense of conflicting ideals and the feeling that, therefore, none were authoritative, has naturally grown the prevalent *lack of the sense of law in the moral and spiritual world*. The spirit of the times seems too often to be merely easy-going; to be characterized by moral indifference and false tolerance and the feeling that nothing greatly matters; just as men say in the Orient, "Everything goes in the East." And, paradoxically enough, this lack of the sense of law in the moral and spiritual world occurs in an age that prides itself upon being a scientific age; though the great central contention of science is insistence on the universality of law.

9. Finally, in the dangers and problems involved in the new external conditions of our time, must be recognized the pressing *problem of race prejudices and antagonisms*. Just because the races have never been so closely or so threateningly associated as to-day, is it incumbent upon the men of the present to face and to solve these racial prejudices and hostilities. This problem could be partially evaded by an earlier generation; we cannot escape it.

The significant fact to be noted in this survey is the insistent and unavoidable demand made by

these several problems of our time upon the moral and religious forces. Can we see exactly what this demand involves?

III

THE QUALITIES DEMANDED

Let us put the situation, as we have now reviewed it, in the compactest summary. We have noted that the external conditions of our modern world *mean* at least: staggering resources of wealth and power, increased comfort and ease of life, the possibility of greater leisure, far larger and more complex relations, and forced interdependence on an unparalleled scale. The *problems* resulting were found to be: the distribution of wealth, the too general separation of work and happiness, the peril of domination by the lesser goods, the passion for material comfort, the rush of life, the sense of the complexity of life and of its conflicting ideals, the consequent lack of the sense of law in the moral and spiritual world, and race antagonisms. For what *qualities* do these conditions and problems call? For the thoughtful lover of his race cannot help wishing to make clear and definite the precise goals that the moral and religious forces

must set before themselves, if they are adequately to fit this generation for its difficult task. Here are certain definite conditions. They plainly involve certain special problems and dangers. What precise qualities does this generation need to meet them? This is our immediate question.

1. First of all, it must be plain that the possession of such staggering resources of wealth and power over nature as characterize this generation demands, in superlative degree, *self-control*, *severely disciplined powers*. Self-control should be an outstanding characteristic of the present generation. Is it so? Is our education definitely aiming at such preëminent self-mastery? But without such self-mastery there cannot be either power rightly to employ these stupendous resources, or capacity wisely to use the possible leisure that modern advances involve. Let one make the situation concrete to himself, in the case, for example, of the second generation of the very rich. Everything that money can buy is within their reach. They have no significant work that they must do. The temptations in many directions are frightful for the undisciplined will. Now, is this inherited wealth to be anything but a curse to them and a menace to the community? If so, they need

clearly to perceive that they are handling prodigious power, and that such power undirected or misdirected is immensely destructive, both to the owner and to all his fellows. The very first condition of its wise use is self-control. The owners of such wealth need such rigorous self-discipline as might fit for a king's task; for some of them are wielding power such as few kings have ever had. And because self-mastery cannot be merely negative, the possession of these astounding resources requires, further, as we have earlier seen, the vision of ideals and enterprises high enough and great enough to dominate the lower and selfish interests. Nothing less can truly deliver from selfishness, self-indulgence, and self-destruction. This makes imperative severe moral and religious training, and an introduction to the highest religious ideals and to the surpassing enterprises of the Kingdom of God. Only so can there be positive conquest of the immense material resources of our time, — the harnessing of these powers and resources for the achievement of still greater goals.

2. It is equally true, in the second place, that the vastly increased complexity of the relations of our modern life demands thoughtful discrimination among its many values and a far *greater sim-*

plicity of life, side by side with the recognition of its complexity. Ideals and values and theories and pleasures and means of all kinds have come flooding in from every people, until life is in danger of being swamped by its own complexity. Our time tends to an indiscriminating acceptance of everything, and to a restless willingness to try all proposals, however inconsistent. It refuses to think, to make distinctions, to critically select, to rigorously concentrate on the best. It is tempted to believe that it can share in all possible interests, however distracting and inconsistent, and still keep hope high and life significant. It fails to recognize that there is a paradoxical demand made upon the modern man — the demand, on the one hand, to recognize the many-sidedness and complexity of the interests of life; and the demand, on the other hand, to see that some of these interests are infinitely more valuable than others, and are, therefore, unhesitatingly to be made clearly paramount. That is, a great multitude of new relations and of lesser values of all kinds have come within our ken; but it remains true that we cannot enter equally into all, and the very multiplicity and complexity of our relations force upon us, therefore, a conviction of the necessity of the

choice of that particular self we finally aim to be, and, above all, the unhesitating sacrifice of relative goods to the absolute good. Upon no generation has ever come so insistently, the demand for the rigorous exercise of the principle, "If thy right hand cause thee to stumble, cut it off and cast it from thee." This requires both intellectual and moral insight, and intelligent training of the moral and religious life.

3. Moreover, in the third place, the forced interdependence and the increasingly large and complex coöperation involved in these new external conditions demand, in preëminent degree, *the social virtues*, — a social conscience, both sensitive and enlightened, both "noble and alive," both with ideals of the highest order and with knowledge and skill to apply them to actual present needs, — a conscience that shall everywhere work toward "a definition of man," to use Nash's language, "that should take in the downmost man." Only such a conscience can cope with the complicated problems of ill-distributed wealth, of joyless labor, of the love of luxury, and of conflicting ideals. We cannot live any longer isolated lives, whether as individuals, as classes, or as nations. Association of some sort is forced upon

us. Some sharing in one another's lives we must have. What sort of spirit is to inform that association or that sharing? Every consideration calls to-day, as never before, for an earnest cultivation of the social virtues.

4. And, once more, these new external conditions especially mean that the coming years must *grapple with race prejudice*, as no generation has ever grappled before. We have seen how this problem is thrust upon us from every angle in the present world situation. Scarcely any nation is without its special racial perplexities. In the language of the editor of *The World's Work*, "the great field for humanitarianism in the future — for that matter, the one great direction of true civilization — is not the field of mere religious propaganda, but the adjustment of race differences. The task is to find honorable and peaceful ways of lessening the dislike that most races of men have for other races — to find ways of ~~of~~ living and working together in a world over which no one race can rule in our stage of civilization, now long past the tribal organization. And this must be done without causing national decay." But such adjustment of race differences requires, in rare degree, a sympathetic, open-minded spirit, one

that needs, in turn, the support of the religious conviction of the inestimable value of every human soul.

5. Finally, as the great crises of the history of the race have always demanded unselfish leadership, so, peculiarly, must this culminating period require intelligent, far-sighted, patient, and reverent *unselfish leadership*. No great steps have ever been taken by the race without much sacrifice on the part of individuals; and the overwhelming problems of our own time are certainly not otherwise to be solved. But such unselfish leadership, if it is to prove effective, must be backed by a great moral reinvigoration of the life of the people in each nation.

These, then, are the inevitable demands of the new external conditions: exceptional self-control and commanding ideals; thoughtful discrimination among the many values of our civilization, — and a consequent true simplicity of life; a social conscience, both sensitive and enlightened, including particularly the conquest of race prejudice, and culminating in the reinvigoration of the whole moral life of the people, under unselfish leadership. This is the task set our civilization — the task confronting our educational and religious forces.

Can any man doubt its demand for vigorous moral and religious training? Are we at all awake to the gravity and extent of our educational task? In any case, definitely to know our task is the first step toward its intelligent accomplishment.

IV

THE ELEMENTS OF ENCOURAGEMENT

In facing the demands thus made by the new external conditions of the world, we may well remind ourselves, at the same time, of the elements of encouragement, involved in these same conditions.

1. In the first place, the mere sight of enormous wealth, wisely directed, brings *recognition of the possibility of great achievements* for the common good, not only through the wealth of a few individuals, but still more through the far greater wealth of the whole community. It will be almost second nature for the man of the coming generation, probably, though he may not count himself Socialist at all, to accept essentially Mr. Wells's definition of his own socialism, as something which "holds persistently to the idea of men increasingly working in agreement, doing things that are sane

to do, on a basis of mutual helpfulness, temperance, and toleration." And already we have had opportunity to see what great wealth, wisely directed, can do in the way of endowed inquiries, and as applied to national and world problems. Let one think, for example, of the work already accomplished and still accomplishing by the Peabody Education Fund, the John F. Slater Fund, the Southern Education Board, the General Education Board; and let one think of the possibilities of such great endowed inquiries as the Carnegie Institution of Washington, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, and the Russell Sage Foundation. Besides direct assistance to education, these agencies, in the first place, are making possible extensive and advanced research that must ultimately mean much for the physical and intellectual progress of the race. They are, also, throwing a searching light upon institutions and social conditions that must finally bring great gains in efficiency in our educational and civic institutions, and help to the correction of some of those very economic abuses of the working classes by which great fortunes have profited. And, apparently, we are only at the beginning of

such possible achievements. It can hardly fail to be true that, in greatly increased degree, the imagination of men of immense fortunes, if these are to continue, as well as of cities, states, and nations, should be fired by the possibility of affecting for good the life of a vast population, or of an entire nation, and of even belting the world with institutions that shall affect the educational, social, and religious welfare of many nations.

It is true that the very hugeness of the fortunes — quite in excess of service rendered — which make possible these extraordinary endowments, in the face of desperate need in the case of many other individuals, itself reflects the “crudity and even barbarism” of present economic conditions. It is true that such colossal endowments carry immense power, and the possibility of grave abuse of that power — an abuse that might conceivably justify the state in sweeping them aside entirely. It is true that the attitude of a self-respecting people toward gigantic private charities, even when no question is raised as to the justice of the fortunes, can hardly help being different from that toward its own similar achievements through the state. It is true that great gifts even to the public, bestowed outright by private benevolence

without thought or discussion or effort on the part of the people, cannot bring with them that inner growth and preparedness for their use and appreciation that are necessary if such gifts are to render their fullest service. It is true that, in large measure, each generation needs probably to face its own problems for itself, in its own way and with its own resources. It is true, probably, that the known deteriorating effect of charity upon the individual can hardly be wholly avoided in the long run, in the case even of the public.¹ It is true, doubtless, that this all points to the need of such increasing public enlightenment and broadening of purpose as shall insure, in the first place, that a few individuals are not enormously enriched at the expense of the nation as a whole; and as shall, in enlarging degree, lay upon the nation itself and upon coöperating groups of many individuals, the fulfillment of all the greater plans for human betterment.

Nevertheless, there is nothing better in human life than thoughtful coöperative effort for the welfare of men. And these great charitable, educational, and research foundations, at least, point the way to still greater possible achievements for

¹ Cf. Kidd, *Principles of Western Civilization*, pp. 434, 435.

men, and stir the imagination anew to the conception of goals worthy of the brotherhood of men.

2. In the second place, the very *bigness of the tasks* laid upon men, under the new external conditions of the modern world, itself brings great compensations. First of all, it holds for men and for nations, as for boys, that large and significant work tends to drive out many of the lower aims and habits.

“Gettin’ clear o’ dirtiness, gettin’ done with mess,
Gettin’ shut o’ doin’ things rather-more-or-less.”

These larger tasks have tended to require a greater efficiency in the entire national life, and to replace stagnant content and petty aspirations with worthier goals. The big task, too, develops capacity. Men grow in the accomplishment of these immense tasks, and win in the process a power of which they had not thought themselves capable. A larger number of men, too, are steadily brought out by these huge modern enterprises. For it is true of each of them, as of Kipling’s color sergeant:—

“’e works ’em, works ’em, works ’em till ’e feels
’em take the bit.”

One feels that these huge material accomplishments may prove a training school for the far

greater spiritual achievements to which the race is called. Moreover, the magnitude of the tasks, economic, industrial, political, international, which are set our time, tends to *stir enthusiasm for still greater possible goals*. Think, for example, of President Roosevelt's plan for conserving the resources of the entire earth! One may be pardoned for doubting whether there was a man of the last generation with imagination enough even to set the problem. And men are cherishing to-day economic, social, and missionary ambitions, that quite match even so vast a material goal as the conservation of the natural resources of the earth.

Once more, even the poorest attempt to work toward great goals like these has something of the inevitable value of the laboratory method of thinking. Men *are* coöperating in these enterprises, on a prodigious scale. They can and will work together. Many of the tasks accomplished, too, are seen to be of decided value to the race. And men have found a satisfaction in this working together toward significant goals, that inevitably predisposes them toward even more significant coöperative undertakings. That is, in the very process of accomplishing these modern tasks, men are making proof of the possibility, the value, and

the joy of great coöperative enterprises. This holds much of promise for the future of the race.

3. The third encouragement in present external conditions is to be found in the growing *scientific study of human conditions*, and in the increasing application of science for the betterment of human life. Such applications of science must keep pace with the advancing power over nature's forces, and with every gain in insight into the conditions for the cure of social maladjustments of any kind. This whole movement has naturally made possible a new "physical conscience" for the individual, a new enthusiasm for sanitary achievement and for preventive medicine, and a rational hope for similar achievement in the intellectual, social, and moral development of the race. The very standpoint of modern science makes it impossible for our generation to doubt that immense improvement is still open to the race through the increasing discernment of the laws of life, and through steady fulfillment of the involved conditions. The optimism of the day, certainly, need not be blind.

4. Moreover, these external conditions, as has been already seen, *force upon men a certain degree of coöperation* as by a kind of mechanical pressure.

It is not only in the colossal enterprises of our time that this is shown. The far finer division of labor and the closer connections of men at every point necessitate interdependence and coöperation for all, even when men resent them. They must associate; they must work together. Now, under this forced coöperation, men are more and more learning to adjust themselves. They must so adjust themselves, and they find that they can. Increasing experience of this forced interdependence, too, is helping men to see the value of the coöperation involved, and, rather to their own surprise, they find themselves gladly willing to take this coöperation on and even to enlarge it voluntarily. The unavoidable conditions of the time, at this point, are themselves tending to develop the coöperative qualities required.

5. Another encouragement to be found in the external conditions of the present is that *possibility of greater leisure* for the higher ends of life that has been already mentioned. It is true, as we have seen, that the wise use of leisure can hardly be said to have been widely achieved in modern civilization. But even the possibility of leisure has large significance for the growth and happiness of the individual, and for the advance-

ment of the entire life of the race. It is hopeless to expect to make either great men or a great nation without opportunity for thought, for growth, for appreciation of life's values, for cultivation of imagination and aspiration, and for the achievement of some genuine spiritual unity in life. The very complexity of our civilization makes the need only more urgent at every one of these points. We need leisure, as no preceding generation ever needed it; and modern conditions evidently have the power to make that larger leisure generally possible. But the gift of leisure must be accompanied with training for its wise use. Universal education, the night schools, and the summer school sessions, the public libraries, the public press, the enlarging uses of public school properties, the better theaters and concerts, the growing possibilities of the moving-picture, the social settlements, the playground movements, the far-sighted park policies of some of our great cities, and the larger religious as well as social activities of the churches, are all helping at this vital point — in making possible a valuable and enjoyable use of leisure. But we are still far from the ideal for the people generally.

6. A further encouragement, reflecting and grow-

ing out of the external conditions of the new world of our time, is the fact of the *enormous educational influence of the daily press and of our great popular weeklies and magazines*, with all their limitations. First of all, through the medium of the press, a rapidly increasing multitude of men are introduced into a wide circle of interests. In this very way a daily education of no mean dimensions is steadily going forward. For such greater breadth of interest, where it is allowed to have anything like its natural weight, can hardly fail gradually to enrich and enlarge the life of the individual and of the society of which he forms a part. If one thinks, for example, to how large an extent his growth, his power of understanding and enjoyment, the sanity of his judgments, and his influence over others, all depend on breadth of interest, he cannot fail to see how large an educational factor the press is bound here to be. It is difficult to overestimate the educational influence of some of our greater Weeklies and Monthlies, also, in the development of social, political, and national ideals. Many of these problems are discussed with a breadth and insight and suggestiveness that cannot help counting in the thought and standards of multitudes of readers. One clear-

sighted observer of American national life has even suggested that it might be doubted whether there were any stronger moral influence at present at work in America than that of certain of our great magazines. It is, of course, chiefly through the press that international criticism, too, has its opportunity for influence, and the contribution to the world's progress thus made by journalism is notable and indispensable.

But the largest service of the press is to be found, perhaps, after all, in its *function as a gatherer of news*. For this makes facts, interpretations, and trends of thought promptly felt throughout the world, and so secures an almost immediate concentration of attention, on the part of hundreds of thousands, on the same problems and on the same lines of thought. In this regular service journalism often brings great pains and skill to the interpretation of significant social, national, and political movements. How much ~~this~~ means for the progress of the race can be seen by comparison with the progress of science. For just as science has gained immensely, as in the case of the Roentgen rays, by the possibility of the experiments of the original discoverer being repeated and extended by fellow workers all over the world ;

so the great social and political trends of the time, through the press, extend themselves over the world with a rapidity inconceivable to an earlier generation, and in that extension and in the reactions everywhere provoked, develop in the clearness and definiteness and sweep of their aims. The mere process of widespread news-telling serves gradually to sift out what is most valuable in the movements of human thought and action.

7. The greatest encouragement to be seen in these new external conditions of our time undoubtedly is to be found in the *trend toward universal education*, with all its immeasurable possibilities for good, and in the *magnificent ideal enterprises* which this generation is undertaking. For these show unmistakably, not only that moral and religious education, on a stupendous scale, is already going on; but also that moral and religious progress has taken place in marked degree, even quite outside the set channels of the educational and religious forces, and has affected not only individual and national life, but made itself felt increasingly, even in international relations. This is to be seen, particularly, in the rising moral standards that are being applied to individual, national, and international life, and in the general

trend toward a rational ethical democracy, toward a social conscience, and toward universal peace.

One cannot thus review even the external conditions of the new modern world without a quickening of the pulse and a stirring of moral determination. We live in a peculiarly challenging age. Its great trends disclose themselves to thoughtful study unmistakably. Its dangers and problems are threatening; but its resources also are immense, and the elements of encouragement deeply significant. The educational and religious forces are able to gird themselves for a difficult but definite and hopeful task. They can see clearly what the qualities of the modern man must be, and train straightly toward those qualities. Intelligent and unselfish coöperation for the highest ends are now possible to men, as never before in the history of the race.

CHAPTER IV

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE OF THE NEW INNER WORLD OF THOUGHT I: THE FACTORS OF THE NEW INNER WORLD AND THEIR INDIVIDUAL CHALLENGE

As one attempts to forecast the moral and religious future of the world, he must take account, not only of the demand of the new external conditions, but not less of the demand of the new inner world of the mind.

The increase in knowledge in the last hundred years may be fitly compared with the enormous increase of material wealth. John Fiske's statement of the intellectual differences of which we must take account is even more true now than when he wrote it: "In their mental habits, in their methods of inquiry, and in the data at their command, the men of the present day who have fully kept pace with the scientific movement are separated from the men whose education ended in 1830 by an immeasurably wider gulf than has

ever before divided one progressive generation of men from their predecessors." In fact the new external world with which we have been dealing has grown chiefly out of this new inner world of thought.

The significance of this great inner movement of thought is only justly reflected in these words of Kidd: "The precursor of every great period of social and political reconstruction has invariably been, as John Stuart Mill has pointed out, 'a great change in the opinions and modes of thinking of society.' There is no era in Western history which can offer any parallel in this respect to the period in which we are living. There is no department of knowledge dealing with man in society, however authoritative its traditions, however exclusive and self-contained its position, which is not separated now by an immense interval from its standpoint fifty years ago. The modern doctrine of evolution is only the last of a long chain of sequences. But the changes which it has already effected in the tendencies of the deeper processes of thought altogether exceed in import any previously experienced. Even its general results have a significance which immediately arrests the attention of the thoughtful observer. The final

aspect of authority and completeness which it has given to the work accomplished by a set of revolutionary tendencies in thought, which for four centuries have struggled with the most conservative elements in our civilization, has so profoundly influenced the average mind, that the culminating effect of the revolution has been felt almost as if the meaning of the whole movement had been compressed into the lifetime of a single generation. The Western intellect has, as it were, passed at last through the initiatory phase of what Hegel called the terrible discipline of self-knowledge. The tendencies which John Addington Symonds beheld slowly transforming our civilization — the audacious speculation, the bold explanatory studies, the sound methods of criticism, the free range of the intellect over every field of knowledge — have all but accomplished the first stage of their work.”¹

As contributing to this new world of the inner life must be especially recognized the influence of natural science and its theory of evolution, the coming in of the historical spirit, the rise of the new psychology, of the new science of sociology and of comparative religion, and of the resulting

¹ *Principles of Western Civilization*, pp. 1-3.

philosophical and theological trends of the time. How new these factors in our modern intellectual life are, it is difficult to realize. But evolution, in its present influential form, dates from Darwin's *Origin of Species*, issued in 1859. The historical spirit only came in with the last century, for it practically begins with Herder. The first psychological laboratory in the world was opened in 1879. Sociology is hardly older than the earlier writings of Herbert Spencer. And comparative religion belongs chiefly to the last fifty years. All of these bring new data and new suggestions of method for the understanding of the world, of men, and of God, and, therefore, have affected both the philosophical and the theological trend of the times, as well as changed for all men the face of the modern world of thought. Let us look, then, at the practical issue of these great lines of thought, as recorded in the conditions of the present day.

I

NATURAL SCIENCE AND EVOLUTION

The prevalence of the scientific spirit, first of all, must mean increasingly the determination everywhere open-mindedly to face the facts, to

discern the laws involved in the facts, and to apply these laws to present conditions.

1. *The scientific method of control.* As we repeatedly saw in the discussion of the external conditions of our time, it is exactly this scientific point of view and method that enable the modern man to face with courage and hope the complex problems of the age. Here are problems of physical degeneracy and disease; financial, commercial, and industrial problems; political problems, national and international; problems of social maladjustment; educational, moral, and religious problems. The modern man, by virtue of the scientific spirit, can attack them all with hope of victory. He knows that he need not blindly strike about him in the dark. He can know the definite line of procedure to be followed. He is sure that an open-minded, persistent study, and methodical investigation through experiment, of even the most complex problem, will finally disclose the great trends and the laws involved. He is sure that these discerned laws will point the way to certain definite conditions, and that if these conditions are honestly and steadily met, control can be gained of the forces at work in the complex situation he is seeking to subdue. Some

problems yield their secret much more quickly than others; but of even the most stubborn the scientific spirit does not despair. *Mastery of all forces through discernment of their laws* — this is the practical goal of applied science. Just here is the root of the sounder optimism of our time.

The mere statement of what the scientific spirit means suggests, at once, also, its moral and religious significance, and the contribution which it has, therefore, directly to make, at this point, to the social progress of the race. And this needs emphasis, for it has been so often assumed that the scientific spirit is somehow necessarily antagonistic to the ideal spirit.

2. *The moral significance of the scientific spirit.* As to its moral significance, where the scientific spirit is genuinely taken on, it is plain that it involves *a certain inevitable moral attitude*, and this, of itself, is an element of great hope in that present-day civilization which is so largely the product of modern science. The scientist must practice a certain fundamental morality — the morality of humble, open-minded willingness to face the facts exactly as they are. To fail in this attitude is indubitably to fail of his goal. The achievements of science become, thus, a further illustration of

Christ's contention of the omnipotence of that humble open-mindedness, which he made the quality of the first Beatitude and the door to the Kingdom of Heaven, as it is the door to the kingdom of science. It is true that the cultivation of this spirit in the study of physical phenomena, unhappily, does not infallibly insure the same spirit in relation to other problems and to persons. But this only means that the scientist may fail in the true scientific spirit, when he makes incursions into unfamiliar fields. The plain demand of the scientific spirit has not ceased, though he has proved unfaithful to it. This is only to say that the genuine scientific spirit requires a relentless, honest integrity in dealing with the facts, — a spirit that is relentless through and through, and that allows no warping of the facts to fit desire or theory or prepossession. The scientific spirit, thus, when given its way, brings a great moral training in *radical conscientiousness*, and works directly in line with Christ's own repeated and insistent demand for utter inner integrity of life. "Just as the scientist's one desire is to get at the exact facts, and just as he has the wholesome sense that any furthering of his pet theory in the end could be of no avail against the facts; so the

disciple of the righteous life, in the thought of Jesus, has one sole desire — to know the truth, to know and do the will of God, without prejudice, without willfulness, with no trace of falseness. All this — prejudice, willfulness, falseness — would only hinder the disciple's one great end.”¹

It should mean much for the moral advance of men, that the full force of this most powerful movement of our time should, thus, both continually exemplify and reënforce the Christian teaching. For this aspect of the scientific spirit has tended to lead men to a veritable passion for reality, to “the spirit of austere devotion to the truth,” that is an essential characteristic of the man of high spiritual endeavor. This has greatly helped, also, to thoroughness of investigation, and so to the discovery of truth in every sphere. And morals and religion, as well as physical science, have profited thereby. Such is the moral significance of natural science.

3. *The religious significance of the scientific spirit.* The religious significance of natural science is hardly less. The modern world really begins with modern science; and modern science involved, as others have pointed out, not only the standpoint

¹ King, *The Ethics of Jesus*, p. 84.

of experience and observation, and the abandonment of the mediæval *a priori* treatment of nature, but, particularly, the adoption of the method of *experiment*. For scientific experiment meant the deliberate methodical investigation of nature to discover its laws and their involved conditions. It pointed the way, thus, through the fulfillment of those conditions, to the control of forces, and to the achievement of ends not otherwise attainable. This, alone, has made possible that progressive conquest of nature peculiarly characteristic of our time.

Now for such use of the experimental method, and for its resulting accomplishment, it should be carefully noted, natural science required absolute freedom of investigation. How could it get it in the conditions of the mediæval period? There were natural and powerful religious motives, and aggressive and stupendous religious forces, that tended to make such freedom of investigation utterly impossible. Men felt obliged to admit that spiritual interests were the supreme interests. These supreme spiritual interests seemed to them to carry with them the authoritative organization of the Church and its equally authoritative dogmatic answers to questions in every sphere of

human thought. None of these questions, therefore, could be open to really free investigation. On the one hand, men could not help instinctively feeling the inevitableness and full justification of free investigation; even half unconsciously there came a sense of self-stultification in denying its right; and yet, on the other hand, religion seemed definitely to forbid. The contribution of natural science, here, consisted in forcing upon the consciousness of men the sense of the inevitableness of free investigation. But it brought the feeling, at the same time, of an inner insoluble antinomy. The difficulty was felt to be a religious one; its satisfactory solution, also, must therefore be religious. As a matter of fact, the principle of freedom of investigation fought its way to recognition through the Protestant religious principle of freedom of conscience, — the freedom to follow God-given inner ideals and the tasks the mind so set itself. Conscience had to be regarded as in some true sense the voice of God in the soul. Science's freedom of investigation thus rooted — we may never forget — in the religious principle of freedom of conscience, and had to be long defended thereby, against the aggressions of the Church. It could only be finally secured against

such aggression, in the name of religion, by acquiring a *religious* basis in this principle of freedom of conscience, as the divine right and obligation of the individual. In one's ultimate philosophical thinking, then, absolute freedom of investigation can be defended only if its ideal and task be regarded as God-given, — the revelation of the will of God in the constitution of man. Science's freedom of investigation, that is, as a finally defensible ideal, roots in the principle — held as a religious conviction — of reverence for one's own inner personality.

We can be sure, therefore, that science's freedom of investigation, for which, historically, it had to fight against the mediæval church, is just as truly a moral and religious need as a scientific and material need. In fact, it should be emphatically said that, wherever the Protestant church has opposed freedom of investigation in any sphere, it has been disloyal to its own fundamental principle of freedom of conscience and shown doubt of the power and value of the truth. For science, too, as Münsterberg suggests, is a "child of duties," — an ideal task which God sets to the spirit of man. Wherever, then, we are not keeping the open mind, wherever we close the

door upon inquiry, wherever we shun the dark corners in our thinking, wherever we attempt coercion of the thought of others, there we fail, not intellectually alone, but morally and religiously. We make impossible that inner harmony of our being, that religion, above all, should bring.

This absolute freedom of conscience means, also, as Sabatier has pointed out, that there can be, ultimately, *no religion of mere authority*. This is not at all to deny that there is a necessary authoritative stage in all training of every kind. But the authoritative stage is transitional solely. It justifies itself by making itself finally dispensable, not indispensable. A spiritual life that has no inner spring is misnamed spiritual—it is a product of external forces. If this authoritative stage is not transitional, then it defeats its only legitimate end. For the end of all direction and authority in morals and religion is to bring the individual to the point where he prescribes for himself that which has hitherto been prescribed for him. The true moral or religious attitude is necessarily self-legislative; else it is not really moral or religious at all. It is quite true that probably the great majority of the adherents of the religions of the race still have no such concep-

tion. But it is not a mere matter of subtle argument. The trend is inevitable. The logic, not of a single thinker, but of the whole trend of modern civilization, underlies the conviction that ultimately religion cannot be a matter of authority. Even the Protestant church, whose basic principle is only developed here to its necessary consequences, is reluctant to grant this contention. The teaching of Jesus certainly assumes the principle, but the avowed disciples of Jesus have seldom perceived it. In the common insistence that religion is a matter of authority, the Protestant Christian, therefore, doubly denies his own reason for being. He is both un-Protestant and un-Christian. For it is vain to talk of any freedom of conscience that is not absolute, that does not mean that the individual not only may but must follow conscience, — the inner ideal, and must, therefore, take on those tasks that are inwardly commanded. To deny this is to deny that God can be thought of as the real creator of man at all, and as, therefore, manifesting his will in man's constitution.

Nor is this to be mistaken for mere subjectivism. The principle of reverence for personality guards as surely against an egoistic subjectivity as against

a smothering of individual initiative by outside pressure. For the sense of the value and sacredness of each person recognizes each as a child of God, as possessing in himself a valuable reflection and expression of the Divine, and so as contributing unmistakably to the revelation and understanding of the will of God, — of the full-orbed and permanent ideals of the race. Political and social, as well as ethical and religious progress, certainly indicate that men are seeing with increasing clearness, that the honest individual reaction of even the least cannot be spared. For the reverent of personality, therefore, it must infallibly prove true, that the ultimate, inner vision of duty results from consideration, not of one's own single personality alone but of the manifested ideal in all personalities.

It is equally vain to dream that anything less than an inner spirituality can satisfy the ideal of Jesus. His emphasis upon the necessity of inner integrity, and therefore of the mental and spiritual independence of the individual, is repeated and insistent. He wishes men to follow him, not for any external reasons, — for loaves or for the signs that he works, — but because of the inner appeal to their spirits, of what he is in himself. His teaching constantly addresses itself to the reason

and conscience of his hearers. He utterly repudiates any other test. As I have elsewhere said, "Jesus knows no moral or religious life that can be called genuine at all, that is not the man's own, — the expression of his own insight and his own choice. He feels an element of pretense wherever the inner life takes on as its own what is not really so. One must see for himself, and he must choose for himself."¹ Jesus' own authority, therefore, is not that of one who commands from without, but that of one whose appeal is felt to coincide with our own highest ideal. His authority is like that of a scientific expert in the moral and spiritual realm.

4. *Bringing a new sense of reality and of hope into the ideal realm.* But one has not fully stated the moral and religious significance of natural science, until he has further seen, that natural science has contributed to both morals and religion the uplifting, hope-inspiring sense of a world greatly *enlarged*, singularly *unified*, inevitably *evolving*, and always *law-abiding*.

This brings, in the first place, an added sense of reality into the ideal world of morals and religion, through the feeling that these ideals are steadily

¹ *The Ethics of Jesus*, p. 81.

making themselves felt in the everyday world of actuality. It brings also a new sense of *hope* and of the possibility of intelligent coöperation with God in his own mighty purposes, and so of the possibility of the achievement of great goals. It is worth while to see what these modern scientific convictions have individually meant in the realm of morals and religion.

We live in a world *enlarged* for our thought quite beyond the possibility of conception by earlier ages; enlarged in the infinite spaces of the revelations of astronomy; enlarged in the mighty reaches of time, measured not only by geological, but by physical research; enlarged in perception of inner, endless energy, microscopic as well as telescopic, and compelling our admission even far beyond all possibility of vision. A man cannot help asking himself in such a world, "Is thy God adequate to this *enlarged* universe?"

And we live in a *unified* world; ~~unified~~, too, beyond all possible earlier conception; unified in the thought of the universal forces of gravity and of magnetism; unified in the principle of the conservation of energy; a world that acts as one world, as though permeated with one will. It *is* so permeated. For our time, as for no other, the

thought of unity dominates. The world is one, past our denial. Man is one, in spite of his seeming duality. Man and the world are akin, and man is the microcosmus in a deeper sense than the old Greek philosopher could guess. And man and God, too, are akin; and our key to the understanding of God is to be found within, not without. No age so certainly as ours should be able to say of man, with the Psalmist, "Thou hast made him but little lower than God, and crownest him with glory and honor." Is thy God adequate to this *unified* world?

And whatever changes come in the great conception of evolution, mankind will never escape again from the idea of an *evolving* world. Physics, biology, embryology, psychology, sociology, make it impossible for us to forget that man is, in some real sense, the goal of the whole physical universe, containing within himself the promise of endless progress. And men have dared to dream that, in this evolution, physical, individual, and social, they could even catch the trend of the ages, the direction of the mighty ongoing of God's purposes. Is thy God adequate to this *evolving* world?

And once more, with the emphasis of the whole of modern science on the conception of *law*, men

look in upon themselves and out upon the universe with other eyes; for the perception of law means discernment of the ways of the universe; means, therefore, insight into its secrets and power to use its exhaustless energies. The idea of law brings, thus, the glorious promise of world mastery and self-mastery — hope hitherto unimagined. Is thy God adequate to this great world of *law*?

We men, thus, of the modern time, who live in this enlarged world, in this unified world, in this evolving world, in this law-abiding world, are forced to enlarge our conception of God and of his will, if we have not already done so, to match this greater vision of the world and of men; for we shall not long believe in a God who is not greater than his world. And when we think of the *enlarged* world of our time, we shall not be able to make the measure of the will of God petty projects of any kind or order. When we think of the *unified* world so necessary to our modern thought, we shall not be able to doubt that the will of God cannot be shut up to small fragments of life or of the race, but must be inclusive of all goods, and consistent throughout. When we think of the mighty *evolving* world, in the midst of which we see ourselves placed, we cannot but believe

that the will of God is in it, working out great purposes that we can at least dimly discern, and in which, intelligently and triumphantly, we may share. And when we think of the will of God, laid down in the *laws* of nature and of human nature, we find it no longer possible to think of him as mere onlooker in the drama of life; for he is sharing in our very life, and we in his. For, in another's words, "even the agony of the world's struggle is the very life of God. Were he mere spectator, perhaps he too would call life cruel. But, in the unity of our lives with his, our joy is his joy, our pain is his."

These convictions, thus, of our modern scientific age may help us to the largeness of the measure of the meaning which Christ — and Paul after him — put into this thought of the will of God. Under these convictions, it is not too much to say, the ambitions of men to-day have taken on, as we have seen, a titanic quality that he must be quite blind who does not see, — financial and economic enterprises, world-wide in their significance; social projects that concern not one nation alone, but all nations; missionary movements that, in their very nature, cannot be carried out without affecting the entire personal and social life of every race

touched thereby, and changing the very face of nature. Every profession is sharing in this enlarged vision of positive achievement. The physician has begun to dream of a race physically redeemed, through the triumphs of preventive, not merely remedial, medicine. The lawyer is beginning to think he need be no mere attorney, but a servant of the public weal, put in trust with the great heritage of law. We seem to ourselves to be just awakening out of sleep, and out of dull lassitude of will. Now we see what life means. We live in an *infinite* world, and in that world we have our part to play. We live in a *unified* world, and just on that account we may work effects, wide as the universe of God. We live in an *evolving* world, the direction of whose progress is not wholly hidden from us; and into the very plans of God, therefore, it is given us to enter. We live in a *law-abiding* world, in which God himself is immanent; and he works in us, both to will and to work of his own good pleasure. Is it any wonder that the ambitions of men of the present day, when seen thus in the large, seem to dwarf all previous aims of common men? We build again, and with eager hope, our heaven-scaling tower, but now on foundations laid by God him-

self; and the confused tongues give promise of changing into a higher harmony in the unity of the will of God.

5. *Bringing a new standard of efficiency into moral and religious education.* Moreover, the scientific spirit joins its influence with that of economic production to bring about the application of a new standard of efficiency to moral and religious education. The simple knowledge of the facts, daily brought up to date, will make known many large wastes and show how they may be avoided. Possibility of small economies — that count much in the aggregate — will be recognized at the same time, — a saving not only or chiefly of money, even in the long run, but of human health, of human energy, of human sensibility, of human power of growth, of work, of joy. Men are bound to come to see, more and more, the possibility of conserving their energy in far greater degree than is now the case. This recognition of the possibility of saving our energies may be even more important than the discovery of new levels of energy yet untapped, important as these may be.

Moral and religious workers will recognize, also, the special danger of not applying in their own

sphere this test of efficiency, just because of the difficulty of the definite testing of moral and spiritual progress. They will, therefore, strive the more earnestly to make certain that education may not fail to meet the test of efficiency. It is to be feared that vague claims as to moral atmosphere are too often made to cover serious educational defects. In any case, we may count it certain that the years just ahead will demand that educational and religious institutions of every kind shall be able to meet the strictest and most delicately applied tests of efficiency. For the coming generation cannot be satisfied with anything less than the fittest man and the fittest possible society. This is the meaning of what has been called the awakening of "the physical conscience," and of the new reasons for personal temperance, tellingly asserted so recently by Dr. H. S. Williams. And we shall not be satisfied with lower standards of vitality and efficiency applied to the intellectual, the moral, and the religious life, both of the individual and of society.

These wider and profounder bearings of natural science and of the theory of evolution upon morals and religion sufficiently indicate the insanity of

that fighting of natural science and of evolution which is still found, unhappily, at various points, both at home and on the mission field. There are missionaries, in many fields, of honest intent but with a false conception of the meaning of modern science, who are standing right athwart the path, for example, of educated Indians, Chinese, and Japanese, and preventing them from coming into the Christian faith, because they insist that to accept in any form the theory of evolution makes Christian faith impossible. The mistaken opposition of such missionaries should turn itself, rather, to the facing of the real dangers connected with an exclusively mechanical and materialistic interpretation of the facts of nature and of human life, to which they are really driving these men whom they would help. They should direct their energies to making clear that the ideal interpretations of morals and religion need have no quarrel with the mechanical explanations of natural science; and they should be able to see, with Lotze, that mechanism (with which alone science has to do) is indeed "absolutely universal in extent, but completely subordinate in significance."¹

¹ Cf. King, *Reconstruction in Theology*, pp. 48 ff.

II

THE HISTORICAL SPIRIT

The historical spirit, too, as has been pointed out, is a distinctly modern phenomenon, for it practically had its birth, as must be clearly recognized, within the last century. The most of the eighteenth century was destitute of it. It has evident close connections with the thought of evolution. But the attitude is not confined to investigators in natural science. "Our outlook upon life differs in just this particular from that of preceding ages," and the historical spirit has affected every line of investigation. The following characterization of modern historical methods illustrates the painstaking way in which it is attempted to build up before the historical imagination the whole past situation: "Psychology has been drawn upon to interpret the movements of revolutions or religions, anthropology and ethnology furnish a clue to problems to which the key of documents has been lost. Genealogy, heraldry and chronology run parallel with the wider subject. But the real auxiliary sciences to history are those which deal with those traces of the past that still exist,

the science of language (philology), of writing (palæography), of documents (diplomatic), of seals (sphragistics), of coins (numismatics), of weights and measures, and archæology in the widest sense of the word. These sciences underlie the wide development of scientific history.”¹ Here, now, is a more and more powerful intellectual movement of our time, that is affecting points of view in all the realms of human life, and is felt to have revolutionary results at vital points. What is its moral and religious significance?

I. *Its moral significance.* Upon the moral side, the historical spirit plainly requires the ability to enter sympathetically and understandingly into the life and thought of other peoples and periods, to put one’s self truly in their place, to discern and to estimate all their environing conditions with imagination and insight. All this, it is to be noted, is the very first condition of a genuine practice of the Golden Rule. It is most significant and suggestive that all our great modern investigators, both in the field of physical nature and in the realm of human life, so far as they have been true to the ideals of their own sciences, have been obliged to take on the great primary Christian

¹ *Ency. Brit.*, art. “History.”

virtues for their successful achievements. Modern science and modern history are abiding evidences of the basic nature of humble, open-minded willingness to face the facts, and of understanding sympathy. The historical spirit demands, thus, in the inquirer, the development of the sense of likeness between himself and these alien peoples and periods. For we can understand the life of another, only in the degree in which we see that his life is like ours. We are obliged at every point to see our own experience as the unlocking key. Like is known only by like. But this sense of likeness is, in turn, a fundamental element of the social consciousness, and, so far as it is truly taken on, it registers for the individual a distinct moral advance. In evidence of this, let one think of the deadly effect of the constant excuse, given through the centuries, for leaving unchanged the hard conditions of the depressed classes — "They do not feel it as we would." There is just enough truth in this statement, on account chiefly of the fact of habituation to different conditions, easily to blind our eyes to its essential falseness and brutality.

It follows that the genuine historical spirit should be particularly and directly helpful in overcoming race prejudice, which, as we have seen, is

one of the greatest present obstacles to the progress of the race in every sphere. A man truly possessed of the historical spirit ought to be peculiarly guarded against petty race antagonisms. Fiction, too, when written in the historical spirit, may render a great similar service, in helping to a better understanding of other classes and sections and races. For we all peculiarly need some vividness of imagination to inform and guide our conscience. That is, distinct moral help, in a difficult problem, is here brought from a widespread field of human intellectual endeavor.

To these moral contributions of the historical spirit are to be added, of course, the lessons directly to be drawn from history itself, for guidance in further progress.

2. *Its religious significance.* The religious significance of the historical spirit is to be seen in its application in the field of comparative religion, which deserves separate treatment, and in the so-called higher criticism of the great religious literatures of the race. For, on the one hand, it is only through such genuine historical criticism that we can come to the right use of the Christian Scriptures, or to the legitimate defense of their supreme value. On the other hand, such genuine

historical criticism, applied to the sacred books of the other religions, has a vital and indispensable contribution to make, especially in India, and in only less degree in China and Japan, to the preparation for that more adequate ethical and religious viewpoint that must follow. At present much is read into these sacred books that came from quite different sources, and the true origin of these larger ethical and religious insights is, therefore, not acknowledged. At this point, also, there are missionaries who mistakenly conceive it to be their bounden duty to oppose at every point the historical criticism of the Christian Scriptures; although they would know, if they put things in relation, that the process is exactly what is required for a true reading of the sacred books of other religions. They occasionally, too, perceive that the results of the historical criticism of the Bible are helpful in meeting the difficulties and objections of non-Christians. But they quite fail adequately to understand the seriousness, even from the missionary point of view, of decrying the historical and literary criticism of sacred literatures. To oppose historical criticism is ultimately greatly to hinder, not to help, the religious and Christian forces in their conquest of the world.

III

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY

The new psychology, too, belongs to the recent years, and is a large factor in the new inner world of thought. Like natural science, its point of view is that of observation, experience, and experiment. Its method, therefore, is not *a priori*, but it seeks an approach to human nature like that of natural science to external nature, and hopes for an analogous conquest here. It aims, therefore, to disclose the laws of life, — the laws of the nature of man and their involved conditions. Its ideal significance is to be seen at various points.

1. Just so far as psychology is successful in *disclosing the laws of man's nature* with their great dominant emphases, morals and religion, in the first place, must regard these laws as a revelation of the will of God — the Creator of that nature. The laws will, therefore, be felt to point here, just as in physical nature, through the fulfillment of their involved conditions, to possible achievement and conquest. For one can know that, in obeying these laws, he is working in line with the forces of the universe, — in line with the will of God. At this point, too, there comes in, through

the discernment of laws, a great new element of *hope* for the progress of the race. And all that has been earlier said of the significance of the new scientific emphasis upon a law-abiding and evolving world has its application in this realm of human nature, and need not be repeated.

2. Through its discernment of the laws of human nature, psychology should be able to point, in the second place, to *definite and concrete and real ideals*, avoiding fictions and abstractions and futilities. It means very much that men should be able at any point in their moral struggle to feel beneath their feet the assured basis of solid fact. They need to know that they are not groping around in the dark, without knowledge of either definite goals to be sought, or of definite means for their attainment. And psychology has the power to render the great service of giving reality and definiteness to moral ideals, and of showing just how they may be realized. Psychology, of course, needs here the supplementing help of sociology.

3. It is further to be noted that the great practical emphases of modern psychology upon the complexity of life, the unity of man, the central importance of will and action, and the primacy of

the personal,¹ are *particularly needed in the Orient* — and especially in India — to-day, if the highest ideals of Christian civilization are to prevail among all peoples. For they bring into prominence the very truths that the East has disastrously ignored, in its tendency to abstract speculation, to a mere passivity in religion, and to a communal civilization that has no respect for personality as such. Psychology may thus be said to have a genuinely world task. The truth is, that these greatly needed practical truths which modern psychology is emphasizing can probably be brought home to the oriental mind with less prejudice through a psychological presentation than in any other way. What the *Imperial Gazetteer*² calls “certain characteristic peculiarities of the Indian intellect — its lax hold on facts, its indifference to action, its absorption in dreams, its exaggerated reverence for tradition, its passion for endless division and subdivision, and its acute sense of minute technical distinctions” — would all be helped by this concrete psychological approach to the problems of human living.

4. What has been called “*the inner health movement*,” also, is obviously closely connected with

¹ See King, *Rational Living*.

² Vol. I, p. 347.

this sense of law in the psychical world. In spite of multitudinous vagaries that make it hard to be patient with many of its aspects, the thoughtful observer may not ignore the ideal significance of the movement in its entirety. For while probably generally too self-centered, this "inner health movement" must still be recognized as notably widespread, and as genuinely religious in its significance and aim and intensity. Sane psychology ought to be able to help the moral and religious forces to direct this movement to really worthy results. It can hardly be delivered, otherwise, from ultimate disaster.

IV

SOCIOLOGY

Sociology is still more distinctly modern. It builds on so many and so complex data that it must be regarded as the most imperfect of sciences, if it deserves the name at all. But it has the great virtue of attempting to see the problem of human welfare and human progress whole, and of grappling directly with that problem. It calls for acquaintance with social facts, and seeks to discover the fundamental laws of all permanent

progress, with their involved conditions. The moral and religious significance of sociology, in view of the previous discussions, can be briefly put.

1. A *moral ideal* is involved in the very existence of the science, since sociology builds directly on the social consciousness and seeks to make that consciousness prevail. It has, thus, gradually deepened for modern men the sense of the imperative need of moral qualities, if the race is to advance, and has indicated with considerable clearness what these qualities are; namely, the qualities of the social consciousness. It sees the goal of human history in a rational, ethical democracy — a democracy that is, therefore, both scientifically and ethically based, and so must make severe demands on each generation and each coöperating individual.

2. So far as sociology is able to discern the fundamental *laws of the permanent progress of the race*, men must recognize these laws as laws of the universe, — as laws of God. Sociology, therefore, like psychology, and on a broader field, should help morals and religion to concrete reality, to a sense of coöperation with God, and, consequently, to a new feeling of hope and of the possibility of

large achievement. Here also the scientific sense of law, not as an inscrutable and inescapable fate, but as a revelation of the secret of power, tends to bring in a new and stimulating atmosphere. That atmosphere, as we have seen, is essentially that of religious faith. For when we discover and obey a law, we seem to discern a way of God's own activity, and so to get the consciousness of coöperating with him. Our analysis, therefore, would seem to indicate that science and psychology and sociology, all alike, require a basis of religious faith to give them full and abiding significance.

3. The most definite contribution of sociology to the moral and religious life — aside from its setting before the human will definite social goals and concrete social tasks — is its clear indication of *the elements of the social consciousness*, with their constant moral and religious suggestiveness. For, on the religious side, sociology's goal is that civilization of the brotherly man which Christ came to establish, and its social consciousness is hardly more than a scientific statement of what that Christian brotherly love definitely means. And, on the moral side, the elements of the social consciousness all make a clear ethical demand, and, as defining love, are as all-inclusive of the ethical life

as love itself. The elements of the social consciousness may be said to be the sense of likeness or like-mindedness, the sense of mutual influence, the sense of the priceless value and sacredness of the individual person, or of reverence for the person as such, and the consequent sense of obligation and of sacrificial love. All of them may be said to be included in the one element of reverence for the person as such, when that reverence is adequately conceived, and they find there their vital unity. The very statement of these elements of the social consciousness indicates how high an ethical ideal this new science of sociology is holding before the modern man.

Have we, any of us, measured or sufficiently valued the enormous strengthening and verification of essentially Christian motives and aims, that are involved in this great modern movement of thought --- so conspicuous a factor in the new inner world of our time? These aspirations of the social consciousness, when taken with the "inner health movement," therefore, naturally form what has been called "the two enthusiasms" which are "real and religious amongst us at the present day." And the social enthusiasm is distinctly less self-centered than the other, and wholesomely supple-

ments it. The religious consciousness is not at fault in attaching itself so markedly to both movements. For both are needed if we are to have a developing individual in a developing society. But both require a solid foundation of assured fact, and of verified laws. The scientific spirit must permeate them both.

V

COMPARATIVE RELIGION

The scientific study of religion, too, is a part of the history of the last fifty years. It is a particular application of the historical method in the supreme sphere of religion.

1. Its moral and religious significance is obvious. It calls, in the first place, in even higher degree, for the same *moral qualities* demanded by the general historical spirit; — in higher degree, because so much is felt to be at stake in religion, that prejudice is particularly likely here to make itself felt. Comparative religion has thus meant sympathetic understanding of the highest ideals of other peoples and civilizations, and an attempt genuinely to share in their best.

2. This attempt of the historical spirit in the

religious sphere can hardly fail thus to develop a discriminating tolerance, and that *organic ideal of religious truth*, that naturally expects to gain through sharing in the best insights of all. For it is an obvious misreading of comparative religion that leads one to put all religious phenomena and literatures on the same level. Scientific study means discernment of differences as well as of likenesses. Indeed, its evolutionary hypothesis naturally suggests differences of level, and looks for advance from one level to another, while carrying on to each succeeding stage the achievement of the preceding stages. Comparative religion, thus, searches for the psychological and historical justification of the religious phenomena it studies, and so is able to discern real values in most unpromising material, and is thus helped to see their significance for our present life and thought. It should be able distinctly to enrich the religious consciousness of our day. For even the highest religion cannot wish to believe that the religious struggles of the race have been wholly meaningless and fruitless.

3. Comparative religion, too, bears unmistakable testimony to the *permanence of religion*, and to the vastness of its meaning and of its claim on

life. The rise of comparative religion has inevitably meant increasing recognition of man as essentially, and, to use Sabatier's phrase, "incurably religious." Thus on the historical side Lord Acton bears witness: "We all know from twenty to thirty predominant currents of thought or attitudes of mind or system-bearing principles, which, jointly or severally, weave the web of human history and constitute the civilized opinion of the age. . . . The majority of them are either religions or substitutes for religion." The immense increase in the literature upon both the psychology and the history of religion is confirmatory evidence. Witness the great series of the Sacred Books of the East, the numerous other libraries upon the religions of the world, the Hibbert Foundation, the Hibbert Lectures, and the Hibbert Journal, the various series of Gifford Lectures, and the great Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics now issuing, and unnumbered monographs on every conceivable phase of the question.

This rise of the science of comparative religion has inevitably been accompanied, also, by increasing *philosophical recognition of religious experiences*. The specifically religious is being recognized as furnishing data for the philosophical interprétation

of man, and of the world, in a way hardly dreamed of earlier. And no earlier form of philosophical thinking has had a larger or more natural place for religion, than has the latest philosophical movement, pragmatism, with its extraordinary emphasis on the concrete and personal. Certainly a philosophy permeated with a religious spirit was never more possible than to-day. We cannot get permanent meaning and value for life without religious faith. Frank recognition of the religious, as an undoubted and essential element in human life and experience, the future must certainly show.

It is hardly open to question, either, that all future forms of education must recognize, that *the motives of religion are ultimately irreplaceable*, as was pointed out in the last International Congress on Moral Education, held in London. Moral endeavor itself needs and requires faith in the ethical trend of the universe. It must at least believe that the world is sufficiently moral to allow the possibility of the moral life. And it will greatly suffer, if it cannot add to this faith in the bare possibility of the moral, the further faith, in Nash's language, that "the universe is on the side of the will." Whether or not we believe in the possibility of rational religious faith, we ought

at least to be candid enough to admit that nothing can take the place of the motives that come from such religious faith. And John Stuart Mill and Sully and Seeley all bear witness that not even our largest social goals can be held to replace the religious motive. We may reasonably expect, therefore, that the virtual religious presuppositions of ethics are sure to make themselves felt more and more, even if unconsciously. Upon that point we need have no fear. Even our most secular education, if it is genuinely and thoroughly ethical, will thereby carry with it a kind of essentially religious faith. In the language of Muirhead, commenting upon "the central problem of the International Congress on Moral Education": "‘A man’s confidence in himself,’ said Hegel, ‘is much the same as his confidence in the universe and in God,’ and what is true of the individual is true of humanity. Without such confidence it is difficult to see with what ultimate convincingness appeal can be made to the ideals of humanity; with it we are beginning to see how a new inspiration can be brought to the work of moral education as the development in souls, prepared by their own deepest instincts to respond, of an attitude of mind which shall be true not only to their own

manhood and womanhood in what is seen and temporal, but to that which is unseen and eternal in the world at large." If man is essentially religious, then the very unity of man makes practically certain that these virtually religious presuppositions of his moral aims cannot remain wholly hidden.

4. The progress of comparative religion makes certain, also, that more and more religious education will make use of the contribution of the *entire religious consciousness of the race*, especially of oriental thought, and that religious faith everywhere will share in increasing degree in the best insights of all. And even the highest religion, that may not feel the need of any of the subordinate faiths, may itself, thus, receive enlarged interpretation.

The new inner world, with its great new science of comparative religion, demands, thus, that man's future shall face the problem of keeping the meaning, — the ideal interpretation of the world and of life, — side by side with scientific explanation of its processes. There *will be* a future religious education in the strictest sense of the term. Religion is here to stay. Indeed, our survey of present-day conditions, external and inner, shows

how imperative is the need, at every point, for a faith essentially religious, if the race is to rise to mastery of its present inheritance, and to continue its advance. Again and again, we have found that the conquest even of the external conditions of our time insistently demanded religious faith in abiding ideals and purposes. In Eucken's words, "it is only as a characteristic expression of the Spiritual Life that civilization can have any inward coherence, clear meaning, and controlling purpose."¹ The study of comparative religion only confirms this necessity, in the witness it bears to the tenacious hold and enormous influence of religion in the history of the race. The man of religious faith has no reason for discouragement, to-day, in spite of the stupendous problems which confront all ideal interests. Great inevitable trends are at work, which men did not indeed create, but which they may discern, and with which they may intelligently and unselfishly coöperate.

But the new inner world of thought cannot be adequately characterized without a brief survey, also, of modern philosophical and theological tendencies. For it peculiarly belongs to these

¹ *The Meaning and Value of Life*, p. 105.

departments of thought to interpret the meaning of all the data brought to them by these other intellectual movements of our time.

VI

THE PHILOSOPHICAL TREND

It is a matter of significance, in the first place, that interest and work in philosophy in all the leading nations have so greatly grown in recent years, even on the part of natural scientists. For this itself is evidence that thoughtful men are increasingly seeing that we cannot give up the problem of the meaning of the world and of life, and that we certainly cannot stop in the earlier crude materialistic inferences from modern science. This, in itself, is a great ideal gain.

But the new inner world of thought has greatly affected present philosophical tendencies. First of all there can be no doubt that philosophy has largely abandoned a purely *a priori* attitude. If it is to interpret the world and men, it knows that it needs, first of all, to get the facts concerning them. It seeks, therefore, to use all the data coming from the great lines of inquiry, with which we have been dealing, and to build directly

upon them. It hopes thus to keep its philosophizing *real*, in the truest sense, and to make some genuine progress.

It tends, also, to an increasing use of the scientific method, so far as that is possible in dealing with problems of philosophy. This has its most notable illustration, of course, in pragmatism, which practically seeks to make the scientific method of proving an hypothesis the ruling method in philosophy. But the tendency is by no means confined to the pragmatists. Practically all schools of philosophy would recognize the necessity of using the method at many points.

It is obvious, too, that the theory of evolution, connecting itself with the earlier philosophical use of the analogy of the organism, is strongly affecting philosophical thinking. The most conspicuous instance is Bergson, who seeks, as he says, "a true evolutionism, in which reality would be followed in its generation and its growth"; and ~~the~~ idealistic trend of his interpretation is noteworthy. But the evolution point of view makes itself felt, in method of treatment, at least, in widely different philosophies.

It is, in part, the same instinct for reality — the determination to take into account all the facts,

and to refuse to be put off by mere analysis of notions and by false abstractions — that has led to the repeated emphasis of our present-day philosophy upon the whole man, upon “personalism” in some form. Some of the most important contributions of modern philosophical thinking might be so characterized. And yet, when a really ultimate view is sought, it is to be suspected that there will be increasing agreement with Eucken, that a satisfying personalism must have a religious basis, if life is to keep its meaning and value. “We reject the tendency to use personality lightly as a catchword and ready cure-all for every evil of the times, since personality must first be given a content and a cosmic setting, and it is just here that the most serious complications arise.”¹

Various phenomena of our time, as we have seen, point to the imperativeness of an ultimate religious basis for all our living and thinking. The collapse of materialism, the growing idealistic interpretations of the facts of natural science, the increasing use of religious experiences as philosophical data, the possible bearing of psychical research, and the extent to which all the great movements of our time need to root in a religious

¹ *The Meaning and Value of Life*, p. 143.

faith, if they are to be either ethically or intellectually satisfying — are all indications of the moral and religious significance of the present philosophical trend. It demands reality, honest facing of the facts, and full use of all the other intellectual labors and experiences of men, and it sees, in encouraging degree, the crucial significance of personality and of a religious basis for thought.

VII

THE THEOLOGICAL TREND

The theological tendencies of our day also show the plain influence of the other modern lines of thought reviewed. On every hand, for example, is to be seen an increasing use of the psychological and historical approach to moral and religious problems. The literature on the psychological as well as historical treatment of religion has grown astonishingly in the last decade. In applying the historical method, the inner logic of a theological dogma can be so disclosed as to give its complete refutation. And this method has been used by both Sabatier and Foster in dealing with the notion of absolute authority in religion. We are thus approaching, both by the psychological and

the historical road, Christ's double insistence on the need both of mental and spiritual fellowship, and of mental and spiritual independence on the part of the individual. It is interesting to see that Eucken's more philosophical survey and analysis of modern conditions reaches this same conclusion of the absolute necessity, if there is to be a significant life, of an inner insistent, masterful spirituality. Theology, too, is clearly aiming to build more and more upon the history of religions, and upon the historical criticism of the great religious literatures of the race, especially the Bible. This helps to insure to it both reality and vitality.

The influence of modern science upon theology is to be seen, not only in the more general use of the evolutionary point of view, implied in the historical treatment of religion; but also in the deepening conviction of law in the moral and spiritual world. The religious consciousness sees in these laws God's own habitual ways of working, and evidence of his faithfulness in dealing with men. But it does not attempt any longer to assert an identity of natural and spiritual laws. Just because the moral and spiritual world is seen to be a world of personal relations, it knows that the laws of that world must be predominantly laws of per-

sonal relation. Theology tends, thus, increasingly, in line with the philosophical trend, to interpret its doctrines in personal terms. It cannot believe that it reaches ultimate reality in the spiritual world, until it reaches persons. If I rightly interpret the trend at this point, theology tends, then, to become more and more characteristically personal, ethical, social, historical, biblical, and Christian in its emphases. And with a true personalism its apologetic growingly builds upon the essential unity of human ideals, upon the conviction of the final simplicity of religion, and of the indispensable contribution which religion has to make to life at every point. Religion is able to verify itself in the same way that holds of other spheres of value, and, especially, in line with the laws of developing personal relations. For myself, I cannot doubt, either, that the world's experience bears unmistakably toward the Christian religion. Under the double pressure of the scientific spirit and of the social consciousness of our modern civilization, in its spread over the world, it is becoming more and more difficult to keep belief in any other religion. The Orient is certain to feel this the more, the deeper its knowledge of the modern world of thought becomes.

CHAPTER V

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE OF THE NEW INNER WORLD OF THOUGHT II: THE COMPREHENSIVE CHALLENGE OF THE FACTORS OF THE NEW WORLD OF THOUGHT

WE have thus attempted to bring into clear relief the main factors in the modern inner world of thought. With each factor there has also been pointed out its moral and religious significance. The present is evidently no time for despair of spiritual progress. But neither is it a time for vague and indefinite spiritual aspiration. The very nature of the factors of the new inner world of thought especially demands honest and definite facing of the challenge involved in the new conditions. Before, therefore, we turn from this study of modern intellectual movements, let us try to put before ourselves in comprehensive view the results of our inquiry, to see, for the inner world of thought — as previously for the new

external world — its meaning, the dangers and problems involved, the qualities demanded, and the elements of encouragement to be found.

I

THE MEANING OF THE NEW INNER WORLD

1. When one asks, first of all, in the light of the previous discussion, what this new inner world — of natural science and evolution, of the historical spirit, of the new psychology, of sociology, of comparative religion, and of the later philosophical and theological trends — *means*, he cannot fail to perceive that even when its factors are taken singly, the impression of the deep importance of the ideal meaning of this new world of thought is most striking. One sees that an intellectual revolution of astounding importance has taken place, and that, consequently, every human ideal has had to define itself anew in the light of that revolution, and to face the critical question, whether, by this intellectual revolution, the realm of the ideal interests has been made narrower, less secure and less significant, or greatly enlarged and deeply verified. I have tried to indicate reasons for believing that these great movements of the inner

life of our time have *made the moral and religious life more sure and significant*, not less so; that through them, in truth, our vision has been vastly extended, and the grounds for hope and courage immensely strengthened, quite beyond common belief. He who measures the progress of the moral and religious forces of the world simply by the number of avowed and enrolled adherents of the most rational and spiritual faiths of the world may doubtless see some clear progress. But that measure is, nevertheless, utterly inadequate. The triumph of the ethical and religious principles of Jesus is to be found not here alone, but still more in the half unconscious way in which these essential principles are steadily and increasingly making themselves felt in all the great inner as well as outer movements of our time. Let one compel himself definitely to state the inner moral and even religious implications of the modern scientific spirit, of the historical spirit, of the determined attempt by psychology and sociology to reach the laws of psychical and social progress, and of the resulting well nigh universal movements inspired by the passion for "inner health" and for social righteousness; — to go no further — and one will have deep and abiding reasons for believing

that this is God's world, and that he is at work in every part of it. For we have seen that every single factor of this new thought world of our time has a genuine moral and religious significance, because each requires definite moral and even religious qualities and emphases, and has, at various points, a real contribution to make to moral and religious thought and progress. No one of them could leave the ideal life unaffected, and no one, when correctly conceived, promises a permanently disintegrating influence, but rather enlargement and upbuilding.

2. Considered as a whole, these elements of the inner thought world make plain, also, the pre-eminent *need of time and of thought* for growth into the best, — time and thought for the perception of the true values, for growth into these values, for the discipline of the powers necessary to their appropriation. These revolutionary lines of thought themselves were made possible only through much thoughtful reflection and unstinted effort. Their best results cannot be quickly and carelessly appropriated. No generation ever had clearer reason for persistent thinking; though perhaps none has been more tempted thoughtlessly to float upon the surface of great movements

made possible by the thinking of others. We need to see clearly the ideals toward which we are to aim. We need to grow steadily into them. We need severely disciplined powers for the uncommon tasks of our time. But neither vision nor growth nor discipline is possible without time and thought. Without such persistent thinking we shall find ourselves only repeating new formulas instead of the old, and to as little purpose. One belongs to a new age not by birth, nor by mere catching up of its shibboleths, but by vigorous appropriation of its spirit. There is no cramming process by which a high civilization may be achieved. Here is preëminently a demand for moral and religious education in the truest sense.

3. All these factors of the new inner world, too, as lines of intellectual inquiry, require recognition of the principle of freedom of investigation, and therefore, as we have seen, must be *built upon freedom of conscience* and the principle of reverence for personality, as a religious conviction. This can be very briefly said; but the meaning and essential spiritual unity of our age are not truly seen, except in the light of this perception. Our intellectual and religious worlds are essential to each other.

4. These great modern departments of human inquiry — natural science, history, psychology, sociology, comparative religion, with their philosophical and theological inferences — ought to be able to show, also, *the great principles* which must guide in human progress, and the trend of all genuine advance. They should be mutually corrective and supplementary; and where they agree in fundamental ideals and principles they should give us great confidence. They should bring, therefore, a clearing up of our ideas and ideals, and increasing discernment of the laws involved in human progress; and so enable us to enter consciously, intelligently, voluntarily, and earnestly into coöperation with God's purposes in the attainment of these ideals.

5. The particular bearing of this whole new inner world on human progress should be found in sociology, if that is correctly formulated. What does sociology indicate as the most essential guiding and determining principle in human progress? The answer might be reached either through an analysis of the ideal which sociology aims to make controlling — the social consciousness; or through a study of the historical trend which sociology believes that it can trace through the centuries.

Now both the ideal of sociology — the social consciousness — and the historical development which sociology thinks that it can show, suggest the principle of *reverence for personality as the fundamental essential in human progress*.

(1) For, on the one hand, out of the principle of reverence for the person as such, all the *other elements of the social consciousness may be derived*: the sense of likeness, the sense of the mutual influence of men, the sense of obligation, and of sacrificial love. For he who believes in the essential value and sacredness of each individual person cannot deny the fundamental *likeness* of men. Their essential likeness lies just in the inviolableness of their personality. And that personality which we are called on to reverence is the outcome of an age-long process of growing individualization. It is no mere copy of another personality, as an atom of another atom, but a unique spirit with a flavor all its own. It has therefore something to give as well as much to receive from others; and this demands the organic conception of society — the sense of the necessity of the *mutual influence* of men. And the elements of the *sense of obligation* and of the spirit of *sacrificial love* grow directly out of the essential value

and sacredness of every person. For this makes it plain that we must accord to each the right to make no less a claim on life than we ourselves make, and that only a being so priceless in value can properly call out limitless sacrificial love. The social consciousness, then, would seem to find its unity in the one basic principle of reverence for the person, as such. And sociology might be said to be aiming to bring about a state of society in which this principle should be absolutely controlling at every point.

(2) A brief summary of the historical trend of the centuries suggests a like result. For *the historical trend* discloses in the ancient period the predominantly communal type of state with its emphasis on coöperation. The modern period has disclosed a like predominant — not exclusive — emphasis on individual freedom and individual initiative. And we are now confronted with the necessity of bringing both coöperation and individual freedom and initiative more clearly and consciously together, and on a religious basis. How can they be organically united? Now the ideals of coöperation, and of individual freedom and initiative, so suggested, are both, once more, involved in the principle of reverence for person-

ality as a religious conviction. For the principle of reverence for personality — the religious sense of the inestimable value and sacredness of the individual person — carries the conviction that society must make sure that it do not lose the full contribution of each of its members, and must, therefore, punctiliously guard the freedom and initiative of the individual. But this implies the need of coöperation on the part of all, and of a coöperation that secures rather than smothers individual initiative. The historical trend also, thus, looks to the principle of reverence for personality, as the essential, determining principle in human development.

That is, the test of the social consciousness and the test of the trend of history seem to agree in giving us the principle of reverence for personality as the guiding sociological principle in the progress of the race.

(3) This principle, too, is only a direct expression of Christ's conviction of every man as a child of God. Is it, also, a fundamental ethical principle, and one manifested by science, and psychology? It is certainly interesting to see that the ideals, both of coöperation and of individual freedom and initiative, are expressed in Herrmann's

summary of the moral law: "Mental and spiritual fellowship with men and mental and spiritual independence on the part of the individual, — that is what we can ourselves recognize to be prescribed to us by the moral law." The fellowship we must have, and yet each must be irrevocably true to his own ultimate inner vision. That is, a comprehensive ethical principle only formulates what we have already found involved in reverence for personality. The progress of scientific inquiry, too, in every sphere has required just this combination of independence and fellowship. It may be properly regarded, therefore, as the very spirit of natural science, as also of historical investigation. It is just as truly the outcome of the ideals of psychology, in its emphasis upon the whole personality.¹ That is, *the scientific, psychological, sociological, ethical and religious ideals tend here to come together.*

It seems, therefore, hardly too much to say that the one great challenge of the inner world of thought is the plain challenge of the social consciousness — of the principle of reverence for the person as such. Specifically, as we saw, this involves the growing conviction of the essential like-

¹ Cf. King, *Rational Living*, pp. 236 ff.

ness of men, of their mutual influence, and of the value and sacredness of the individual person.

The growing conviction of *the likeness of men* translates itself, by the use of the self as key, into the understanding of others. For it alone insures that better understanding and fairer interpretation of other men, and brings the sense of obligation to them as beings like ourselves. And it insures, not less, a steadily deepening sympathy with all and a growing faith and hope for all. This element of the social consciousness should count increasingly, in the face of class divisions and closer race associations.

The sense of *the mutual influence of men*, — of the fact that we are members one of another — has passed rapidly through three stages, in which men have thought of this mutual influence, first, as only inevitable; second, as perhaps rather desirable; and third, as simply indispensable. And no man has entered fully into the social consciousness who has not reached the third of these stages. We are not simply to say: "We are members one of another, parts of one whole, and we must face the fact, uncomfortable as it is, more's the pity"; nor are we even to say that it is possible to recognize that there are aspects of

this mutual influence that are not without their desirable features. But rather are we to come into possession of the clear conviction, that men are made on so large a plan that they cannot come to their best in independence one of another; that they are indispensable to one another, and that every race and every individual has its own value to share.

And the sense of likeness and the sense of mutual influence, as we have seen, both grow out of the still deeper *sense of the priceless value and sacredness of the individual person* — whether child, or woman, or of the other class, or of the other race. This alone is that reverence for the person as such, that essentially involves obligation and love. Without some recognition of this inevitable sacredness of the person, a man has not truly entered upon the moral life at all. And at its highest, it is the finest flower of spiritual growth.

This trend of the new inner world toward the social conscience may be said practically to involve at least three phases: the recognition of a new standard of service; the perception of the demand for respect for personality in all relations; and the prevalence of such a spirit of brotherhood as shall either outrun or prepare for the Socialistic state, according to one's conception.

The social consciousness means, then, in the first place, the recognition of a new *standard of service*, applied in all spheres of society, in all relations of life, and to all individuals; the measuring of every life and of every institution by service rendered; the recognition of the obligation upon the part of all to share their best, and the certainty that this sharing of the best is increasingly to prevail.

The application of the social conscience means, also, and especially, the prevalence of the spirit of *respect for the person in all the relations of life*. It is everywhere fundamental. It is the crucial test to be applied at every point. All social abuses will be found somewhere to violate this spirit. No small part of our labor difficulties comes from the attempt to treat men as if they were simply a part of the machinery of an industry, instead of recognizing what is due to men as men, to persons as persons. And various kindly provisions of another sort will by no means make good this basal lack. Even our American record of divorce, shameful enough in some of its aspects, must be regarded as having this element of encouragement, that it undoubtedly, often, bears witness to a deepened sense of the respect due to personality in this closest relation of life.

Again, the social consciousness can hardly fail to mean such a *development of the social virtues*, such an incoming of the true spirit of brotherhood, as shall either outrun Socialism or prepare for it, according to one's conception of the meaning of the Socialistic goal. For there will be practical agreement, on the part of men greatly varying in their estimate and definition of Socialism, in the insistence that social welfare in the largest sense is to be sought, and that true liberty, in the language of Miss Scudder, "consists not in the license of each person to indulge desire, but in the power bestowed by the community upon its every member to rise to the level of his richest capacity, by living in harmony with the Whole." This means nothing less than that ideals that have been thought of as peculiarly religious are bound to come more and more into recognition as essential ethical and social ideals. For more and more it must be recognized, to use Miss Scudder's words again, that the "law of individual selflessness and sacrifice," is "the fundamental law of social health." "In the name of the larger social self, of which the functions can only be performed as the individual joyously surrenders all claim to special privilege" the individual "finds in self-subjection

his true liberty. He who loses his life shall find it."

Finally, this same unmistakable trend toward the social consciousness is certain to demand in rapidly increasing degree a like *spirit of conciliation in international relations*. The spirit of internationalism already manifest among workmen in all nations, the great strides made for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and the changed spirit which has, at least in some measure, come into diplomacy, are all alike indications of what we may reasonably believe the early future has in store for us. We are surely approaching a time when patriotism is not to be interpreted as implying a persistent attitude of suspicion, distrust, and hatred toward other nations.

This, then, at least, must be included in the *meaning* of the new inner world of thought: the outworking of definite moral qualities and of definite moral and religious contributions; the pre-eminent need, for our age, of time and thought, if it is to come even to intelligent self-consciousness; the recognition of the necessary religious root of all these great modern forms of intellectual inquiry; the statement of many of the more significant principles that must direct in human progress, and so a

clearing up of our ideas and ideals in this greatest field; and particularly the impressed conviction that the principle of reverence for personality is the essential guiding and determining principle in human development. Modern education should prepare men to appreciate and appropriate this spiritual significance of these great intellectual movements of our time.

This full discussion of the meaning of the new inner world should make it possible to put very compactly the problems involved, the qualities demanded, and the elements of encouragement to be found.

II

THE DANGERS AND PROBLEMS INVOLVED

The very fact that our age has been marked by such enormous progress in knowledge involves, of course, many changes in the conception of the values of life, and of their relations to one another. And just because the present becomes thus a period in which old ideas and ideals are breaking down, it becomes, at the same time, inevitably a period of dangerous transition. So revolutionary a time must bring its own peculiar dangers.

1. There is to be seen, thus, first of all, the *danger of the false materialistic and atheistic inferences from modern science*, and the consequent throwing over of all religious ideals. This danger is the greater even in the West, because there is often, on the part of the educated themselves, an ignorance of the real essentials of Christianity, that is fairly appalling. Our education has been many times so one-sided that capacity for religious appreciation has seemed well-nigh atrophied. Out of that perverse materialistic one-sidedness, it may be hoped, we are escaping. But many still seem to feel that virtually materialistic and atheistic conclusions are forced upon them by modern thought. The West is beginning to see more clearly at this point, and to understand that the way to idealistic interpretations is as open as ever. It even believes that the reasons for religious faith are more soundly based than before. But in the Orient the situation as regards this danger is more nearly that of the West of twenty-five years ago. Educated men in India and China and Japan who have felt the pressure of modern scientific teachings are often finding it very difficult to retain religious faith at all. Not only is it true that modern science tends to make it impossible for them to keep their

older religious beliefs; but they are inclined to draw the inference that any rational religious faith is impossible. The religious forces of the world still need, therefore, clearly to reckon with this danger, especially on missionary ground, although, happily, the means for the solution of the problems involved are at hand, to an extent not true even twenty-five years ago.

2. There is also involved in the setting aside of idealistic interpretations the further and naturally accompanying danger of a *purely utilitarian point of view*, — the attempt simply to secure a balance of selfish interests in the progress of the race, rather than any ideal achievement. There have been influential, at this point, not only the half-despairing feeling that idealistic views were being lost perforce, but also the prodigious material advances of our time, that have tended, temporarily at least, to absorb the attention and ambition of men. Under the glamour of these great utilitarian goals, men have felt it almost possible to return to the standpoint of the ancient world, with its belief in the self-sufficing nature of the present. They have seemed to think they might escape the romantic “haunting sense of the infinite” that Christianity brought, once for all, into the world. But it is

impossible. The ancient position cannot long be held by any real modern. It belongs to his modern consciousness, permeated with the disquieting ideals of Christianity, to raise questions that no utilitarian culture can answer, and to make claims on life that no utilitarian civilization can satisfy. It is quite true that men see, as never before, the economic conditions of righteous human relations, and are more than ever determined to realize their ideals now and here on earth; but a merely utilitarian standard, we may be confident, is not finally to prevail. Nevertheless, whole multitudes are still under the selfish utilitarian spell, and the danger is one that the educational and religious forces must recognize and provide against.

3. On the other hand, in this period of revolutionary changes in knowledge, there is the danger, on the part of mistaken religionists, of *withstanding all the newer knowledge* in a prejudiced conservatism. One can quite appreciate the feeling out of which this opposition springs. It is felt that the newer views endanger the priceless interests of religion. And yet such an attitude of intolerance brings not only moral danger to the individual, but a distinct damage to genuine religious interests. For its impossible methods of defense and its misrepresen-

tation both of science and of religious interests make a rational religious faith impossible. This tendency, too, is to be found not only at home, but on missionary ground to-day. It is the danger of those who pride themselves on their religious orthodoxy; and it needs frank facing, especially on the mission field. Religion cannot be saved by a denial of truth in any sphere.

4. In the inner world, too, as in the outer, there has naturally come, especially in the study of many ethical and religious systems, *the sense of conflicting ideals*, and therefore the feeling that none of them are authoritative or commanding. From this there arises the great danger of lack of all thoughtful discrimination, and so the further danger of a false tolerance. Neither intelligence nor religion can gain by lack of discrimination. But many a man prides himself on his breadth and tolerance, when his breadth only means that he has put all ideals practically on a level, and his tolerance is not true tolerance at all, but only an indifference untroubled by convictions. These are the dangers of many who count themselves religious liberals, and they need quite as frank facing as the danger of intolerance; for they mean spineless lack of all deep conviction. And out of that nothing worthy can come.

5. The very largeness of the achievement, too, made in these great departments of intellectual inquiry, itself tempts men to *stop* in these goals, which, although they are great and engrossing, are, after all, still secondary. Here too, that is, there besets us *the peril of the lower attainment*, — the peril of the lesser good.

The dangers, then, that the inner world of thought holds for our time are: the danger of the false materialistic and irreligious inferences from modern science; the accompanying danger of a purely utilitarian view of life; the danger of religious intolerance on the one hand, or of lack of all thoughtful discrimination and of all convictions on the other; and the constant peril of resting satisfied in the lower attainment. This is a definite challenge to the ideal influences of our age; for it indicates the particular points at which the ideal life is threatened by the new world of thought.

III

THE QUALITIES DEMANDED

1. When one turns now to ask, what are the qualities demanded by the problems arising in this

new inner world of thought, he must see, first of all, that there is need of *clear insight into the always difficult problems of a critical transition period*, and, particularly, into the problems of the moral and religious bearings of the theory of evolution and of historical criticism. We have need of patience with one another at both these points. As another has said of the theory of evolution, "Possibly no other single conception of the human mind has produced, throughout so many departments of knowledge, results at once so profoundly disintegrating and so radically reconstructive. It has, to use the words of Romanes, 'created a revolution in the thought of our time, the magnitude of which in many of its far-reaching consequences, we are not even yet in a position to appreciate, but the action of which has already wrought a transformation in general philosophy, as well as in the more special science of biology, that is without a parallel in the history of mankind.'"¹ It is not too much to say that the hypothesis of evolution has affected the method employed in the consideration of practically every subject of human inquiry. It was inevitable that its relations to moral and religious problems should be of deep significance. At the same time, as we

¹ Kidd, *Principles of Western Civilization*, p. 39.

have already seen, historical criticism, too, in the treatment of the religious literatures of the race, is essential, and it greatly affects religious conception at many points. Present-day religion must face the questions raised by historical criticism, therefore, as truly as those of the bearing of evolution.

2. In all these problems, and in the situations which they disclose, there is plainly demanded, in the second place, and in peculiar degree, *a breadth of view that is still sharply discriminating*, that does not end with putting all ideals and faiths on the same level, and yet does not fail to see the true value and contribution of each. The time particularly demands, thus, not indiscriminating breadth, and, least of all, moral and religious indifference, but a broad tolerance that justifies the name, because it is not a tolerance without convictions, but a tolerance founded upon convictions.

3. In the third place, as we have already fully seen, this new inner world of thought, no less than the world of external conditions, demands, above all, *the qualities of the social consciousness* — rooting in reverence for personality — as the indispensable moral conditions of human progress.

IV

THE ELEMENTS OF ENCOURAGEMENT

The elements of encouragement, also, involved in the great advances in the new intellectual world, are unmistakable, and, in view of the previous discussion, may be very briefly stated.

1. We have seen that every department of this great modern movement of thought has involved in itself a *virtual moral and religious development*; and that each of these great departments of human inquiry has large and steady help to give to the moral and religious progress of the race. It is difficult to overestimate how much this means.

2. It has been not less plain that through these great inquiries of our time, *definite direction*, too, has been given for the moral and religious advancement of the race, through the laws discerned, — scientific, psychological, and sociological.

3. At the same time, these movements of the inner world of thought have been a great *revelation of the inevitable spiritual qualities of men*, and of the determining nature of these qualities in human development. They constitute a rebuke to our timid faith.

4. These great factors of modern thought have, also, endowed the present age, under the inspiration of the Christian religion, with its two greatest characteristics — *the scientific spirit and the social consciousness*. For in these may be almost summed up the intellectual and moral achievements of our time.

V

EDUCATIONAL APPLICATIONS

Before leaving this survey of our modern world, outer and inner, with its great needs and trends, it may be worth while to see some of the suggestions that naturally arise for specific moral and religious education.

1. First of all, in view of many characteristics of the modern spirit, it may be expected that the religious education of the future will be permeated through and through with the ethical, and that the inevitable *inwardness of the moral and spiritual life* will never be left out of account. In this sphere most of all it will be seen that there can be no genuine education without the calling out of individual insight, initiative, and choice. Moral and religious education will show, also, more and more the influ-

ence of the social consciousness, with its constant respect for the person in all relations; and will therefore train the individual definitely for entering into enlarged social goals, for grappling with race prejudice, and for the meeting of new standards of service.

2. For the formal education of the schools, these principles must apparently carry with them *certain plain demands*: that both the physical condition of the pupil himself and his social environment shall be scientifically examined and corrected; that manual training shall be introduced into the schools earlier, and be open to all; that the training of the school shall be related more definitely and concretely to the social whole, to the entire present and later community life; and that the need of definite moral instruction and training — given, however, through the child's entire reaction — shall be clearly recognized, a training that shall not only call out good intention and develop moral backbone, but bring the pupil, not less, to an intelligent sharing in the community's best ideals, and to a knowledge of social goals, laws, and methods. Some reports of first-hand observations in school and college make one fear that a dispassionate but thorough investigation, both of public schools and

of colleges and universities, would disclose, in far too many cases, well-nigh criminal carelessness as to moral conditions. We may not leave it to chance that the child or the growing citizen shall be brought to self-initiative, self-control, consideration of others, some sharing in the wisdom of life, and in the highest and largest community ideals. This definite moral and religious training will involve that the problems of the pupil's moral life shall be brought to the pupil himself, and that he be helped to see them in their concrete relation to his own life and volition. In bringing these problems to the pupil, increasing use is likely to be made of visual methods, as in Mr. Milton Fairchild's public school lectures, and in a wise use of moving pictures; and the public sentiment of the school and of the entire community will be brought into play from the start. Methods like those of some of the best English schools, of the George Junior Republic, and of the schools of ethics of such institutions as the Ohio State Reformatory of Mansfield, are certain to come into much more prominent use, in order to secure definite training for leadership, through the wide distribution of responsibility in school and community life. The use, too, of careful, wisely adapted texts in moral education, by both

teachers and pupils, is sure to extend. Some valuable essays in this direction have already been made, and much more is to be expected. That the moral training of the pupils of our public schools is not to be left to chance is more and more clear, from the prevalent tone of the gatherings of teachers and of educational journals, and from the formation of various organizations like the Religious Education Association, devoted to the express furtherance of moral and religious education.

3. The religious education of the future, as distinct from moral education, must seek to produce, above all, that faith in *the eternal significance of life and the world*, upon which we have seen that all moral endeavor, too, must ultimately depend. The problem here is like that, for example, of Bruce's *The Moral Order of the World*, and *The Providential Order of the World*, — the endeavor to see the reasons for a rational faith in an end and personal purpose greater and higher than our own. This faith should not be less, but even more, possible to a generation that has come to living belief in a vital social evolution and in the trend of civilization toward enlarging goals.

The religious education of the future will be inclined, too, one judges, to lay new emphasis upon the Reformation ideal of duty to God through duty to man, and, in a still more intimate sense than our fathers conceived, it will find the will of God in the law of duty. The ethical thus gains the warmth and concreteness of a personal Will. In the intelligent and voluntary sharing, thus, in those social goals that we have come to believe are permanent and worthy, we shall have at once both moral satisfaction and the religious sense of coöperation with God, in his own eternal purposes, — the sense of working as well as praying, that the will of God may be done on earth, even as in heaven. Such concrete expression of the spiritual life in *deed*, is demanded by our very natures, if the sense of reality is to be fully achieved.

If religious education is to come to its full fruition, it must, also, seek to make as definite and specific as possible the application of the Christian spirit to the entire life of man; and in this it will try to escape the domination of the simply conventional and traditional, and endeavor to try out honestly and fully the Christian ideal. It will aim to make less true than it is at present Peile's statement: "Now it is a hard saying, but a whole-

some one, that the great majority of mankind have for centuries done everything with the moral rule of the Gospel except obey it."

Above all, the moral and religious education of the future, no less than that of the past, can never spare the power that comes, as in no other way, through personal associations and embodied ideals. We seem to be on the eve of a determined attempt, on the part of a hypercritical and rather unhistorical analysis of the Gospels, not only to make the legitimate distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of developed Christian dogmatic, but also to rob men's lives of the inspiration of the world's greatest life. Certainly, we can do nothing, finally, against the truth; but let us not deceive ourselves into thinking that any summation of far smaller lives can ever make good the dynamic of his great personality. For myself, I cannot doubt that the final scholarly verdict of the future does not belong with this hypercritical school, and that, however carefully we guard ourselves against unwarranted assertions, the inspiration of the ideal of Jesus, embodied in his personal life, will remain the richest asset of the moral and religious life of the race.

CHAPTER VI

THE LESSON OF THE HISTORICAL TREND OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

As what is actually going on in the world to-day is, plainly, the increasing spread of Western civilization over the world, if we are to understand the modern age, we need clearly to see just what Western civilization means, not only through the analysis of present conditions, already attempted, but also by tracing its historical development. Only so shall we comprehend it in its genesis. This should help not only to clearer perception of our situation and problems in the Occident, but also to a better understanding of the meaning of the spread of Western civilization into the Orient, and of the methods and spirit that should guide men there. For the contrast between the Orient and the Occident is much like that between the ancient and the modern periods.¹

¹ I am particularly indebted, in this chapter, to Kidd's *Principles of Western Civilization*, and shall freely use that suggestive book for illustrative purposes; though I have not adopted precisely Mr. Kidd's formulation of the results of his inquiry. Mr.

Since we cannot survey the whole historical development of Western civilization to discover its trend and its underlying, determining principles, we may,

Kidd seems to me inconsistent, in so sharply setting the ancient and modern civilizations in antagonism at all points, and in representing the first epoch of history as one of the rule of force only. This makes the present day antinomy in social progress much sharper, than on his own principles it could consistently be. For if moral control in evolution is to come in at all, on those principles of simple natural selection which he adopts, this moral control must have what he calls "military efficiency," or "the ascendancy of the present," as well as "social efficiency," or "projected efficiency." Or, in other words, social efficiency (or projected efficiency or the ascendancy of the future, or the ascendancy of interests lying quite beyond those of the present political organization, as he variously terms it), must have fitness to survive or military efficiency from the start; just as Wallace interprets the evolutionary significance of ornament in the male when he says, "The extremely rigid action of natural selection must render any attempt to select mere ornament truly nugatory, unless the most ornamented always coincide with 'the fittest' in every other respect." (Quoted by Kidd, *Op. cit.*, p. 63.)

The two great epochs in the history of the race that we call ancient and modern cannot, then, be marked by two utterly antagonistic principles of development. The differences between the ancient and modern worlds are great indeed; but the determining principle of development in the first cannot have been mere force, and the determining principle in the latter be purely moral. At bottom both must have the same causes; for we are bound to ask, "Why is Western civilization prevailing to-day? Why did the ancient exclusive state prove so efficient from a military point of view? Why did Japan, for example, take on so readily military efficiency?" The ultimate reasons must be the same, or closely related, in all these cases.

perhaps, reach these more quickly by the combined results of three methods of approach. We may look at the historical development from three points of view, to obtain: first, the suggestions coming from the consideration of the more important contrasts between ancient and modern civilization; second, the suggestions coming from well-recognized instances of mistaking at first the full meaning and proper application of the principles underlying Western civilization; third, the suggestions coming from the observed relation of the fundamental principles and characteristics of present-day Western civilization to the elements of the social consciousness.

I

THE SUGGESTIONS COMING FROM THE MORE IMPORTANT CONTRASTS BETWEEN ANCIENT AND MODERN CIVILIZATION

We may well begin with a summary statement of the more notable contrasts between the ancient and modern periods; and then see how they gather around one or the other of two outstanding phenomena: the institution of the ancient exclusive state, or the coming in of Christianity.

1. What, in the first place, were the *characteristic features of the ancient period*?

First of all, the ancient world is marked by "the institution of *exclusive citizenship*," which, as Mommsen says, was "altogether of a moral-religious nature," and was built upon ancestor worship.¹ Out of this institution of exclusive citizenship may be said to grow practically all the other characteristics of the ancient world. This means, for example, that the ancient civilization must be regarded as plainly of *the communal type*, as over against the modern, more individualistic type. This dominance of the state naturally connects itself also with the ancient sense of the *self-sufficingness of the present life*. This, the historians of philosophy have commonly set over against the "romantic" element in modern life. The modern feeling grows out of what has been called the "haunting sense of the infinite," brought in by Christianity. It involves the sense of relation to principles which are superior to all that is temporal, and which are the natural reflection of those great Christian convictions which separate the ancient and the modern periods.

The absolute domination of the individual by the ancient exclusive state suggests what is, perhaps,

¹ Kidd, *Op. cit.*, pp. 162 ff., 167 ff.

the greatest moral contrast between the ancient and modern worlds — that the exclusive state of the ancient period knew *no reverence for the person as such*. The contrast here is so immense as to be almost unbelievable. The theory of the ancient Greek and Roman state held, even for the small, favored body of citizens, that all “should be regarded as the property of the state”; that “the sovereignty of the state was absolute, that individual freedom as against the state was unknown, and that the existing political relations embraced the whole life of the individual, the whole range of his duties and activities — civil, social, moral, and religious.”¹ The total lack of all reverence for the person as such is, also, to be seen, not only in the fact that the actual Greek and Roman state was founded upon slavery, and that, too, a slavery not merely of barbarians, but of other Greeks and Romans, but in the further most significant fact, that even such *ideal* political constructions, as those of geniuses, like Plato and Aristotle, made slavery the necessary foundation of the state. There is no feeling, here, of the intrinsic sacredness of human life, and there is no sense of obligation to human beings as such. In Kidd’s words, “To the ‘bar-

¹ Mahaffy, and Bluntschli, quoted by Kidd, *Op. cit.*, p. 180.

barians' Aristotle considered the Greeks had no more duties than to wild beasts." In modern civilization such exclusiveness as in the ancient state was taken coolly for granted is simply unthinkable.

It naturally followed, also, from the ancient institution of exclusive citizenship, with its complete domination of the entire life of the individual, that in the ancient civilization in general religion should have reference only to temporal blessings and to the present; and that *a rule of law is not yet discriminated from a rule of religion*. Whereas, in modern civilization, there is an increasingly clear discrimination of the ethical and religious from law, custom, or political relation.¹ With the ancient exclusive citizenship is connected, also, "that *almost stationary social state*," that is to be contrasted with "the rapidly progressing societies of our Western world."

All the contrasts, so far brought out, hold, in general, also, in the comparison of the Orient with the Occident, as might be shown in detail, for example, from the history of Japan.

2. If we now turn to some of the *outstanding features of the modern age*, certain other contrasts

¹ Kidd, *Op. cit.*, p. 249.

between the ancient and modern worlds disclose themselves.

Kidd points out particularly the *different conception of truth* which has come to characterize the most modern period. In Western civilization, truth is thought of, he contends, as coming out in an historical process, as "the net resultant of forces which are in themselves apparently opposed and conflicting." The modern conception of truth may thus be said to be a dynamic conception; whereas, in the ancient and mediæval periods, truth is regarded as absolute, and embodied in state or church or system—it is a static conception. Growing inevitably out of this new conception of truth, Kidd sees the new *modern virtue of tolerance* that involves a conflict, "in the stress of which every cause and opinion and institution is to hold its life only at the challenge of such criticism and competition as has never been possible in the world before."¹ This new conception of truth and new modern virtue of tolerance really correspond to the principle of *freedom of investigation, as based upon absolute freedom of conscience*. This, in turn, as we have seen, is only an expression of Christianity's fundamental principle of reverence for the person

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 318.

as such. It is this demand for absolute freedom of investigation, and its actual possibility in our time, which have made possible, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the great achievements of modern science, and have led naturally to an age that could be called preëminently a scientific age.

Now, all these contrasts, as has been already sufficiently indicated, evidently group themselves about one or the other or both of two great phenomena: the ancient, exclusive, moral-religious state, and the bringing in of Christianity. It is, on the one hand, the exclusive moral-religious state which gives character to the entire ancient period; and, on the other hand, it is the new principles brought in by Christianity that underlie modern Western civilization.

3. *The ancient exclusive state.* Let us ask, then, first of all, for the moral and religious significance of the ancient exclusive state. Why did the exclusive moral-religious state come to be the prevailing type in the ancient world? Why were the ancient states all communal? What made this type of state survive and prevail? What gave it "military efficiency"? Mr. Kidd, perhaps, states the matter as compactly as it can be stated when he says: "There springs inevitably from the concep-

tion of common descent from deified ancestors a system of morality the exclusiveness of which it is almost impossible for us to fully realize; a system of morality in which there is to be distinguished a feeling of obligation to regard all outside the tie of the resulting moral-religious citizenship, as not only without the pale of all duty and obligation, and beyond the range of even those feelings which to us seem to be the outcome of a conception of a common humanity; but as persons whom it would actually be a kind of sacrilege to admit under any circumstances as equals.”¹

(1) This very constitution of the ancient state instituted the *closest possible ties* between its citizens, and gave to them the conscious sense of deepest obligation to the state, and the willingness to sacrifice for it. And all this was directly based on religious faith.² That is, Mr. Kidd is surely justified in saying that we have represented in the ancient exclusive state “the most potent principle of military efficiency which it would be possible to conceive.” “We may obtain some idea of the peculiar religious sanctity attached to the bond

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

² Exactly this consciousness, it may be said, in passing, has prevailed in modern Japan.

of citizenship, and of the spirit which pervaded the fabric of the ancient state, from Cicero's assertion that no man could lay claim to the title of good who would hesitate to die for his country; and that the love owed by the citizen towards this larger community of which he was a member was holier and more profound than that due from him to his nearest kinsman."¹

(2) But this most efficient military state had, it should be noted, *a definite, avowed, moral-religious basis*. It is this which led so inevitably to some of the strongest elements of the social consciousness, — to the overpowering sense of membership one of another, and of the obligation to sacrifice for the whole. It is exactly these qualities which made this type of state prevail. That is, it is plain that, even in the ancient period, "military efficiency" goes back to "social efficiency," and plainly roots in moral-religious convictions. The particular element of the social consciousness here emphasized is that of the sense of mutual influence or organic unity — that men are members one of another, inevitably, desirably, indispensably. Out of this springs the spirit of sacrifice, and the sense of the right of the state to demand all from the indi-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 173.

vidual. It is not just, therefore, to speak of this ancient period as one of the rule of simple force, as Mr. Kidd seems to imply.¹ The efficiency of the state in this period is not due simply to the sum of the physical strength of its units, but depends on the moral-religious cement. Even in the ancient period, thus, the determining elements are moral-religious, resulting in the definite social quality of the sense of organic unity. That is, it must be admitted that, in the case of the ancient state itself, there is more than the mere "ascendency of the present." The very fact that the ancient state is "altogether of a moral-religious nature," involving willingness to sacrifice on principle, shows that there is already here something that transcends the present. Moreover, any vigorous patriotism is, probably, always more or less consciously thinking of the state *as going on*, as developing, — is thinking of its growing glory, and, therefore, is always more or less plainly subordinating the present to the future, in a virtually religious way.²

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 240.

² Even in the lower biological evolution, survival is never a matter of the mere physical force of the individual. Any better adjustment to environment helps — whether protective mimicry, activity, health, cunning, skill, intelligence, better organization, or superior social qualities — anything that gives greater fitness

(3) Now, among all the various ancient examples of the moral-religious exclusive state, what determined the survivors? Why, in that great struggle for national existence, out of which have come those peoples in whose life the principles of Western civilization are most manifest, and who are leading in its progress and spread over the world, — the

to survive in the struggle for existence. Moreover, the fitness of the species to survive calls often for the sacrifice of the individual, and just here is to be seen the evolutionary significance of the phenomena of death and of sexual reproduction.

Nor is it ever mere original physical force that determines the outcome in human evolution, else civilization would have no assurance of maintaining itself against barbarism. There comes a time in human evolution when intellectual development becomes more important than physical, and the physical is arrested — through the use of the instrument, intellectually devised — that is, through ability to tap the far greater forces of nature. Ultimately, this becomes that progressive mastery of the forces of nature through knowledge of law, which insures the progressive conquest of barbarism by civilization. When, therefore, the Afghan chief contended that Western civilization was superior to that of the Afghans, only in the possession of the rifle, he placed his finger simply upon one military illustration of the whole wide range of the use of natural forces, which makes the scientific distinction between the superior and the inferior civilization. So, too, there comes in human evolution a time when moral development becomes more important than intellectual, through the contribution of the social consciousness. In truth, the moral needs constantly to accompany the intellectual, for the intellectual development, as we have seen, must have its basis in the moral-religious principle of freedom of conscience.

Teutonic peoples, and especially the English-speaking peoples, — why did these survive? what made them prevail? what gave them leadership? ¹ The reason cannot be found simply in the constitution of the ancient exclusive state. That originally characterized all the struggling states. It must, therefore, be either the superiority of the survivors in those very social qualities which are called out by this type of state, or some *other* advantageous variation. Now any advantageous variation was most likely to occur in that state *where the individual had greatest opportunity for initiative*. For that would be the state where most inventive ingenuity and skill would be shown.² The surviving and prevailing states, then, in the

¹ Cf. Kidd, *Op. cit.*, pp. 157, 161.

² Mr. Kidd's own language implies that some other principle than that of the exclusive state is necessary to account for the fact that certain of these states prevailed over others. For he says: "Under no other theory of society could the ideal of conquest, by a people *naturally fitted to conquer*, lead so directly to conquest on a universal scale" (*Op. cit.*, p. 174). What is this natural fitness to conquer? What makes one of these ancient states superior to others? What is it that in this type of states, all tending to military efficiency, makes one of them most efficient? Evolution suggests that it must be the one in which variation is most active, — where there is, as has just been said, most individual initiative, — the opportunity for inventive skill and ingenuity.

modern outcome, are pretty certain to be those in which the struggle is as free as possible; and the struggle will be as free as possible in all lines, only where the principle of reverence for the person as a religious conviction prevails. For if individual initiative and absolute freedom of investigation are to make headway, they must have their source in something that will be regarded as inviolable, — that is, in religious conviction; as has been true, as a matter of fact, in the most modern period.

Kingsley thus illustrates the conditions of survival, in explaining the superiority of the English over the Spanish in the struggle that ended in the destruction of the Great Armada. After speaking of the ingenuity shown by the English in the construction of their ships, he says: "But the great source of superiority was, after all, in the men themselves. . . . The 'fiercest nation upon earth,' as they were then called, and the freest also, each man of them fought for himself with the self-help and self-respect of a Yankee ranger, and once bidden to do his work, was trusted to carry it out by his own wit as best he could. In one word, he was a free man. The English officers, too, as now, lived on terms of sympathy with their men unknown to the Spaniards, who raised between the com-

mander and the commanded absurd barriers of rank and blood, which forbade to his pride any labor but that of fighting." The English were characterized by "fellow-feeling between commander and commanded," — no small element in their victory. That is, the secret of the greater military efficiency of the English went back to the spirit of coöperation, on the one hand, and to the spirit of individual initiative, on the other. It is worth noting, in addition, that these were both made doubly effective, because of the sense of moral indignation against the cruelties of the Spanish Inquisition, and the consequent sense that was given to the English of being engaged in a divine cause.

We may, then, perhaps, assume that not only a marked spirit of coöperation, but the other element of the social consciousness — reverence for the person, as seen in some freedom for individual initiative, — was not wholly lacking even in the ancient state, in its strongest representatives. Though the other element of coöperation, of communalism, was, of course, decidedly dominant.

(4) The *great defects, obviously, of the ancient exclusive state*, from the modern point of view, lie in the *exclusiveness of its citizenship*, and in the

absolute dominance of the individual citizen by the state. On the one hand, those outside of the exclusive citizenship were not recognized as having any rights at all. The sense of organic unity was confined to a narrow, exclusive body. There was no reverence for the person as such. On the other hand, the dominance of the individual citizen by the state naturally tended to keep the social state stationary, because it shut out individual initiative, and the resulting opportunity for the prevalence of new ideas. Upon this side, too, there was no reverence for the person as such. The failure of the ancient state on both sides, therefore, is moral. Such exclusiveness of citizenship, and such dominance of the individual by the state, were certain, ultimately, to lose their basis of conviction, as the later Greek and Roman periods both show, and as is becoming more and more obvious in the present evolution of Japan.

The real power of the ancient state lay in its sense of common origin and organic unity. And these very principles of likeness and of organic unity are certain to lead, finally, to an extension of the privilege of citizenship — to an enlargement of the spirit of coöperation. Christianity, it should be noted, simply carries the principle of organic unity

to its logical conclusion of including all men, and founds it upon the religious basis of the Fatherhood of God. This gives a basis like in kind to that of the ancient state, but far firmer, and now become universal.

In like manner, the ancient conviction underlying the right of the state so absolutely to dominate the individual was, also, certain to weaken. It was inevitable that there should increasingly come in, on the part of the citizens of the state, a sense of injustice and resentment of this dominance, and, so, lack of heartiness in support of the state. Weakness of the state necessarily follows. "Monsieur de Coulanges has pointed out," writes Hearn, "that the absence of individual liberty was the real cause of the disorders and the final ruin of the Greek societies." Even the great dominating Shogun, Iyeyasu, could say: "The art of governing a country consists in the manifestation of due deference on the part of a suzerain to his vassals."¹ And for this constant recognition of the rights of the individual, again, Christianity alone gives the final basis in that principle of reverence for the person as such, which is only another form of Christ's insistence that every man is a child of God.

¹ *Japan, an Interpretation*, pp. 491, 393.

4. *The Bringing in of Christianity.* When one turns now from the consideration of the ancient exclusive state to those principles of Christianity which tend to characterize increasingly the modern world, he sees first of all, as has just been suggested, that Christianity's great revolutionary conception is the conviction that every man is a child of God, and therefore of priceless value, always an end in himself and never to be used merely as means. That conviction pronounces the ultimate doom of all tyrannies of every kind. It is particularly worth while, at the risk of some reiteration, to see just how vital this central conviction of Christianity is, to all that we most prize in modern civilization. We shall not otherwise learn the lesson of this great trend of the Christian centuries.

(1) This principle of *reverence for the person as such*, as a religious conviction, involved, then, two things; first, the feeling of the infinite significance of man's relation to God; and, second, the sense of the priceless value and sacredness of the individual person. And these convictions lie at the root of the great characteristic features of Western civilization.

The sense of the infinite significance of man's relation to God brought to men inevitably the conviction that the spiritual interests were far

superior to the temporal, and that loyalty to these spiritual interests must dominate all else. The present life necessarily, therefore, could be no longer self-sufficing, as it was for the ancient Greek and Roman world. The sense that religion was the supreme factor in life had fully come. It is this aspect of Christ's conviction, that every man is a child of God, that is first brought into prominence in the mediæval period, with its insistence upon the supremacy of religion.

But there followed not less certainly, from the conviction that every man is a child of God, the sense of *the priceless value and sacredness of the individual person*. And this contained in itself, as in germ, the whole spirit of the modern social consciousness, and has underlain centuries of social evolution. For, as the Christian centuries unfold, the full implications of reverence for the person as such, — of the sense that all men are, alike, children of God, — are to become more and more manifest. These implications, as we have already noted, will be plainly seen to be the sense of the likeness of men, the sense of the organic unity of men, and the sense of obligation and sacrificial love for all men. The modern social consciousness, that is, has this definitely Christian root.

Religious reverence for the person as such will produce, not less surely, respect for every man as having an indispensable function in life, — his own God-given message and mission. This implies the necessary recognition of his absolute freedom to carry out his ideals, and so of that freedom of conscience and freedom of investigation in all lines, that is the very essence of the modern scientific spirit, and the source of its marvelous triumphs.

(2) This fundamental Christian conviction of reverence for the person, of every man as a child of God, therefore, *meets both of the moral weaknesses of the ancient exclusive state* — its narrow exclusiveness, on the one hand, and its absolute dominance of the individual on the other — and makes possible, especially, the development of *all the strength derivable from the principle of freedom*. For it abhors the ancient failure to revere the person as such, whether in the exclusiveness of its citizenship, or in the state domination of the individual. We simply cannot put ourselves back, in either of these respects, into the feeling of the ancient age. We are moved by an essentially different conviction — that of the priceless value and inviolable sacredness of the person. This launches in human history a movement that must

finally have universal sweep, — a movement “which is to enfranchise not simply the slave and the serf, but the sullen, long-bound, silent peoples; which is to question not simply the right of kings, but of majorities.”¹

(3) It deserves attention, also, that this Christian principle of reverence for personality connects naturally and inevitably with that *new conception of the truth*, which has obviously characterized the present. For the respect for every man as having his indispensable function, his own God-given message and mission, naturally leads to the new organic conception of the truth, and to the new virtue of tolerance.

(4) This element of the social consciousness — the recognition of individual freedom and initiative — is not antagonistic, but *supplemental to the element of coöperation* or organic unity, which in a narrow field was so strongly manifested in the ancient civilization. Both the sense of organic unity and the respect for individual freedom and initiative grow out of reverence for the person as such — out of the conviction of every man as a child of God. The two — coöperation and individual freedom and initiative, or the sense of

¹ Cf. Kidd, *Op. cit.*, p. 224. Cf. pp. 348, 412.

organic unity and the sense of the necessity of the individual contribution, or fellowship and individual independence — are only supplemental aspects of the one principle of reverence for the person. The fact that this fundamental Christian principle involves necessarily these two aspects, carries with it the inference, that neither atomistic individualism, nor swamping socialism or ancient communalism, can command the development of the future. In fact, there is never, on the one hand, the most effective unity and coöperation, unless each individual is making his own complete, peculiar contribution. And, on the other hand, *all* must coöperate to insure that no lesser antagonisms prevent the contribution to all of even the least individual. Many of the finest personalities are dominated and exploited by cruder souls; and so the value of their possible service for society is largely lost. This subtler but uglier violation of personality, that threatens the highest social development, can be prevented only through great common controlling principles and ideals, which are religious in their character. That is, once more, the indispensable conditions of human progress, both in its more obvious and in its subtler aspects, are seen to be moral and religious.

Here, again, Herrmann's statement of the fundamental ethical law comes out. Mental and spiritual fellowship with men is indispensable, but it helps human development, just in the proportion in which it enables the individual to be true to his own best.

The probability is, that we have to-day reached a period in human progress, when emphasis must be laid anew on the factor of coöperation, *for the very sake* of keeping individual freedom and initiative and of insuring the individual contribution. Both are obligatory and essential. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard *such* coöperation as antagonistic to a true individualism. The peculiar task of our time, at this point, may be said to be to distinguish between those forms of coöperation or state action that would smother individual initiative, and those other forms of coöperation or of action by the state that are necessary to insure the full expression and opportunity of the individual.

In our search for light from the historical trend of Western civilization, we have, thus, tried to review the suggestions which come from the more important contrasts between the ancient and modern periods.

II

THE SUGGESTIONS COMING FROM WELL-RECOGNIZED INSTANCES OF MISTAKING, AT FIRST, THE FULL MEANING AND PROPER APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING WESTERN CIVILIZATION

We turn now to the second portion of our inquiry, — to the suggestions coming from well-recognized instances of mistaking, at first, the full meaning and proper application of the principles underlying Western civilization. The very fact that this phenomenon has so often occurred is a hint of the danger of our own generation, and of the need of some vigorous thinking, if we are not to make a like mistake. For the tragic nature of these attempts, in the history of the West, lies in the fact that men were bitterly fighting the logical consequences of the very principles they professed to adopt. For, as Kidd remarks of one of these mistaken attempts — that of the application of the Reformation principle: "It is remarkable to see how profoundly unconscious the human mind remains, and is yet for long to remain, of the potentiality of principles underlying the result which has been accomplished." ¹

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 316.

Illustrations of these mistaken attempts may be found, first, in the early interpretation of Christianity as ascetic; second, in the later Catholic interpretation of what it means that the spiritual transcends the temporal; third, in the working out of the principle which underlay the Reformation; and fourth, in the logical developments of the *laissez-faire* principle of the Manchester economic school.

1. First of all, the whole early attempt to *interpret Christianity in ascetic terms*, however naturally one can see that it arose, mistook the meaning of that supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal for which Christianity stands. Asceticism could not truly express Christianity's conviction of the supremacy of the spiritual; for it meant flight from the world, instead of victory over the world. And it still taints, one fears, almost all thinking on religion, and has made dominant a false conception of the saint and of religion. Asceticism, in fact, in its selfish seeking of individual salvation, was both absolutely contradictory of Christianity's fundamental duty of love, and absolutely blind to Christianity's belief that love alone is life. And, so far as men have escaped from the error of this earlier interpretation, it has been by substituting

Christianity's genuinely ethical conception of religion for the old ascetic interpretation.

2. The later mediæval period disclosed a parallel interpretation, in another sphere, of what it meant that the spiritual should transcend the temporal. Now the church declares that there must be indeed victory over the world, and not mere flight from the world. But victory over the world is taken to mean *the absolute dominion of the church*. The contention of the Popes, therefore, is that the church dominates the state, and a return is thus made to the ancient situation of regarding the rule of law as identical with the rule of religion. Here, again, a genuinely Christian conception of what spiritual dominion should involve is absolutely denied; and a kingdom by force is substituted for the kingdom of the Spirit by spiritual means. The church, that is, has yielded to the temptation that Christ rejected. The inevitable consequences follow this substitution of force for free persuasion of a free individual; and the absolute domination by the church means the stopping of progress through intellectual paralysis. "Mr. Lecky's somber description," Mr. Kidd says, "of the conditions of the world as they presented themselves throughout this period can hardly be

considered to be overstated. The spirit which prevailed had produced a condition in thought in which, says Mr. Lecky, 'the very sense of truth seemed blotted out from the minds of men.' During these ages 'every mental disposition which philosophy pronounces to be essential to a legitimate research was almost uniformly branded as a sin, and a large proportion of the most deadly intellectual vices were deliberately inculcated as virtues. . . . It was sinful to study with equal attention and with an indifferent mind the writings on both sides, sinful to resolve to follow the light of evidence wherever it might lead, sinful to remain poised in doubt between conflicting opinions, sinful to give only a qualified assent to indecisive arguments, sinful even to recognize the moral or intellectual excellence of opponents. . . . The theologians, by destroying every book that could generate discussion, by diffusing to every field of knowledge a spirit of boundless credulity, and, above all, by persecuting with atrocious cruelty those who differed from their opinions, succeeded . . . in almost arresting the action of the European mind.'"¹

3. This claim to domination by the Catholic Church, as it was made in the name of religion,

¹ Kidd, *Op. cit.*, pp. 291-292.

could only be met, as was earlier pointed out, by a religious principle — *the principle of the freedom of conscience*, as going back to the divinely guaranteed sacredness of the individual person. For the Protestant appeal to Scripture against the authority of Popes and Councils, as well as the demanded absolute separation of Church and State, could only involve ultimately the declaration of the absolute freedom of the individual conscience — that there was to be no domination of the individual by any power or system, sacred or secular.

But this freedom of conscience, which was the underlying principle of the Reformation, was not at first so understood. At first the Reformation was interpreted as only the substitution of one set of doctrines for another — to be regarded as equally authoritative. Its full scope was only very gradually recognized. Men were slow to believe that it must carry with it, finally, absolute freedom of conscience, and, therefore, absolute freedom of investigation, — absolute freedom of men to work out their inner ideals. They were still less prepared to see that, ultimately, it must mean the substitution of the religion of the Spirit for all religions of authority, — the setting free of the human soul from all absolutisms.

4. Another illustration of the mistaken application of accepted principles is to be found in the working out of *the position of the Manchester economic school*. The history of economic and social progress makes clear that, while the Manchester school of economics had as its aim complete freedom of competition, the *laissez-faire* policy, which, it was assumed, would bring that full freedom of competition, was not securing that result; but, on the contrary, as the economic struggle went on, tended continually to some form of one-sided domination. A mere let-alone policy, it was found, could not give that fair rivalry which was sought, between the forces of labor and the forces of capital, or insure their coöperation on terms of equal advantage. A mere let-alone policy could not give such rivalry, either, between industrial enterprises, but tended ultimately to the establishment of a more or less complete monopoly. That is, it has become more and more clear that the whole people, in the guise of the State, must come in, in the line of the moral-religious convictions underlying our civilization, to secure and to insure such real enfranchisement of all human activities as was sought by the Manchester principle of absolute freedom of competition. That

is, reverence for the person as of supreme value, and, therefore, as nowhere to be used as means only, it has been seen, must come in to secure recognition of reverence for the person as guarding freedom of individual initiative.

It is thus to be seen that all these instances of mistaken interpretation of the application of great principles show that the inevitable trend of the historical development has been toward the conscious recognition of those moral-religious convictions which are the underlying principles of Western civilization. Reverence for the person corrected, alike, the early ascetic interpretation of the Christian life, the papal interpretation of spiritual dominion, the intolerant interpretation of the Reformation principle, and the mistaken inferences of the Manchester school.

III

SUGGESTIONS COMING FROM THE RELATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CHARACTERIS- TICS OF PRESENT-DAY WESTERN CIVILIZATION TO MORAL-RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS

But we may also be helped to discover the trend of the historical development in the West, and its

underlying moral conditions, by seeing the relation in which fundamental principles and characteristics of our present-day Western civilization stand to moral-religious convictions. In general, that relation can be expressed in a sentence: the principles and characteristics of present-day Western civilization cannot be justified as first principles, but only as inferences from great moral-religious convictions.

1. In the first place, we have already seen how close and inevitable is the connection in which the *new conception of truth* and the consequent *new virtue of toleration* — which Kidd makes absolutely basic in the astounding progress of recent Western civilization¹ — stand to the Christian conviction of reverence for the person, as expressed in the Reformation principle of freedom of conscience and the resulting freedom of investigation. Kidd does not overstate the fact when he says: “The principles of intellectual tolerance, just as the principles of religious tolerance and — as we shall see directly — the principles of political tolerance, can only be held, in the last resort, as a conviction of the religious consciousness.”²

¹ Cf. *Op. cit.*, pp. 318, 332, 337, 363, and, especially, 397.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 363.

2. In the same way Kidd points out that "the most fundamental political doctrine of modern democracy," "*the native equality of all men*," with its accompanying inference of "natural rights," was not originally regarded as a first principle at all, but as a corollary from a religious principle.¹ And the real meaning of the "native equality of men" is better expressed in Christianity's principle of reverence for the person as such, because every man is recognized as a child of God, and as, therefore, of priceless value, and nowhere to be used as mere means for another.

3. So, too, universal suffrage, or *the wide extension of the franchise*, which is a recent and quite exceptional political phenomenon and something still felt by many to be quite absurd, finds its justification not in some principle of mere political policy, but in this same moral-religious conviction of reverence for the individual person as such. It expresses, half unconsciously, the conviction that the State cannot afford to lose the honest reaction of even its least citizen. And, in spite of all prepossessions to the contrary, the extension of the franchise, in general, has proved mightily effective.²

¹ Cf. *Op. cit.*, pp. 107 ff.

² Cf. *Op. cit.*, pp. 367 ff.

4. Practically the same thing must be said for *the principles of Western Liberalism as a whole*. They are political in their sphere, but not in their origin. They are ultimately based on moral and religious convictions. They express the demands of an advancing conscience, and they have involved at every stage much individual sacrifice. Mr. Kidd quotes another as saying of England: We forget "the tremendous struggles that were needed before the crust of sluggishness and prejudice could be broken through; the lives willingly sacrificed, the careers ruined, the fortunes flung away, the imprisonment and dragooning, the ostracism and social persecution readily accepted before a Liberal party in the modern sense could come into existence." He adds: "No fact has left a more lasting mark on the English mind in its relation to politics than this deep-seated conviction that Western Liberalism as a political creed is, in the last resort, a creed, not of ease and of conscious political Utilitarianism, but of sacrifice. . . . This is the ultimate cause why the meaning of Modern Liberalism in England and the United States goes far deeper than political forms and institutions." ¹

¹ Cf. *Op. cit.*, pp. 375, 376.

5. Still more obvious must it be, that that whole movement which has made the recent past a period of "the *general enfranchisement* of all the conditions and forms of human activity," — "the era of the emancipation of creeds and of commerce, of industry and of thought, of individuals, of classes and of nationalities" — goes back, once more, to the religious principle of freedom of conscience, rooting in reverence for personality. And that enfranchisement must still go forward, if the progress of the race is to continue.

6. It must be even more plain, that those great moral ideals that separate our civilization by so *immense an interval from the Greek state at its best*, have their source in Christianity's spirit of humanity. The Christian principle of reverence for the person as such forever divides here the ancient and the modern.

7. If one still further asks as to the relation of these moral-religious principles to the tremendous *recent advances of Western civilization*, he must see that something more than mere political nationalism has been here at work. In their scientific aspect, these advances, of course, root in that freedom of investigation, whose moral-religious genesis we have already so often traced. In their

political and national aspect, they root in those principles of democracy, which we have also seen require finally a moral-religious basis. The deep significance of the method of party government, for example, is to be seen only in the fact that it provides continuously for constant and tolerant conflict of ideas.¹

We seem, thus, to be led to the conclusion, that the fundamental principles and characteristics of our present-day Western civilization do root in-

¹ Cf. Kidd, *Op. cit.*, pp. 356 ff. In this whole question of the trend of history, we should clearly see that it is entirely conceivable that there should be no particular progress in human history on earth. It is quite possible to think of the earthly life of men, as Lotze (*The Microcosmus*, Vol. II, p. 171) points out, as only a preliminary stage of training, in which each man virtually starts from the same point. And if progress is recognized, still it is plain that the preceding generations do not share in its gains. All their sacrifices and struggles and toils avail nothing to give them aught of this final consummation of human history, except upon the supposition of the immortality of all, and their consequent real sharing, in some possible sense, in the gains of civilization. There is, strictly, no such thing as "the education of the human race." But, while it is thus philosophically conceivable that human history should show no real progress, any deep study of that history makes it difficult to doubt the fact of some advance, and the extraordinary significance of the moral-religious convictions of the social consciousness, as underlying and determining the progress of our Western civilization. The trend seems unmistakable, and the conditions of progress seem clear.

evitably in moral-religious convictions. The outcome, then, in all these lines of inquiry into the historical trend of Western civilization corresponds to the results reached in our analysis of the present conditions of our civilization, external and inner.

8. Before we leave this study of the historical trend of Western civilization, it should be emphatically said, that this result *does not mean the bringing in of a soft and flabby and sentimental civilization*, but, rather, one in which the virtues which have always underlain "military efficiency" are continuously demanded — courage, grit, will, coöperation, sacrifice, individual initiative, inventive power to use the forces of nature, moral indignation, and religious faith. Let us note some of the considerations which make this certain.

First of all, it should be obvious that this period of the enfranchisement of the human spirit from all dominations must unavoidably mean, that the rivalry and the struggle are as unceasing as is the struggle of political parties under a system of party government. This is the very condition of progress. This rivalry, too, must grow intenser with growing freedom. For the absolute freedom of the individual implies that every institution and opinion must be perpetually challenged by

criticism, — by the severest testing; and it demands, as we have seen, the overthrow of all absolutisms. Such a situation calls for much hard fighting for long years to come. The oppositions of the obstinate conservative and the insistent radical are needed to insure the unwearied testing of all that claims the support of the advancing civilization.

Moreover, the very fact that the fundamental principles of progress are moral and religious — never merely political, economic, or those of selfish policy — requires the incessant championing of these principles at any sacrifice; for selfishness will be always against them. This demands a courage that is not merely nor chiefly military, but even more difficult to show.

We may not shut our eyes to the fact, either, that these final principles of Western liberalism are only half believed by many of those who avow them. How many Liberals are genuinely liberal, even in conviction, to say nothing of action? how many Democrats are genuinely democratic? how many Christians genuinely Christian? how many Protestants genuinely Protestant? It is vastly depressing, at times, to find to how small a degree many have entered into the meaning of the

causes they avow. The truth is, that many really accept only certain external results and gains of liberal opinions, and do not really understand or believe in the underlying principles, but, on the contrary, disown them. The superficial followers of a cause are often its worst foes. There is thus constantly needed, men who shall stand inflexibly for the principles of freedom, who shall never yield on questions of human rights, but shall engage in constant war on tyrannies.

The worst of these tyrannies, too, — those of personal domination and exploitation, — it is to be noted, cannot be reached except through the control of the moral-religious convictions, growing out of reverence for the person. These principles, therefore, peculiarly need to be consciously, intelligently, and avowedly taken on by all individuals, if the real victory of human progress is to be won. How long a fight must precede such a victory !

The ultimate reasons for the principles of Western civilization, moreover, as we have seen, are not on the surface to be glibly and easily defended. They lie deep ; and on this account, also, the battle for them must be fought over and over for long generations and for every individual.

It is, also, true, that in these social processes,

as well as in the personal moral struggle, there is what Lotze has called "a morally advantageous deficiency in moral insight." Just as in the growth of the individual, so in the progress of society, the right, the unselfish, the sacrificial course — that does not say, "After us the deluge," but looks to the good of coming generations — cannot seem immediately profitable or advantageous. It cannot be chosen simply on grounds of selfish prudential calculation. The moral-religious convictions of the social consciousness, therefore, seem to become efficient forces for progress only in this way. At each step of progress there is, first, on the part of the thoughtful, a growing sense of contradiction between the social facts, in some matter, and accepted moral principles, — a growing sense of moral dualism and of self-stultification in passively yielding to the situation. This drives certain men to make the needed change, though it do not profit. For example, men may say: "We will not base our success, in commercial rivalry, upon the exploitation of women and children or upon denying to the laborer a man's real life." The determination is carried out, perhaps at great sacrifice at first; but in the end it proves unexpectedly efficient, insuring greater progress. This must be

the result, in general, if we are to be able to keep finally our faith in the morality of the universe; but it does not so seem at first, and it often does not so work at first.

It is also to be noticed that the setting free, through the present-day scientific and economic development, of such tremendous forces of nature and powers of wealth, may put immense possibilities for evil into the hands of unscrupulous men; and this, of course, if the race is to progress, must be constantly fought and prevented. Here again there is call for the fighting virtues.

The considerations, thus briefly reviewed, may suffice to show that we need have no anxiety lest civilization should be entering on a weakly sentimental stage. Justice and truth and absolute loyalty to reverence for personality are no revelations of weakness, nor are they sources of weakness. There will be constantly required all that is worthy in the fighting virtues.

9. But we may well definitely face the question, whether *we may reasonably expect the forces of righteousness finally to prevail*. What assurance is there that, not the unscrupulous, but the men of the righteous purpose will, in the long run, control the enormous forces of nature and of wealth, that

our modern world has produced, — that right will make might? The question is worthy a careful answer; for it may help to make still more sure the inevitable connection of righteousness with human progress. What are the grounds of assurance? They can be very briefly suggested.

In the first place, we have already seen that military efficiency, even in the ancient period, required a moral-religious basis.

Moreover, barbarism, as a matter of fact, has long been unable to stand against civilization, except where this civilization had failed in ultimate moral qualities from within.

Those peoples, too, who are to-day most consciously and fully acting upon these great moral-religious convictions of the social consciousness, are, in truth, leading in the present world struggle.

The qualities, also, for which military efficiency calls, point in the same direction. First of all, self-control is required; for self-control is the prime condition of the most advantageous use of power of any kind. To self-control must be added, obviously, courage, grit, will, coöperation or team work, sacrifice, and individual initiative, and, therefore, scientific discovery and power to use the forces of nature. And, as spiritual

dynamic, moral indignation and religious faith — the belief that the universe is on the side of the will in its struggle — have great military efficiency, in the case of a righteous cause. All these qualities show that, in the long run, the righteous nation or civilization, in a righteous cause, can hardly possibly fail to prove the better fighters.

Moreover, there is such a thing as the civilization of the military conquerors being really vanquished, ultimately, by the higher civilization of the conquered.

It must be, also, clearly recognized that "peace at any price" is not a truly moral goal. The superior civilization may not allow itself to go down before the inferior. It may not passively yield. The righteous man or nation may not refuse to champion, at all cost, the cause of the weak or oppressed. It is in this sense that Jesus came to send "not peace but a sword." One should have no faith in the principle that war is a perpetual moral necessity for the world; but, nevertheless, the individual, the nation, the civilization *must do all that love for man demands*, but only that. *That* is the demand of morals, of religion, of Christianity; and that demand may require fighting; but it offers no defense for war of

any other kind. Not the persistence of war, therefore, is the requirement, but the persistent need of the fighting virtues.

Indeed, the whole fear that a righteous civilization, permeated with the convictions of the social consciousness, is intrinsically weak, seems to be the outgrowth of *a false conception both of goodness and of religion*. Even so clear-sighted a man as Mr. Courtney, for example, denies that the exceptionally good man could be a hero of drama, and the reasons seem to him to be obvious. "In the first place, the drama dealt with action and the saint was passive. In the second place, the drama dealt with emotions, and, *ex hypothesi*, the saint was a man who had subdued emotion. In the third place, what an audience looked for in a hero was an exhibition of mastery, of force, of something which would engage their interest and make the hero significant."¹ That is to say, moral and religious achievement is here conceived of as passive and negative, unemotional, and without force or mastery or interest. It would be difficult more completely to caricature genuine character, and especially the Christian religious ideal; although this description might fairly represent certain ascetic and

¹ Cf. Kidd, *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

oriental religious types. In the first place, what is meant by saying that the saint is passive? Certainly, from Christ's point of view, the truly religious man is not passive, but must evince in all relations an outgoing, ministering, sacrificial love. Mention is often made of "the passive virtues"; but a very little attempt to practice them will show that they mean much more than mere passivity. So, too, what is meant by saying that the saint is a man who has "subdued emotion"? Apparently it is assumed that that implies that the saint is a man without emotion, which would mean that he was not more but less a man. Whereas the true subduing of emotion must involve that he has emotion as a mighty force under control, and is capable of mighty indignations and mighty enthusiasms. And, from the point of view of Christ, once more, if he is not capable of such indignations and enthusiasms, he is no true saint.

In like manner, it seems to be assumed that the genuinely moral and religious man cannot give the impression of force and mastery, and so cannot be interesting. A college senior once wrote an essay on the subject, *Is Goodness Interesting?* And that is a very interesting question; for, if goodness is not finally interesting, — enlisting all our best

powers, — it will not long or truly retain our devotion. “Is goodness interesting?” Well, Goodness knows that goodness is not interesting, if goodness is simply negative, — cutting certain things off and emptying certain things out; though even those processes are by no means easy. But if goodness means the taking on of mighty indignations and mighty enthusiasms; enlistment, heart and soul, in the great causes; throwing oneself with conquering faith into the triumphant purposes of God himself in the progress of his Kingdom; — then, nothing on earth is so interesting as goodness. And this, one judges, is Christ’s conception of goodness.

The self-surrender for which he calls is not that of simple passive yielding, or of mere negation, but demands that commitment of self to the will of God, that involves the highest self-assertion, and the positive taking on of the mighty on-going purposes of God himself. *There* is scope for the exhibition of all possible force and mastery, and there is no danger that such goodness will be uninteresting.

If, then, “military efficiency” means something more than the bullying use of brute force, then the righteous nation, with the social consciousness at its foundation, has it and may count upon it. It does not depend on stirring the war spirit, or using

military methods with children; far from it. For what is needed is not a military machine, but an inevitably prevailing type of civilization — inevitably prevailing because it roots in moral purpose, that has everywhere worked itself out to full expression.

Our whole study of the historical trend of Western civilization seems, then, to mean two things: first, that the great fundamental conditions of human progress lie in moral-religious convictions, particularly in the sway of the Christian principle of reverence for the person as such; second, that the trend of civilization is so far from entering upon a soft and flabby and sentimental stage, that it, rather, requires, particularly from all who would be leaders, the most virile qualities, — qualities that shall enable them, not only to fight against tyrannies, but determinedly to enter intelligently, unselfishly, and aggressively into the great on-going purposes of God in the progress of the race. The men who are to-day in dead earnest in that determination are not likely themselves to feel any need of a "moral equivalent for war," however much they may recognize its need for those who are willing self-indulgently to settle down to the easier material conditions of our time.

CHAPTER VII

THE MEANING OF THE CHALLENGE IN OUR OWN NATIONAL LIFE I: THE NEW PURITANISM

THE outcome of our analysis of present-day conditions and of the historical trend plainly brings a moral and religious challenge to our own national life.

As a leader in Western civilization, as an inheritor of both English and American traditions, and as seeing most clearly the moral and religious basis of our whole civilization, there is naturally suggested to America, by such a moral and religious challenge as that of the present, the Puritan ideal. Many of the demands of the times, indeed, as we have seen, like those of self-control and simplicity of life, are clearly in the direction of Puritan aims. There is evident advantage, also, in coming to terms with such a concretely embodied ideal, taken right out of our own historical antecedents, in order to see just how far it fits the present need, and how far it must be supplemented by later convictions. We shall certainly relate ourselves more naturally to

an ideal that is a part of our own inheritance. Moreover, we cannot help recognizing that — with whatever limitations — the Puritan and Pilgrim fathers laid the foundations of the nation in strenuous moral and religious character; and we may well ask whether, in departing from them, we have lost in essentials while gaining in non-essentials. Perhaps in no other way can the meaning of the present challenge in our own national life be better brought home to us.

In any case, it seems impossible for a thoughtful man, in the light of the historical trend of the Christian centuries, to face the inevitable challenge of the new external conditions and of the new inner world of thought, and not feel the greatness of the demand made upon our own national spirit, — the need of a stern moral awakening at many points, and of the incoming of something like a new Puritanism. The times require an enlarged and reinvigorated moral spirit and ideal. The general world conditions, as we have seen, force the demand upon us. Ours is an age marked by an enormous increase of power over nature, of wealth, and of knowledge. Resources, that is, of every kind are vastly enlarged; and problems are correspondingly increased. We have found it impossible to doubt that this situa-

tion calls for preëminent self-control, for ideals and interests great enough and high enough to dominate the material, for sharp discrimination among the many values presenting themselves for our choice, for genuine simplicity of life, and for willingness to sacrifice in unselfish service. How far are the American people to be able to measure up to such standards?

Many circumstances in our national life compel one to raise the question. The American is too often characterized by a "nervous over-activity," that contains no sound promise of power. Our temperament and our climate combinewith rapidity of growth and extent of opportunity to drive us on. This very intensity and hurried rush of our modern American life carry with them obvious and great dangers of lack of thought and consequent shallowness of life. And yet alert thinking is never more required than when the pace is rapid and the life intense. We have problems of unusual difficulty to face, if our development is to go steadily forward. We shall not master them without masterful thinking. Apart from that, our political, economic, and social creeds, as well as our moral and religious ones, become pieces of planless patchwork; for we have thought nothing through to the end. The

points are certainly few, at which America can, as yet, justly claim intellectual leadership of the world of to-day. No people will drift into such leadership; it is the fruit of severe thinking. The kingdom of heaven is not to be taken by violence. Some quiet thoughtfulness is imperative, if we are anywhere even to see things in true proportion, if the great is to be to us really great, and the petty to sink into its relative insignificance. All personal and national standards suffer from such lack of thought.

One can hardly doubt that John Rae put his finger upon — what is even more now than when he wrote — a real temptation of the American people, if not of them alone — “the passion for material comfort above all other things — the complete absorption in the pursuit of material well-being and the means of material well-doing, to the disparagement and disregard of every ideal consideration and interest, as if the chief end and whole dignity of man lay in gaining a conventional standard of comfort.” Are we to yield to this prevalent “passion for material comfort,” and to prove recreant to our more spiritual inheritance? Are we nationally to be unwilling to take “our part in suffering hardship,” for the sake of a far higher

national achievement? Lowell's words, spoken at Harvard's two hundred and fiftieth anniversary, may still give us pause. "A man rich only for himself has a life as barren and cheerless as that of the serpent set to guard a buried treasure. I am saddened when I see our successes as a nation measured by the number of acres under tillage, or of bushels of wheat exported; for the real value of a country must be weighed in scales more delicate than the Balance of Trade. The Garners of Sicily are empty now, but the bees from all climes still fetch honey from the tiny garden plot of Theocritus. On a map of the world you may cover Judea with your thumb, Athens with a finger tip, and neither of them figures in the Prices Current; but they still lord it in the thought and action of every civilized man. Did not Dante cover with his hood all that was Italy six hundred years ago? Material success is good, but only as the necessary preliminary of better things. The measure of a nation's true success is the amount it has contributed to the thought, the moral energy, the intellectual happiness, the spiritual hope and consolation of mankind. There is no other, let our candidates flatter us as they may." If a standard like this is to be applied to the American nation, there can be no playing

fast and loose with intellectual and moral values.

The extraordinary mingling of the peoples in the United States, as well as the general world influences of our time, have tended somewhat to accentuate for the American people that conflict of ideals that is everywhere to be seen in this peculiarly transitional time. And no American, who loves his country, can be without anxiety, that that general lack of the sense of law in the whole realm of the spiritual, which we have found so characterizing our age, should manifest itself so ominously in our own people, in a prevalent lack of the sense of grip in the moral and religious life. There is quite too evident an easy-going spirit, that feels nothing as absolutely imperative or decisive, — a shallow, optimistic good nature, that has no basic belief in the rigor of the nature of things. In the world of spiritual values, we seem to belong to an amiable rather than a strenuous age. And the fruit of this attitude is to be found in a widespread spirit of lawlessness that has infected highly privileged individuals and communities, that seem ready with a fool's laugh to turn back to barbarism, and have forgotten Kant's solemn words, "If law ceases, all worth of human life on earth ceases

too." How inconsistent and paradoxical all this is, for an age that boasts itself a scientific age, we have already observed; for the fundamental conviction of modern science is the universality of law. Our generation needs to heed, not only the protest of the philosopher, and of the spirit of its own science, but the similar and still graver and more ancient warning: "Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap."

All these and other similar current phenomena of American life call aloud for some taking stock of our moral and religious heritage, that we may see at what points we have drifted and lost ground, at what points we have truly advanced, and that we may summon all our energies for a still nobler national life. That result, as certainly as there is law in the world, assuredly will not come to a vacillating, flabby, self-indulgent generation; for the moral life is, on the contrary, essentially clean-cut, vigorous, and serving. For such moral reinvigoration and advance, we need the will even more than knowledge.

"We know the paths wherein our feet should press,
Across our hearts are written thy decrees.
Yet now, O Lord, be merciful to bless
With more than these.

“Grant us the will to fashion as we feel,
 Grant us the strength to labor as we know,
 Grant us the purpose, ribbed and edged with steel,
 To strike the blow.

“Knowledge we ask not — knowledge thou hast lent,
 But, Lord, the will — there lies our bitter need,
 Give us to build above the deep intent
 The deed, the deed.”¹

The title of the chapter — The New Puritanism — states our problem. If it is Puritanism that the nation needs, then that means that from the older ideal there is something to be retained and something to be maintained. Just what? If it is to be a new Puritanism, then there is something to criticize and to correct. Just what? That is, how far was Puritanism mistaken? How far was the reaction from Puritanism mistaken? Can we see both movements now more clearly, and correcting and supplementing both, add to the positives of Puritanism the positives of the modern spirit, and so reach a reconstruction in our living as well as in our thinking? There is attempted here, that is, not history, not eulogy of the Puritans, not banter, but a straight facing of our national needs.

¹ John Drinkwater, in *The Spectator*.

I

THE GREAT POSITIVES OF THE PURITAN SPIRIT

The greatness of the Puritans lies manifestly in their convictions and in their conscience. Martineau's words are peculiarly true of them: "The noblest workers of our world bequeath us nothing so great as the image of themselves. Their task, be it ever so glorious, is historical and transient; the majesty of their spirit is essential and eternal." What, then, are the great abiding positives of the Puritans?

1. First of all, there stands out their *sense of God and of the spiritual world*. The Puritan had the prophet's vision of God as the realest of realities. For him the things that were seen were temporal. It was only the unseen that was eternal. It was, thus, no absentee or uninterested God, no God living in some little corner of his universe, in whom the Puritan believed, but a God with whom all the world had to do and with whom all life was instinct. He heard, as a present fact, the old prophetic challenge: "Is not my word like fire? saith Jehovah; and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?" The Puritan had profound reli-

gious conviction. It is his great distinction. And such religious faith, it would not be difficult to show underlies all our reasoning, all work worth doing, all strenuous moral endeavor, all earnest social service. This deep religious faith of the Puritan is, therefore, an abiding need of humanity. For the men who are to be capable of great achievements must be seers of the invisible, believers in the living God, and in the onward march of his providence. Great deeds require great convictions.

2. Out of this deep sense of God and the spiritual world came, in the second place, the consequent *conviction of commission, of divine calling, of vocation*. The Puritan believed that he was sent from God, that he had a divine charge to keep, a calling to fulfill, a mission to accomplish, a message to utter. For him,

“God bends from out the deep and says,
 ‘I gave thee the great gift of life;
 Wast thou not called in many ways?
 Are not my earth and heaven at strife?’”

The Puritan thus added to the prophet's sense of God the apostle's sense of commission. And this, too, is an abiding need for all men who would live a significant life. Somewhere and somehow, if there is to be any high meaning in life, men must

have the sense that they are here on no fool's errand, that life is not purposeless and empty, but that it is given them to know that they are "sent from God," and may have share in his own great purposes. Every people with a vigorous and throbbing life has had some such faith, and every nation that means to count greatly in the world still needs the Puritan's feeling of commission from God. Without this, patriotism itself is low-born, and lacks its divinest element.

3. Of the sense of commission is born, in turn, the Puritan's *feeling of responsibility and accountability*, — the Puritan conscience and his loyalty to duty as the law of God. He was come, he felt sure, to do the will of God. It is, indeed, the great achievement of religious faith to translate impersonal duty and law into the personal will of God. So, and so only, can law and duty take on an appealing warmth and intimacy, and gain immeasurably in meaning and in power. So, they become great and sacred inspirations. Men feel then that they have to do, not with an impersonal law laid on from without, but with the revelation of a living will within them. Because of belief in God, because of belief in his commission from God, the Puritan could not escape the immediate and tremendous

sense of responsibility and accountability. If he were here on commission from God, to do solely the will of God, responsibility and accountability were to be faced at every turn; and the entire life must be permeated with the sense of them. There can be no light and frivolous trifling with life, or with any situation in it. How certainly is this sense of responsibility and accountability, too, a permanent need of the human race, and of all worthy achievement by any nation. It ought to be peculiarly natural for a people that make earnest at all with the modern social consciousness. Such a people cannot forget their responsibility for the neediest in their ranks, nor doubt that God must hold them accountable for even these least.

4. But to him who has the prophet's vision of God, as the realest of realities, the apostle's conviction of divine commission, and its inevitable accompaniment, the feeling of responsibility and accountability, there must come, also, a tremendous *sense of the significance and value of life*. For he thinks of his life as connected with God, as sharing in God's life and in the very plans of God; and there can be, therefore, nothing in it meaningless and worthless. It was possible that such a conception might overpower man in his living, as it sometimes

seemed almost to crush the Puritan, but it could not make life seem trivial. For, as Liddon says: "With God, the human soul not merely interprets the secret of the universe; it comprehends and is at peace with itself. For God is the satisfaction of its thirst." To desire with all one's soul the truth, — to have the single aim to know and to do the will of God, exalts the man and his life inevitably. It lifts one above personal caprice and prejudice; it clears the judgment; it gives singleness, simplicity, and transparency of spirit; it contains, thereby, the secret of power and of greatness, for only the domination of a great purpose can make a life great; and it alone gives abiding triumph, for "he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever." This sense of the significance and value of life, once more, is an abiding human need, and a permanent necessity, too, for an exalted national life. Our merely material or even humanistic tasks, as we have already seen, however gigantic, cannot permanently either satisfy ourselves, or enable us to render the highest service to the world. "Either there is something other and higher than this purely humanistic culture, or life ceases to have any meaning or value."¹ We need the Puritan's profound religious conviction.

¹ Eucken, *The Meaning and Value of Life*, p. 140.

None of these great positives of Puritanism, then, can we spare. We require them every one, and we require them mightily. And we can have them in even greater degree than the Puritans had them, if we take them up, less from the point of view of the Old Testament than did they, and more from the point of view of the New Testament, of the unity of the life of man, and of the inner spirit of Christ.

II

THE REACTION FROM PURITANISM

But if we are accurately to estimate our relation to our inherited Puritan ideal we need, not only to note, thus, its positive contributions, but also to study the historical reaction from Puritanism, in order to discern the relative justification of this reaction and any suggestion that it may have of Puritan weaknesses. In all lines we shall find that the reaction from the Puritan spirit had some real measure of justification; but that the mistake made in each reaction turns on an ambiguity in the cry raised against Puritanism, and really ends inconsistently in a Puritan weakness.

1. The first reaction from Puritanism may, perhaps, be said to be *sentimentalism*. It justly re-

acted from the Puritan sense of an arbitrary God, and his consequent lack of tenderness and love. Just so far as, under the influence of an extreme Calvinism, the Puritans made much of the arbitrariness of the decrees of God, they made it difficult to ascribe to God any genuine and reasonable love. And this defective conception of God was practically certain to be reflected in depreciation of tenderness and love in men. They were still living in the Old Testament period, and at this point hardly rose even to its best visions. This virtually unchristian attitude could not go without protest. It demanded, in the very name of the love of God, repudiation of the Puritan position at this point.

Sentimentalism might be said to arise, on the contrary, from an abuse of the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, and from a disastrous misunderstanding of the real nature of love and forgiveness. Its mistake turns upon the ambiguous use of love, as thoughtless, weak, good nature. It forgets that love, too, may have its "consuming fire" that must wish to burn the dross out of the one loved; that sin is more terrible to the father, as has been said, than it can be to the judge. It forgets that he could be no true Father of men,

who made the results of evil choices, the same as those of right choices. Sentimentalism, thus, fails to discern that, just because God is a Father who is absolutely faithful in his love, there must be law in the moral and spiritual world. A faithful father could not consent to play fast and loose with his children. Sentimentalism disbelieves, therefore, in the necessity of discipline, and shirks steady training in home and education. It thinks, for example, that university students may have at the same time the freedom of men and the irresponsibility of boys. It imagines that lawlessness is particularly pardonable in that privileged few, set apart for the higher education, who are, in fact, most of all in honor bound to be loyal to law. It cannot understand Dr. Arnold's words at Rugby: "It is not necessary that this school of ours should contain three hundred students; it is not necessary that it should contain fifty, but it is necessary that it should be a school of Christian gentlemen."

That is, at every point sentimentalism weakens the sense of law, and so of all true love, and thus itself ends in a Puritan weakness. For the Puritan's belief in God's arbitrary election of the individual weakens, ultimately, the sense of inner moral law, and makes impossible any truly moral

conception of a forgiving love, in the same way as does sentimentalism.

2. The second reaction from Puritanism may be called a *false tolerance*. This was a mistaken expression of a natural and quite justified reaction from the narrowness of interests that characterized the Puritan mind. The Puritan hardly conceived the breadth of legitimate human interests, or dreamed of a redemption of all that wide world of the human. Human nature could not remain satisfied with that position. Eventually it must be seen to be dishonoring to religion itself; for it dishonors men, made in the image of God, and confines religion to a section of life, instead of seeking for it a full conquest of the world. Religion, in its endeavor to see life from God's point of view should be peculiarly wide-ranging. Narrowness, here, is a kind of contradiction in terms. The legitimacy of the reaction from Puritan narrowness cannot be questioned, therefore, even when, with the Puritan, one has religion particularly in view.

But the reaction, at this point, has tended, as a matter of fact, toward a false tolerance, that needs careful facing. The tendency, in any reaction, is quite to forget the element of truth in

the position from which one is turning. And false tolerance reaches a kind of breadth that is as indefensible as the narrowness it seeks to avoid. In this easy-going generation of ours, can we make plain what a true, as contrasted with a false, tolerance is? False tolerance turns upon the possible ambiguity of the word "breadth," and comes from a perverse misconception of what breadth requires.

(1) For breadth certainly does not mean, in the first place, that one should *ignore the results of experience*. And yet breadth is often so used as to imply that it is narrowness to regard the lessons of experience, as though everything remained forever an open question. Students often assume that the only way to take up great moral and religious questions is to study them as if they were absolutely new, — as if there were no such thing as race experience at all; although this is plainly to ignore, probably, the largest elements in the solution of these problems. Men have learned something in the course of the centuries; and one may be pardoned having some prejudices in favor of the Copernican system as over against the Ptolemaic. One is not only to keep a question open when the evidence is not in, but to

decide upon the evidence when the evidence is in.

(2) Just as little, in the second place, can breadth mean *lack of discrimination*, — the putting of all things on the same level. That is not breadth at all, but simply stupid lack of discriminative thinking. And yet men seem often to feel that this putting of all things on a dead level is precisely what breadth requires. The theory of evolution has been often thus perverted to mean — what evolution itself must at every step deny — that there is no true evolution, that a phenomenon is as low as its lowest stage, that a thing *is* what it *was*, that all stages of development are equally valuable or equally worthless, as you please. Evolutionary views of morals and religion are often taken as meaning that all ideals and all religions are on the same level, that man has here no clear task of discrimination and of decisive judgment. A man with this false tolerance, thus, often abuses the perception that one cannot anywhere in life draw an absolutely sharp line, to make it mean that, therefore, no lines are to be drawn, that no discriminations at all are to be made. There may be continuous, unbroken evolution throughout the organic world, but, if

there is, it does not follow that I cannot tell the difference between an elephant and a sweet pea, or that I may not wisely exercise such discrimination. I cannot put my finger upon the exact point at which an irresponsible unmoral infant passes into the child as a responsible moral being; but that does not lessen the fact that such a change does take place. Such lack of discrimination, surely, is not true tolerance.

(3) Nor, in the third place, is tolerance *lack of conviction*. For tolerance is not indifference nor sophistication. The truth is that true tolerance is no easy-going virtue, into which the indifferent, convictionless man may drift some fine day. It is no virtue for dullards or sluggards, or for men without spines. It belongs only to the man of deep convictions. For if you do not care a rap what I think on a subject, it is no tolerance in you that you are willing I should think as I do—you are simply indifferent. But if it seems to you most vital what position a man takes on the subject, if you have upon it yourself profound convictions, and still acknowledge freely my full right to my own possibly opposite conclusions, then you show tolerance; not otherwise. For you cannot be truly tolerant without convictions.

(4) And as surely as breadth does not mean ignoring the results of experience, nor lack of discrimination, nor lack of convictions, just as surely it cannot mean a *mere narrow intellectualism*, that forgets the complexity of life, forgets the wide sweep of man's interests, forgets the claims of the whole man, and so counts itself superior to morals and religion. It is curious that such intrinsic narrowness should mistake itself for exceptional breadth.

In all these mistaken conceptions of breadth, alike, it is then to be noted, that the false tolerance, which began as a reaction from the narrowness of the Puritan, ends in a lack of discrimination, just as marked as that which was charged against the narrowness of Puritanism. The reaction from Puritanism objects, for example, to the Puritan condemnation of all plays and all novels as evil, because it makes no discrimination. But the reaction itself ends, quite too often, in accepting all as good, in equally indiscriminating fashion. Undiscriminating acceptance has no stones to throw at indiscriminating rejection. The fact is, that there is a great deal of bullying just now, in the name of breadth, of the man who thinks there must be some decent line somewhere to be drawn between the broadening and the cor-

rupting, between the enlightening and the debasing. The grown man often seems to be as afraid of the word "narrow" as the boy of the word "green"; and both alike are bulldozed, in the name of "breadth" and of "seeing life," into approving and sharing much of which they ought to be heartily ashamed. And they forget that in any case it is better to be green than to be rotten; for greenness, at least, has promise, rottenness has none. The very end of education and of civilization may be said to be, to make the really thoughtful man, the man of discrimination, the man who can see things in their proper proportion. We may well ask this indiscriminating breadth and this false tolerance, whether the very essence of the intellectual life is to be given up in the moral.

3. The third reaction from Puritanism may be called a *false realism*. This naturally arose as a mistaken interpretation of a quite justified reaction against the ascetic aspect of Puritanism. For that was felt unfairly to ignore the physical man and his needs, and to fail to see the close connection of the physical with all higher achievement. The ascetic tendency, wherever found, is quite certain to fail in doing justice to the common goods of life, and to the common indispensable

and basic virtues as well, in its claim to the possession of superior attainments. One can, to be sure, easily understand that it has root in a noble, even if mistaken, feeling. But here again, religion tends, ultimately, to dishonor religious faith. For the ascetic contempt of the body is contempt of a condition divinely ordained and created. That the strong ascetic feeling in Puritanism called for protest, in the name of religion itself, cannot be doubted.

But the reaction against Puritanism, at this point, tended to swing to a remote extreme, and to retain no element of religion, and hardly of morals. For there is a false realism that thinks itself peculiarly enlightened and enfranchised from all the older restraints. This false realism is itself an abuse of the emphasis upon the real, and turns upon the ambiguity that lies in that word. It sees in human beings only the man of some modern sociologists, — the man who is essentially and merely a creature of two appetites, — the appetite for food and the appetite for sex. And it proceeds to evolve all history out of these two appetites and man's physical environment. It involves an indiscriminating emphasis on the physical, and takes pleasure in reiterating, in the refrain of a

modern English poem, "Love is lust." It talks of getting down to the "hard facts" of life; by which again it means the recognition in man only of the physical. The real throughout is simply the physical.

Now man is, no doubt, physical, a creature of appetites and passions; this is a "hard fact." But it is not less a "hard fact" that man has interest in literature, in music, in art, in friendship; that he has memory and anticipation, the sense of beauty and of truth, the sense of duty and obligation, and is capable of all high moral and religious ideals; and this, this false and narrow realism tends to ignore. That is to say, this false realism ends again, inconsistently enough, in a Puritan weakness. For Puritanism has been charged with making too little of men in the face of the invincible decrees of God, especially in the case of the non-elect; and it must be admitted that the charge is true. Puritanism does, in this aspect, overwhelm and override man in a way impossible to God. But what littleness is this of the false realism, where there is no real belief in man's heroic mold and possibilities at all! It cannot see that man is made for action, and made for personal relations, that he is "called to an

imperishable work in the world," and has need, therefore, of faith in immortality, if he is to be satisfied at all. The man of Puritanism is a far greater being than the man of the false realism.

4. The fourth reaction from Puritanism may be called a *false estheticism*. It was legitimate enough that there should be, in the human mind, a reaction from the Puritan underestimate, and almost contempt, of beauty. Even among the sternest of the Puritans themselves, beauty could not be wholly denied. And though one can understand the sense of moral danger which prompted it, it is still hard to forgive the Puritan crusade against the beautiful in art and architecture. The love of beauty too was divinely implanted in men. It could not be utterly denied, and not violate God-given instincts. It is no mere sense of the prettiness of a phrase that has led men to group so persistently together "the good, the true, and the beautiful." The human soul feels, even half unconsciously, in all true beauty, some divine prophecy of ultimate harmony. Men could not, either in faith in God, or in loyalty to themselves, keep the Puritan standpoint here. A reaction was inevitable. But it did not run its course, until it had reached in modern life an equally false estheticism.

The false estheticism turns upon the ambiguity of the words, "beauty" and "art"; and involves a mistaken conception of what beauty and art require. It does not follow that, because an interest and ideal have been ignored, they must now be made to dominate all other ideals, and that, in such domination, they will lose nothing of their own intrinsic worth. But this false estheticism would make the esthetic the only consideration, and is capable of saying with Swinburne:

"To say of shame, What is it?
Of virtue, We can miss it;
Of sin, We can but kiss it
And it's no longer sin."

And it is to be feared that the sensuous beauty of FitzGerald's version of Omar Khayyam has often been made to excuse or to hide the rank falseness of the moral ideals that lay beneath.

This false estheticism forgets that the artist is first of all a man, and must regard, above all, the harmony of his own being; and may not, therefore, in his art set aside the laws of the universe and of his own nature. It is quite true that the architect may, if he will, ignore the laws of gravity; but his structure will soon cease to bear witness to any ideal. And just as truly, where the work

of art lends itself to the lowering of human life, and prompts to the violation of its fundamental laws, the artist has forgotten the end of art, and has bound it to lower aims. It is no prudery to protest that art — whether in play or dance or picture or statue or poem or novel — has no business to be degrading, or simply to provoke the passions. For where the sensual comes in, appreciation of beauty as such has been driven out; and the so-called work of art has ceased to be a work of art, and become a panderer instead. In so saying, one does not forget the difficulty of the question, and the need of handling dark themes; but do our time, our art, our stage, our novels, have no need for the sobering words of a philosopher, who has peculiar right to be heard in the matter of esthetic judgment: "We too easily forget that much which looks extremely well in a picture and has a striking effect in poetry, would make us heartily ashamed of our prepossessions if we were to see it, not at a single favorable moment but in the ordinary course of life, in connection with all its manifold results. The charm of what is strange and full of characteristic expression and one-sided originality is so great that it leads every one to be sometimes unjust towards that

consistent, thoughtful, steadfast order of civilized life which, though less warm in coloring, is ineffably more worthy.”¹ The immoral is everywhere a violation of a true love. It contains at some point, we may be sure, a hideous element of treachery. It is a false estheticism, which throws a glamour of loveliness over what is essentially ugly and sordid.

All this is to say, once again, that this reaction, also, ends in something very like a Puritan weakness. For the true answer to moral exclusiveness is surely not esthetic exclusiveness. The true ideal must rather be, the beautiful — the ideal — embodiment of the ideal life.

III

THE NEW PURITANISM, ADDING THE GREAT POSITIVES OF THE MODERN SPIRIT

In the light of the discussion of the great positives of the Puritan spirit, and of its weaknesses, as seen both in the relative justification of the reactions from Puritanism and in their inconsistencies, can we discern a little more clearly what that new Puritanism must be, that should

¹ Lotze, *The Microcosmus*, Vol. II, p. 65.

strengthen and ennoble our national life? The new Puritanism, to which the nation is called, certainly needs, first of all, to *keep the great positives of the Puritan spirit*: their prophetic vision of God and the spiritual world; their apostolic conviction of divine commission; their involved feeling of responsibility and accountability; and their consequent tremendous sense of the significance and value of life. We may not be able to think these in precisely the same way as they. But the national life cannot be securely built upon foundations less deep and strong than these. We have already seen how certainly our whole Western civilization roots in moral-religious convictions; we require, not less than the Puritan, for national greatness the sense of the on-working of God in the history of men. We have seen how every great people has believed in its divine origin and calling; we cannot yet spare, if we are to be a great people, the Puritan's thrilling sense of divine commission. We have seen how even the ancient state acknowledged its accountability to principles that bound it to limitless self-sacrifice; in the larger, swifter, and more complex life of our time we surely need not less, but more than the ancient, and more than the Puritan, the sense of account-

ability and responsibility. We have seen how life cheapens and grows petty where great motives die out, where faith fails and a materialized civilization creeps in; and we need — we deeply need — the Puritan's tremendous sense of the significance and value of life, if we are worthily to gird ourselves for our national task.

At the same time, the new Puritanism will seek to avoid those Puritan weaknesses from which the human mind has inevitably reacted. It will avoid the Puritan lack of tenderness and love, the Puritan narrowness of interest, its false asceticism, and its underestimate of beauty. It must show a greater faith in God than these Puritan weaknesses evinced. And the new Puritanism will just as certainly rise above the false extremes disclosed in the reaction from Puritanism. The new Puritanism must not be blinded by sentimentalism, by a false tolerance, by a false realism, or by a false estheticism. It will have a love that is genuine and faithful; a tolerance that is marked by discriminating convictions; a realism that can be just to the whole man in the wide sweep of his aims — man at his best, as well as at his worst; and a sense of beauty as an ideal, that will not desecrate itself by seeking ruthless destruction of

other ideals, but will, rather, seek the larger harmony of organic unity with them.

One may well believe that the best thought and life of the nation are thus aiming to preserve the true and worthy elements both of Puritanism and of the reaction from it. It has not been without permanent gain for the national life, we may hope, that both these movements have been lived through.

But if a genuinely new Puritanism is to be achieved, still another step must be taken. The new Puritanism must seek consciously and constructively to add to the great positives of the Puritans *the great positives of the modern spirit*, that may correct the weaknesses both of Puritanism and the reactions from it. These great positives of the modern spirit may, perhaps, be summed up in the supreme demand for a genuine, reverent love; the perception of the breadth and complexity of life; and the recognition of the unity of man.

1. First, and most of all, as over against the Puritan lack of tenderness and love, as well as a false sentimentalism, it will bring to Puritanism that modern interpretation of fundamental Christianity which we call the social spirit, with its

convictions of the essential likeness of all men and of the sacredness of every personality. It will seek, therefore, to embody a *genuine and reverent love* for men, that will avoid the constant temptation of the strong, in all lines, to override the less aggressive personality. All that has been said, in preceding chapters, concerning reverence for personality, as the determining principle in human development, and concerning the way in which modern conditions, external and inner, demand at every point the manifestation of the social consciousness — only serves to accentuate the need of this first and well-nigh all-inclusive supplement to the Puritan spirit. Puritanism was too individualistic to be possibly at home in the modern world, without this social supplement of a genuine and reverent love. No kind of revival of Puritanism can be permanently effective, that ignores the Puritan weakness at this essential point.

2. And, in the second place, as contrasted with the Puritan narrowness of interests, as well as with a false tolerance, the new Puritanism will bring full *perception of the breadth and complexity of life*. It will see clearly, with modern psychology, the necessity of a wide circle of interests for the health and sanity of the human spirit. It will

not doubt the essential unity of human life, and the close relatedness in which the spiritual stands to all the rest of life. It will have learned fully the lesson, that human nature avenges itself for any disregard of the wide range of its interests. It will not yield, therefore, to the mediæval temptation to abandon, in a short-sighted asceticism, whole spheres of life. For this, it sees, is not to conquer in the name of the higher interests, but really to surrender the claim of Christianity to dominion over the world. It may not forget, as Fremantle pointed out, that not only the individual soul, but the world in all the wide sweep of its interests, is the subject of Christian redemption. In full view, therefore, of the whole range of human activities, in complete recognition of the breadth and complexity of life, it will still aim to keep the supreme values truly supreme. It seeks and thus attains both breadth and simplicity of life. In this paradoxical combination of breadth and simplicity of life lies no small part of the difficult and peculiar task of the new Puritanism of the modern day.

3. In the third place, the new Puritanism will correct the Puritan asceticism and underestimate of beauty, as well as the false realism and false

estheticism of our own time, by a clear *recognition of the unity of the life of man*. For the discernment of the unity of man's entire life forbids both a false realism and a false estheticism; for both disclose their essential falsity, in that they have to do, after all, with but a fragment of a man. The recognition of the unity of man's nature, just as certainly, delivers from a false asceticism; for it makes it possible to mark out *the true place of self-denial* in the worthy human life. The problem deserves careful consideration, for it greatly concerns us as a people.

This half ascetic element in the Puritan life — the spirit of self-denial — is, perhaps, the one practical element of Puritanism, to which it is most difficult to do justice. One cannot help seeing, in the ascetic leanings of Puritanism, both an element of undoubted strength and a morbid element of danger. The new Puritanism must learn how to make careful discrimination at this point, and to keep the strength without the morbidity of the Puritan. It must discover, in other words, the true place of self-denial in the conquering life. This will require that it definitely *set aside various false conceptions of the meaning of self-denial*.

It must, then, perceive, in the first place, that a true self-denial *does not choose suffering for its own sake*. It does not argue, as so many earnest souls have been inclined to argue, in the past: "I know it is my duty because I hate it so." Duty, undoubtedly, may at times seem difficult and unattractive enough; but the hating of a course of action is not reason for believing it duty. No suffering is to be chosen simply as suffering. This is neither wisdom nor courage, but perversion of aim and bravado, that is quite certain to end in a false and petty pride.

True self-denial, in the second place, has *no room for the ascetic assumption that the body is evil per se*. It accepts its physical life, like its mental and spiritual, as a good gift of God and alike a part of his creation. It knows, indeed, that the body, like any other good gift, can be abused; and it does not deceive itself concerning the temptations that may come through it. Nevertheless, it refuses to substitute a pagan conception of the body for the Christian. It does not despise the body. It will not abuse the body. It sees clearly that the flesh, as flesh, is not evil.

Nor can the new Puritanism ever think of such self-denial as it takes on, as a *work of extra merit*

and supererogation. Duty commands that man should be true to his best insight. He cannot be more than that. And to take on conduct beyond the vision of clear duty, is not to add to duty's real achievement, but to detract from it. But it is peculiarly difficult to escape this feeling of extra merit for unnecessary hardships voluntarily taken on. Men are likely to be particularly proud of the little asceticisms that they have sought out or devised for themselves; and they readily exalt them into the supreme place in moral achievement. Whereas, in reality, they hold uncommon danger for the more prosaic but infinitely more worthy virtues of the common life, as the history of the race in asceticism, pharisaism, and Puritanism abundantly shows. A true self-denial must make certain that it is not betrayed into this evil by-path of a fancied excess of merit. If the particular self-denial taken on were justified at all, it was either because one needed it for his own life, or because service of others demanded it. In either case duty requires it, and there is no room for extra merit or for excess of pride.

{ Nor may the man who has found some particular self-denial of value to himself forthwith erect this

abstinence of his own into a perpetual *standard for all other lives*. Where much is made of the self-denial for its own sake, this is practically certain to result. Men are seldom able not to erect some small asceticism of their own into a fixed standard for the judgment of others. The man who goes without breakfast is pretty certain to feel that the army of breakfast-eaters are a degenerate race. So surely as various minor self-denials are continuously needed for individual men, just so surely must the man, who would give self-denial its true place, guard against this insidious tendency to make one's own pet asceticisms into a general norm of human conduct. The new Puritanism will perceive, thus, that the true act of self-denial cannot be made forthwith an external test of righteousness for other men. There are no such external tests.

The new Puritanism, moreover, will never imagine that self-denial, to whatever lengths it may be carried, can give, in itself, *positiveness of life*. It is means only. It is not itself love, but, so far as it has meaning at all, it is but a method of love. Its entire justification lies there. "If I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and if I give my body to be burned, but have not love, it profiteth me nothing."

It is imperative, not only for clearness of thinking, but for the soundness of the moral life, that we should thus clearly distinguish the true self-denial from all false asceticism. But the very strength and persistence of the imitations suggest the importance of true self-denial. The new Puritanism will not doubt that self-denial must have a real place in all worthy life. And face to face with the enormous material development of the modern world and its dangers for the ideal life, we shall feel again the stern call to such simple living and such self-denial as the Puritan could bear. We shall not make again the mistake of asceticism, of regarding self-denial as an end in itself, but we shall take on understandingly and whole-heartedly all that self-denial that is valuable for the individual himself, as physical, mental, and moral hygiene; all that self-denial that, though the individual himself may not feel its need, is fairly demanded by the good of the whole community; and all the self-denial that is further involved in the full subordination of all the lesser goods to the greater, and in the clear recognition that a man is made for heroic service, and cannot himself be largely and finally satisfied in passive self-indulgence. From all these various points of view we shall hear again the challenge of

the ancient voice: "Take thy part in suffering hardship as a good soldier of Christ Jesus."

(1) First of all, self-denial is needed for positive self-discipline, *for mental and moral hygiene*. It is no abuse of the body; but builds rather on careful study of bodily laws and conditions; and it thereby takes on all self-denial that is helpful to the attainment of one's highest self. It is the method by which a man seeks to maintain himself persistently at his best, — seeks to be true to the vision of his best moments. And it requires far greater self-mastery to obey the laws of the body in the maintenance of one's bodily best, than, in a false asceticism, simply to abuse the body. All efficiency — of which we are talking much in these days — goes back finally to *personal efficiency*, and there are many things to indicate that it is still true that the individual is nowhere counting to his full capacity. Probably most of us, by the practice of a more scientific and earnestly moral self-control, have a distinctly higher type of life and a larger and finer service within our reach. The chief objection to the use of intoxicating liquor and tobacco probably lies just here. As simply an abnormal use of the nervous system, it is difficult to believe that these intoxicant and narcotic habits are to hold the

future; and they will do so the less, the more insistent becomes the scientific demand for avoidance of waste — of money, of time, of nerve, of energy, of high quality of work.

(2) The new Puritanism will take on, in the second place, *all self-denial that is valuable for others*, — for the common life of all. It will not hesitate to sacrifice its personal gratification where a community good is at stake; and some men will always be ready to take on, for example, total abstinence from intoxicating liquor, for this reason, who would not have felt abstinence necessary for their own sake. Indeed, if the community has the right to demand from its locomotive engineers, for the greater protection and more efficient service of the public, total abstinence, it can hardly be denied that it has a like right to demand from its great financial, political, and social engineers a similar freedom from befuddling conditions. The fabric of national life is a seamless robe. The connections are marvelously close, and are becoming more so with every year. The community may suffer less immediately and obviously by the selfish intemperance of financial or educational magnates than by the befuddled brains of the locomotive engineer; but in the end the danger is likely to be greater.

The best brains and the most unselfish purposes are none too good for the tasks which confront the modern state. And it is one of the standing disgraces of the educational world, that in the discernment of the personal need of temperance, it should not only have been in general no leader, but should have lagged far behind great industrial corporations.

Nor is it merely at this point that self-denial for the sake of the common good is required. It is quite impossible to face the various forms of social maladjustment in our national life, as we shall later find, without seeing that they all demand both unselfish leadership and unselfish community coöperation, if they are to be even approximately righted. As Croly puts it, "the promise of American life is to be fulfilled — not merely by a maximum amount of economic freedom, but by a certain measure of discipline; not merely by the abundant satisfaction of individual desires, but by a large measure of individual subordination and self-denial. And this necessity of subordinating the satisfaction of individual desires to the fulfillment of a national purpose is attached particularly to the absorbing occupation of the American people, — the occupation, viz.: of accumulating wealth."¹

¹ *The Promise of American Life*, p. 22.

(3) And the new Puritanism, in trying to keep, in the spirit of self-denial, the truth of the Puritan asceticism, while rejecting its weakness, will be clear, in the third place, that a true self-denial means that the *relative goods must be kept in their relative place*; that the great demand of all higher living is to keep the first things first. The simple life, in other words, is no mere matter of the possession of things, few or many. True simplicity lies not in a man's circumstances, but in his spirit. Simplicity of life is an achievement. It is no inheritance. And it is truly achieved only by those who, while they deny the value of none of the lesser goods, nevertheless unhesitatingly sacrifice the lesser to the greater, the temporary to the permanent, the relative to the absolute, — who know that, not only the evil, but even the good is the enemy of the best, and who seek persistently the best. We have already seen how specifically modern conditions call for just this subordination of the lesser goods.

(4) For the new Puritanism, true self-denial will mean, further, *the clear recognition of man's heroic mold*. It will not think too meanly of man, but will see that he is made, in his very nature, body and soul, for action, for self-mastery, for conquest, for the highest personal relations, and that, therefore,

he cannot finally be satisfied, even as to happiness, to say nothing of achievement in character, with mere passive self-indulgence. There is here a peculiar challenge to all our higher education. If it belongs to the college and university to fit for living, — to furnish in peculiar degree those who are to be the social leaven of the nation and of the world, then the college and the university may least of all forget the full meaning of life and of man, and man's heroic mold. And they must awaken the deepest and the best in young men and women, and enable them to respond with joy to that heroic service for which, after all, human nature craves. It is a mean and petty education in which deep calls not unto deep. And the standards of self-indulgence with which some college communities seem content are a disgrace to the name of education, to say nothing of religion. The simple fact is, that there is still a widespread willingness to condone and defend college dissipation and lawlessness, that must be regarded as thoroughly illogical and out of date. The true situation is this: in its college and university students, the nation sets large numbers free from productive labor, for the high and special privilege of long training for leadership. Every obligation of honor binds these to be not less, but

more scrupulously law-abiding and self-controlled than others. Special privileges in the world's democracy have just one possible justification — a correspondingly great special fidelity and special service. Where teachers or students forget this, they stultify themselves. This is not an exalted standard, but only the minimum of obligation.

It was quite in the spirit of the new Puritanism that the editor of *Life* wrote some time since, after the death of a distinguished politician: "Here was a life of great promise, vehemently lived and bewilderingly successful. But the man was first-rate, and the success was only second-rate. He made quantities of money; his friends liked him. He had a dozen estates; he had horses and pictures and palaces and rare objects of art; toys, all of them, and nothing more. He could not help being a rich man, for the stuff was in him, but his huge fortune, making possible his huge expenditures, surely cost him more than it was worth. It made his friends regretful; it made him prefer his own interests to ours. . . . And at the last the wagon that should have been hitched to a star followed a race-horse, and he seemed content to have it so. . . . The flesh was a little too strong for him; the world's more garish allurements somewhat too

enticing. It might hardly be kind, or worth while, to say so, if he did not illustrate so faithfully a tendency of all of us, in this generation, to think of money as the chief good, and of the pleasures that can be bought as preferable to the more austere but loftier delights that come of sticking close to duty. . . . He would have been a greater, and, no doubt, a more truly happy man, if he had taken less thought for money and for pleasure, and more for the eternal verities and for us." It is a true estimate of values which here expresses itself. And when a comic journal feels the call so to speak, the need of something like a new Puritanism in our national life can hardly be questioned.

It is no narrow fanaticism, for which the new Puritanism, to which our study has brought us, stands. The ideal set forth belongs in all its parts to our natural inheritance. It preserves, first of all, the great spiritual positives of the Puritans: the prophetic vision of God and the spiritual world, the apostolic conviction of divine commission, the stern upgirding sense of responsibility and accountability, and the consequent pervading assurance of the significance and value of life. It has fully learned, also, the lessons of the reaction from Puri-

tanism; and, therefore, shuns both the austerity that is irreverent of personality and a sentimentalism that knows no true love; both narrowness and a false tolerance; both a false asceticism and contempt of beauty, on the one hand, and a false realism and a false estheticism, on the other hand.

And it adds, thus, to the positives of the Puritans the great positives of the modern spirit: the supreme demand for a genuine and reverent love; the perception of the breadth and complexity of life; and the recognition of the unity of man's nature. It can, then, be loyal both to the scientific spirit and the social consciousness of the modern world, and do justice, at the same time, to the powerful element of self-denial in the Puritan. It believes, therefore, in a vigorous personal hygiene — physical, mental, and moral; it believes in all that self-denial that is demanded by the common weal; it believes in the steady subordination of the lesser to the greater goods; it believes in man's greatness, — in his heroic mold, and that he can, consequently, never be satisfied in mere self-indulgence. The new Puritanism calls the nation, therefore, at once, to a deeper spirituality, to a sounder and broader view of man, and to a vigilant and victorious moral life. And it believes that all

are necessary, not alone for the individual, but for all true greatness in the national life as well. Only so can America fully meet the challenge of the modern time.

*"Not in the camp his victory lies
Or triumph in the market-place,
Who is his Nation's sacrifice
To turn the judgment from his race.*

"Happy is he who, bred and taught
By sleek, sufficing Circumstance —
Whose Gospel was the apparelled thought,
Whose Gods were Luxury and Chance —

"Sees, on the threshold of his days,
The old life shrivel like a scroll,
And to unheralded dismays
Submits his body and his soul ;

"The fatted shows wherein he stood
Foregoing, and the idiot pride,
That he may prove with his own blood
All that his easy sires denied —

"Ultimate issues, primal springs,
Demands, abasements, penalties —
The imperishable plinth of things
Seen and unseen, that touch our peace.

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"The yoke he bore shall press him still,
And long-ingrained effort goad
To find, to fashion, and fulfil
The cleaner life, the sterner code.

*"Not in the camp his victory lies —
The world (unheeding his return)
Shall see it in his children's eyes
And from his grandson's lips shall learn!"*¹

¹ Kipling, *The Reformers*.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MEANING OF THE CHALLENGE IN OUR OWN NATIONAL LIFE II: THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN RACE ANTAGONISMS

IF America is to meet, in any adequate fashion, the challenge of the modern age, it is obvious that it must not only come to terms with its inherited Puritan ideal, with all that that implies; but must also specifically face its great peculiar problem of relation to the negro race. There has been forced upon us, again and again, in the course of our discussion, the primary and essential significance of reverence for the personality, as a guiding principle in human development. We cannot pretend, therefore, even superficially, to have faced the challenge of the times, if we refuse to note with care the bearing of this principle upon the negro problem.

How serious and pressing that problem is, no thoughtful man, white or black, north or south, needs to be told. Its very vastness is appalling.

We have seen the negroes in the United States increase, since the war, from four millions to ten millions — a whole nation in themselves, a population greater than that of the entire country in 1820. The difficulty and delicacy, too, of the questions arising out of the relations between races that seem markedly different cannot be ignored. And in the more recent years, with diminished feeling and interest and education in the momentousness of the issues involved, there has been observable, even in the north, an increasing willingness to hold the negro simply to menial service, and to forbid him the right, as far as possible, to any higher aspiration. Now neither prejudice nor sectionalism nor denunciation nor declamation, nor the stirring of race hatred — least of all, — can possibly avail anything in the solution of this peculiarly difficult problem. Each and all — they can only further complicate the problem, and postpone its just settlement.

We need the clarifying, calming, and steadying power of great principles, nowhere more than here, where prejudice and passion are so easily aroused. Surely we want to know the truth, the path of real justice, and to follow it. The history of the race should make clear that no ques-

tion can be settled until it is settled right. And we can be perfectly certain that we cannot here lightly turn our backs on that principle, which we have seen to be an absolutely basic moral and Christian principle, a principle whose dominion is demanded by modern conditions at multiplied points, and a principle that has proved itself the supreme test of civilizations in human history. Only one principle can guide us in the difficulties of the relations of race to race — reverence for the person as such, absolutely unaffected by color or race connection. This, then, is the constant challenge of our national life, — whether we are to be true, as individuals and as a nation, to this principle of reverence for personality. And the spirit of reverence for the person has its severest test in the relations of race to race, and most of all in the relations of blacks and whites. No more difficult, no more delicate, no more vital problem, thus confronts the American people than the problem of the true relation of white and black in this nation. And in these race relations we may be perfectly certain that no evasion, no compromise, no merely mechanical method, can give us peace at last. Nothing less than genuine loyalty to this one deep-going, far-reaching, fructifying

principle of reverence for the person can solve our problem, or put us in the way of solving it.

We may not deny the gravity of the issue. Both whites and blacks, north and south, are here on trial as nowhere else. Are we together to be equal to the emergency? Dare we attempt soberly, thoughtfully, and with all charity, to apply this great principle of reverence for the person to the relations of the two races? In our initial chapter, we found that this principle always involved both fundamental self-respect and respect for the personality of others. Let us try to see what this would mean in the relations of these races.

I

SELF-RESPECT

I. First of all, then, there must be self-respect on both sides. *The negro must respect himself* and his race. All the circumstances of his history have made imitation of the whites more easy and natural, and yet his future demands self-reverence as nothing else. Let him hear Emerson saying: "Trust thyself; every heart vibrates to that iron string." And let him say with Emerson, though in no spirit of shallow, unteachable conceit: "We

will walk on our own feet; we will work with our own hands; we will speak our own mind." Let him be sure of the truth of Tennyson's golden words:

"Self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control,
These three alone lead life to sovereign power."

Let him take to heart Whitman's direct exhortation to him: "Commence to-day to inure yourself to pluck, reality, self-esteem, definiteness, elevatedness." One may be glad that the Colored National Baptist Association approved the movement to supply negro children with well-formed negro dolls. As *Collier's* says, "there is more involved than appears on the surface in encouraging little negro girls to clasp in their arms pretty replicas of themselves. The white race does not monopolize beauty or loveliness, and it will be a happier day for all when this is realized."

And self-respect requires, first of all, that a man should really deserve respect, that he should know that he has a calling of his own to fulfill and means to have self-control enough to fulfill it, — that he should not fail in those conditions which give the qualities of character or influence, *whether his achievement is recognized or not*. But if he fulfill the conditions of self-respect, he

can hardly fail of winning ultimately the respect of others. The negro has the hard task, which confronts every growing man and every developing race, to make himself capable, valuable, indispensable: capable of self-support, and of work that needs doing; having a valuable individual and racial contribution to make; then, with his marked individuality, finally demonstrating that the nation cannot spare him, that his unique contribution is indispensable to the perfected national life.

The first step, undoubtedly, is self-support, — some financial independence. And Booker Washington is probably right in the emphasis that he places upon this; just because such financial independence is, inevitably, so considerable an element in self-respect. It is not a merely material goal that is here sought. And when one remembers that in fifty years the negroes have passed from the condition of being owned chattels to the ownership of six hundred million dollars in property, he cannot fail to feel that great progress has been made. It is in line with this conviction of the importance of financial independence, that Sir Harry H. Johnston writes: "The one undoubted solution of the Negro's difficulties throughout the world is



for him to turn his strong arms and sturdy legs, his fine sight, subtle hearing, deft fingers, and rapidly developed brain to the making of Money, money being indeed but transmuted intellect and work, accumulated energy and courage.”¹

All this means that the negro must know himself, must come to consciousness, find himself, see his own individuality, — his own possible contribution to the race and to the life and work of the world, and believe in the value of that for which it is given him to stand. He must not allow himself to be betrayed into a mere imitation of the whites, that must necessarily shut him out from his own true self and service. He cannot afford, the nation cannot afford, that he should be a mere echo of the whites. Let the negro, then, first of all, believe in himself; let him develop — what some of his wisest leaders seem genuinely to have — real race pride, and pride in association with his race. Let him take pride in his race’s marked individuality — for no race is more individual — in its unique endowments and possibilities. Elaborate deductions of negro music from other music have been attempted; but the very fact that the deduction has to be so labored and extended, indicates that the negro has at least

¹ *The Negro in The New World*, p. xii.

a marked and peculiar musical endowment. It would be an immense pity to lose out of our national life the singularly appealing power of the genuine negro melodies. Both white and black may well remember, too, that practically the only original folklore the nation has, is negro folklore, though it has been interpreted to us by a southern white. And who would willingly let die the delicate quaintness of humor and imagination of "Uncle Remus" and "Daddy Jack"?

Both whites and blacks may be reminded, also, that, as a great philosopher has pointed out, the qualities that have made the Anglo-Saxon so often dominant are not altogether enviable qualities; they have their distinctly ungenerous, hard, selfish, domineering side, that any race may well avoid. The so-called "John Bull attitude" the negro need not envy. As contrasted with this, the pure negro seems often to have a temperamental kindliness of disposition, a good-nature, a readiness to make the most of a situation, and to find none insufferable, that, while it may often be an obstacle to advancement, has a great gift to make to the contentment and happiness of life. It is possible to make life quite too strenuous, to live so completely in the future as never really

to live in the present, — to take no enjoyment in life as it passes. And this is the certain danger of the American rush. The negro's tendency to content — while undoubtedly a temptation to laziness — has in it, thus, a real element of strength, and much suggestion for an over-enterprising people that has become frantic in its haste.

All these characteristics of the negro are connected with his unusual emotional endowment. And the whites may well be on their guard against that "certain blindness in human beings" which should keep them from at least some imaginative appreciation of the powers of insight, revelation, and enjoyment involved in such emotional capacities. Dangers, this immense emotional endowment surely has; but let one measure its worth by remembering that the sense of reality itself roots in feeling, and by recalling the difference between the hours in which life seems cold and dead, and those in which, in warmth of feeling, his being tingles with the sense of life's meaning.

And we may not forget — what Stanley Hall and Booker Washington have both recalled — the positive genius which the negro seems to have for religion. His natural religious endowment is probably unsurpassed by that of any race, unless it

be the Jewish. And the modern Jew is hardly his rival here. That his religious feeling needs much intelligent direction is undoubted, but quite unwonted religious capacity he certainly has. He is a natural seer; and the more utilitarian the triumphs of the race, the less can it spare the negro, with his undying sense of another world and another life and of the presence of God in the world.

And is there any finer record of fidelity in the world's history than that of the negro attendants of Livingstone, in their bringing back of his dead body to his English friends, in spite of the enormous difficulties of that nine months' journey? When I stand under the arches of Westminster Abbey, at Livingstone's tomb, I bow my head, not alone in reverence for the heroic soul whose body lies beneath, but also for the marvelous fidelity of his lowly negro attendants, who alone made it possible that his mortal remains should find there their resting place.

No exhaustive analysis of the negro mind has been here attempted; but it is suggested that such qualities as these may well make the decriers of the negro hesitate, and give to the negro himself a just race pride. The very fact that he naturally

excites such race antipathy, indicates that he has a rarely marked race individuality; and that of itself is promise, on the one hand, of much compensation for himself, and, on the other, of power to render an indispensable service to mankind. The negro, then, must relentlessly deny himself the weakening luxury of self-pity, great as the temptations to it are. He may justly respect himself and take pride in his race. For I cannot doubt that President Stanley Hall is abundantly justified when he says that if the negro can be made to accept without "corroding self-pity his present situation, prejudice and all, hard as it is, take his stand squarely upon the feet of his race, respect its unique gifts, develop all its possibilities, make himself the best possible black man, and not desire to be a brunette imitation of the Caucasian, he will in coming generations fill a place of great importance and of pride both to himself and to us in the future of the republic."

And just because the negro respects himself, and for his own sake, he will not press the demand, or make a bitter struggle, for so-called social equality. I say "so-called" social equality; for real social equality is giving to all equal opportunities of social development and enjoyment, not at all necessarily prescribing just what associates any should have.

No one could ask that this point should be put more admirably than that clear-sighted negro, Professor Kelly Miller, has put it: "The negro's sense of self-respect effectively forbids forcing himself upon any unwelcome association. Household intercourse and domestic familiarity are essentially questions of personal privilege. . . . The negro is building up his own society, based upon character, culture, and the nice amenities of life, and can find ample satisfaction within the limits of his own race. . . . But the negro ought not to be expected to accept that interpretation of social equality which would rob him of political and civil rights as well as of educational and industrial opportunity. . . . The negro and the white man in this country must live together for all time which we can foresee. They must mingle in business and in public life. All their relations should be characterized by mutual respect, courtesy, and good-will. In all purely personal and social matters let each, if he will, go unto his own company." Professor Miller is here only claiming for his own people the attitude which *The Independent* recommends to the Jews: "Jews can make their own social world like other people, and there are ways in plenty to meet others socially if they want to, even though certain clubs

and resorts exclude them. Where they are not wanted they will not want to go. Men and women must choose their own company, and not feel hurt if kissing goes by favor."

Like a self-respecting man, then, who does not wish to go where he is not wanted, the negro may well remember that he has in good degree the self-sufficiency that belongs to any race. He is not to be shut out of life nor from any of the best things of life, simply because he is shut away from the whites. In no bitter and in no exclusive spirit, let him say to himself, "As truly as any race, my race can be self-sufficient." For his own sake, at present at least, this probably means that it is wiser and more self-respecting not to fight separate schools, separate cars, etc., provided only that the accommodations are the same, and that the separation of the races is truly maintained, in that the schools and cars of the blacks are not made a dumping ground for the less desirable whites. Justice the negro wants, not necessarily social mixing. And it may be wondered, sometimes, if the providential meaning of this seemingly hard forcing of the black back upon himself may not be, that the nation is not to be allowed to lose the irreplaceable gifts of this truly gifted people, as it has already

too often wastefully thrown away so many of the peculiar gifts of incoming immigrants.

Above all, the negro has the very difficult task of not allowing himself to be betrayed, even by injustice, into bitterness, resentment, suspicion, and hatred. The only mortal wound a man's enemy can give him is to provoke him into an unworthy spirit, to tempt him to lower himself to the level of the attack made upon him. One may doubt whether he would himself be equal to the demand made upon the negro; but, nevertheless, as long as moral principles abide, and a man's empire is his own spirit, so long the only way out of such a situation as that in which the negro finds himself — the only complete triumph — is to hold himself above it, to keep sweet, to grow by moral victory, to gain the conquest of that meekness that inherits even the earth, — *maintaining oneself at one's best even under provocation*. And so the race's greatest leaders have borne themselves. For, in another's words, "no one long wants to oppose the man whom opposition never embitters. But the man who tries to overcome opposition by showing that he resents it, and by hurling himself against it, only builds it up the stronger. Keeping sweet in spite of opposition is never a sign of amiable weakness; only the

strongest can do it. Therefore such keeping sweet is an irresistible attack on the opposition, and will convert it to friendliness or agreement, if anything can."

2. And in this difficult problem of the relation of the black and white races, *the white, too, must keep his self-respect*. Undoubtedly, with the many differences between individuals and races, the feeling of uncongeniality must often be present, sometimes in such marked degree that some kinds of association, at least, are better not attempted. But even then, the feeling is not one to be proud of; and one needs to recognize a certain limitation and blindness in himself that prevents him from entering with sympathetic understanding into the life and thought of the other man or race, and finding some larger basis of agreement. While, then, we recognize race antipathy as a fact, with a measure of justification, we may not defend it as a final good, but we are rather to see it, in the light of present-day world conditions already pointed out, as one of the greatest present obstacles to the progress of the human race. With some shamefacedness, therefore, although race antipathy is closely connected with a vigorous race consciousness, we may recognize, simply as a natural fact to be taken account of, the often marked general

uncongeniality of the white and black races, showing itself in very different ways in different people. It is not wise for any of us to ignore this fact, nor unnecessarily to rasp this feeling of uncongeniality in others.

But no feeling of uncongeniality can justify essential injustice, and the white cannot keep his own self-respect, however brilliantly he may argue, if he refuses complete justice to the negro, or refuses obedience to the finer fundamental moral and Christian principle of reverence for the person. And any attempt to deny that the negro belongs to the human race, and has all the rights of a person, simply proclaims the denier hopelessly belated, and exposes him to the just scorn of all men, whatever his pretensions. There is not the slightest room for argument at that point. And that there are still a few brutal men who can so talk, is only a sign of the mortal wound that slavery of the black gave to the white. The enslaver cannot easily escape the curse of slavery in its bitter blinding reaction on his own inner spirit. The dark inheritance does not belong to the black alone. The whole national life still suffers and must long suffer from it.

To preserve his own self-respect, therefore, the white man must be scrupulously just, never deny-

ing the negro his fair and equal chance, — his *chance for all the development of which he is capable*. Any other policy is suicidal for the nation. We are a professed democracy. Now it is impossible to look at the question of democracy in the large, and not see that any attempt to hold the negro down is a blow to the nation's life.

In the first place, we have reached such a point in history that there is now absolute necessity of the conquest of race prejudice for the sake of the largest world-progress. In the second place, we may not forget that without such fair and just treatment of the negro, we cannot ourselves keep our own democracy. Lincoln said long ago that the nation could not continue, "half free and half slave." It is just as certain to-day that a true democracy cannot exist, half aristocrat and half menial. In the third place, for the sake not only of the negro, but of the entire national life, the negro must have the ablest and soundest leaders from his own people. Let one measure the immense loss it would have been, not to the negroes only, but to our whole national life, if the single man, Booker Washington, had been confined in his ambitions to the position of a railway porter, as many desire to confine the negro race. For all the larger

interests of the nation it is imperative that the fullest opportunity should be given for the development of negro leadership. And in the fourth place, if as a nation we are to take pride in our cosmopolitanism, it is certain that we cannot take any different relation to the negro than to other races. We have no right to that pride, if we are not able to deal justly and considerately with the race that stands closest of all to us. In all this, one is pleading not simply for the negro, in one sense not mainly for the negro; but for the possibility in the national life of a genuine and thoroughgoing democracy. Wherever force or brutality, wherever fraud or deception or indirection come in, wherever repression or withholding of just opportunity in any form appears, there the doer of injustice is doomed to suffer in his inner spirit as truly as the one wronged. The strong suffer with the weak, and the whole nation with its most oppressed class.

If only in answer to the instinct of self-preservation, then, the white man will not forget that opportunity of self-development is necessary to preserve the negro's self-respect and necessary for any upbuilding hope; and that the nation cannot break down the negro's hope and self-respect and not sap, at the same time, his power of self-control.

Certainly, there is nothing, in all this dark and difficult problem, that both races require so much to learn, as strenuous self-control. And there is to-day, in this whole question, no folly so stupendous and so unforgivable as that the race that counts itself superior should show extreme lack of self-control, exactly at this point of the relation of the races. The great proof of sanity and of evolution above the animal is power of self-control. Outrage provokes outrage; violence provokes violence, and cannot set its own limits. And we are naturally now seeing the same treatment applied by tobacco and cotton white-cappers to whites whose acts are in any way not approved, as was formerly reserved for blacks. This, too, is a part of slavery's own curse; but it ought not much longer to keep us blind to that great saying of Kant's, already quoted, "If law ceases, all worth of human life on earth ceases too."

Here the interests of the two races are bound up indissolubly together. Neither race has any option. Just as at Atlanta in the riot, so always and everywhere, the leaders of the two races must consult together, and work together in mutual understanding and mutual respect for the uplifting of all. The steps that have to be taken in the development of

the social consciousness anywhere, here too must hold. Such consultation and work together are inevitable, whether we like it or not, if our national life is to be preserved. They are just as certainly desirable, even if not forced. And they are indispensable, if either race is to come to its best. The interests of the two races are indissolubly knit up together. They must share in each other's good. Both have, as Edgar Gardner Murphy puts it, an "indivisible inheritance." "If there be freedom of the press; if there be a press fit or unfit to be free; if there be a vital and spiritual religion; if there be books, artists, poets; if there be an historic and responsive language; if there be stable banks, equitable markets, courts accessible and for the most part just; physicians, hospitals, and — by no means least — the kindly interest of the wisest and kindest of a more highly developed population, — these are the negro's. In so far as they are ours, they are his; in so far as they are not his, they tend, in subtle, inexorable fashions, not to be our own. In the fundamental sense we can no more make a bi-racial division of our civilization than we can make a bi-racial division of the sunshine, the rain, the returning seasons." ¹

¹ *The Basis of Ascendancy*, p. 12.

II

RESPECT FOR THE LIBERTY OF OTHERS

I. And in this problem of the relation of the races, we must respect throughout the liberty of the other man. We cannot force the attitude of the other anywhere, with gain, even if it were possible. The only real and permanent gain is in winning his will to the right attitude. *Northerner and Southerner alike* must try, therefore, charitably, thoughtfully, to get the other's point of view, — to recognize the sincere efforts on either side to help in this difficult problem, and to seek all possible coöperation. Doubtless each has much to learn from the other. It may be suspected that, abstractly, the Northerner is more nearly right in his theory as to relation to the negro; the Southerner, more nearly right in his individual concrete friendliness. It has been, for example, so difficult for capital, even with high aims, to get the exactly right cue in relation to labor, when only whites — and often those of high quality — were involved, that it would not be strange that, even with the best intentions, those close to the negro problem should not see quite clearly the delicacy of the principle involved. On the other hand, the actual, patient, long-continued

friendliness may be all too lacking in the accurate theorist. The instinctive feeling of the Southern white as to so-called social equality may be connected with earnest desire to be absolutely just and fair to the negro. And, even when the Northerner does not sympathize with the feeling, it is essential that he should not confuse the issues in his judgment of another. Just as surely, the Northerner's instinctive recognition of worth in the black, even if socially expressed, intends no injustice to other whites. On both sides there must be liberty, and frank recognition of the other's liberty.

2. And just as certainly must all the whites *respect the liberty of the blacks*. Nothing but a weak-willed child, without character, can be the product of a steady policy of repression and domination, that never calls out the child's own will and gives him no chance to use his will. In this difficult problem of the relation of the races, we need to be reminded of that far-reaching principle of Patterson Du Bois, that the true father's attitude is never, "I will conquer that child whatever it costs him," but "I will help that child to conquer himself, whatever it costs me." And the more paternal either North or South feels called to make the relation to the negro, the less may it

forget that the attitude of mere domination is not only impossible physically, it is even more impossible morally. The one thing that the nation cannot afford to do is to keep the negro in leading strings, even if it could. For its own salvation, the nation must rather aim, at any possible expense, to bring the negro forward as rapidly as may be to self-knowledge, to self-reverence, to self-control, that the negro race may cease to be a menace or a problem, and become as a whole what it already is in part, a constituent, helpful element of the national life. Let us not repeat with the negro the bitter mistake which Jane Addams reminds us we have so often made with the immigrant, — not only failing to see his worth, to take the real gift which he brings, to enlist his love and loyalty for the nation, but, on the contrary, even stirring his hatred and resentment.

III

RESPECT FOR THE INNER PERSONALITY OF OTHERS

Right race relations involve, also, a deep sense of the priceless value and sacredness of the individual person. This highest attainment, this

finest flower of civilization and of individual development, it has been often complained, the negro peculiarly lacks. And north and south, we have tried to punish this lack of reverence for the person in the negro with immediate, lawless, furious revenge. Even if the charge against the negro were fully admitted, has the method proved effective? Can it ever, for any age, or any child, or any man, or any people, possibly be effective? Rather are we not cultivating, with remorseless inevitableness, great harvests of the very spirit we are seeking to root out? In our supposed superiority we violate the personality hardly less ruthlessly or less revoltingly than the brutal criminal we would punish. We sow to the wind, and reap the whirlwind, — reap it in white and black alike, brutalizing more and more the whole national life. No pictures need be drawn; the daily paper tells, with heart-sickening reiteration, the depths of barbarism to which mobs of supposedly civilized whites north and south, have sunk, in their desire for vengeance. But just so far as we yield to this spirit, we are losing the very first elements of an ordered government and a decent civilization. The whole theory and method of lynch law are devil-inspired. They

threaten everything that is sacred or valuable in the life that men have to live together.

How *are* we to secure from the negro and white alike this white flower of the moral and Christian spirit, — reverence for the person? There is only one way — never, in the universe of God, who in his Christ stands ever to knock at the door of the human heart, never but one way — the way of contagion of character. Reverence alone can beget reverence. A child is not likely to rise to the sense of the beauty of delicate respect for the person, whose own self-respect is utterly broken down. The pupils of a certain teacher were so notably well behaved, that a man was led to inquire of one of her little pupils what she did to secure such a result. "Oh," the boy replied, "I don't know; she doesn't do anything; but she just walks around, and we feel as polite as anything." We have small hope of creating the delicate sense of reverence for the person in the less favored race, so long as the more favored race stamps the other spirit of contempt, by awful barbaric examples, upon it. There is only one way — the way of contagion by personal example. "But if this way be abandoned," as *Ecce Homo* says, "the effect will appear in a certain slow

deterioration of manners, which it would be hard to describe had it not been described already in well known words. 'Sophistry and calculation' will take the place of 'chivalry.' There will be no more 'generous loyalty,' no more 'proud submission,' no more 'dignified obedience.' A stain will no more be felt like a wound, and our hardened and coarsened manners will lose the 'sensibility of principle and the chastity of honor.'"

The present situation as to race prejudice and race antipathy of all kinds is a divine challenge to us all of every race, and a solemn call to the rededication of ourselves to the finer fruits of the moral and Christian spirit — to the spirit of reverence for the person. Like Christ, we are to stand and knock at the door of the humblest personality. Like Christ, we stoop in shame wherever the inner sanctities of any soul are violated.

CHAPTER IX

THE MEANING OF THE CHALLENGE IN OUR OWN NATIONAL LIFE III: A TRUER DEMOCRACY

WE have been trying to see what the challenge of the modern world means for our own nation: first, in the demand for an enlargement and reinvigoration of the moral life of the people in a new Puritanism; and, second, in the problem of race antagonisms, which is so directly forced upon us, and has assumed such vast proportions. But we cannot stop here. We need still more definitely to see the bearing of these modern conditions upon democracy; for it is as a democracy, that America has its life to live, and its part to play in the world. It is demanded of us as a nation that we make certain that we are so facing the changed conditions of the modern world, as to insure at each step a still truer democracy. Not otherwise, assuredly, can we be loyal to the underlying principle of our civilization, — reverence for personality.

The prodigious increases in knowledge, in power,

and in wealth that have characterized our time, ought naturally to carry with them the possibilities of a far more genuine democracy. If they do not so prove, then, at some point, the nation has been unfaithful to its trust, or blind to its opportunity. We need clearly to see where and why it has failed, and to set before ourselves as a people a strong and consistent national policy in our dealing with modern conditions that shall be unmistakably democratic in its entire spirit and outcome. Just because the changes of the modern time have been so largely economic, and the effect of these economic changes so far-reaching, we must expect to find some of the gravest problems of democracy in this sphere of the economic. But, serious as is the economic challenge, it is not here alone that the modern world flings down the gauntlet to a democratic people. In many lines the possibilities of democratic success or failure are enormous.

In the first place, the general trend among the nations, the world over, we have found to be such as naturally to spur a democratic nation to still more earnest endeavor. A democratic tendency, within the nations generally, seemed clearly discernible, and steps in the contrary direction are

practically impossible. Even in dependencies, where present conditions appear hopeless, the conviction that no people has a right simply to exploit another people is deep and growing, and is increasingly supported by the conscience of the world. Side by side with a sense of world-politics and imperialistic policies, there has developed, too, the spirit of a sound nationalism naturally based. Coupled with the feeling concerning dependencies, this must increasingly put a wholesome check upon unscrupulous imperialistic aggressions, and direct the world ambitions of the nations into lines of coöperative international endeavor. For no nation can ultimately afford to array against herself the general moral judgment of the world. The rapid progress of international arbitration, also, points, as we have seen, in the same direction. Socialism and nihilism, too, have compelled the nations to open their eyes to conditions essentially undemocratic, and to demand at least some change. And the swift and enormous growth of sentiment, that but a few years ago would have been called socialistic, is unmistakable.

Surely the modern world conditions permit to a democracy no turning backward; but are rather a trumpet call to a consistent, significant, and

notable advance toward a still truer democracy, — a democracy that shall be absolutely and manifestly loyal to its great basic Christian conviction of the priceless value and sacredness of every individual person, and that will leave, therefore, none anywhere to be mere conveniences for other men. Measured by such a standard, it must be admitted that the world has never yet seen a genuinely Christian democracy. But America may not set before herself any lesser goal; for this is democracy's final meaning. A true democracy must be permeated through and through with the spirit of reverence for every personality; and this requires both a clear-sighted and tireless, unselfish leadership, and some response to an unselfish and reverent standard of conduct on the part of all citizens. For, as Croly says, "for better or worse, democracy cannot be disentangled from an aspiration toward human perfectibility, and hence from the adoption of measures looking in the direction of realizing such an aspiration." ¹

This means that a democracy cannot make enduring progress without ethical progress. Its foundations must be laid in a thoughtful justice for all, and in unceasing pains to bring all to the

¹ *The Promise of American Life*, p. 454.

height of their several capacities. Only so can either nation or individual attain the best. "The future of the American people," it has been well said, "depends upon the future of the American conscience."

It is peculiarly perilous, moreover, for a democracy to fail in genuine exemplification of the democratic spirit; not only because the ultimate power is in the hands of the people, and a government that fails them is certain finally to be brought to book; but, because the undemocratic action or policy involves self-stultification at every step and the consequent permeation of the national life with all the evils of a disintegrating sham. As the world's largest and most conspicuous democracy, too, America is particularly bound to lead in the exemplification of the democratic spirit, and in extending the sway of democratic principles. She should greatly assist, and not hinder, the existing democratic trend in the world. To this end, also, America should correct as speedily as possible all undemocratic inconsistencies, and point the way to a far nobler national life. Not only for its own sake, then, but also for the sake of the world civilization, America needs steadily to aim at a truer democracy. Just how, and at what points?

Can we make out with some precision exactly what the challenge of modern world conditions requires from American democracy?

All modern progress, we have clearly seen, goes back to increase in power, that has come through laying under tribute, more and more, the inexhaustible forces of nature, by modern science, as expressed in the labors of discoverers and inventors. This possible progressive conquest of the forces of nature had its root, we saw, in the new inner world of thought, in absolute freedom of investigation, guaranteed by the religious principle of freedom of conscience. The new world — outer and inner — with which we of this age have to do, is, from this point of view, a singularly unified world. Wealth grows out of the practical application of natural power, and issues in various forms of economic and political power. The instruments of economic progress are the discoverers, inventors, and practical appliers of the forces of nature. For the social, moral, and religious progress of the race, all this power — natural, economic, and political — needs control and direction, according to great principles and ideals. The test of a civilization or nation, from this point of view, is this: Is all its power under ethical

control? is all its power exercised, in full loyalty to the principle of reverence for personality? or are all the features of its life designed to bring each individual to his fullest possibilities, and so to his completest contribution to the life of the nation and of the world? This does not mean putting all on a dead level; it does not mean leveling down to an average, in the spirit of the ancient communism; it does not mean the false insistence that all have equal capacity for service, and are, therefore, to be equally rewarded. It does mean the possibility of a man's life for every man — the possibility of each coming to his own best, and the direct encouragement of that best by the community, both for the individual's sake, and for the sake of the common good; and it involves exceptional reward for exceptional service; though this reward may be chiefly in larger opportunity for unselfish leadership, — in increasing chance to work out enlarging community ideals. The future quite certainly holds the far more frequent vision of consummate ability turned from the pursuit of private fortune to public service.

The external features of our time, as earlier reviewed, can hardly fail to suggest to the thoughtful man, at every point, a national as well as

individual challenge. In the first place, the progressive conquest of nature's forces, and the resulting stupendous development of natural resources, have created a new world for nations as well as for individuals.

I

A DEMOCRATIC POLICY IN THE CONQUEST OF NATURAL FORCES

The conquest of natural forces, to begin with, has come so rapidly, yet so irregularly, and at such scattered points, that the community, as represented in states and nations, has nowhere developed a consistent policy concerning them. But it must become more and more evident that in this progressive conquest over the forces of nature (that must be held, in justice, to belong to humanity as a whole), wherever any new power or application of power is laid under tribute, there the whole community have certain great inalienable rights to conserve; however jealously it may seek at the same time to protect the rights to reward for exceptional service, on the part of the discoverer, the inventor, or the practical applier.

The community is immensely concerned in the way in which new explosives, new poisons, new

narcotics, for example, are to be used; and it cannot, in justice to the simplest demands of an ordered government, leave the manner and extent of their use to chance, to selfish interest, or to the forces of evil. So, too, it makes a great difference to the community how such new applications of force as the automobile, the aeroplane, and the wireless telegraphy are to be employed. And the same thing holds for all new machinery, especially where significant economic changes are certain to follow. If, independently of ample reward for the inventor, important mechanical devices are allowed immediately to be monopolized, the community is defrauded, often of *any* advantage from the invention, and usually of a very large part of the advantage accruing. The reward here is chiefly for manipulation of conditions, and is immensely disproportionate to service rendered. It may often happen, also, that changes in machinery involve, in the readjustment, grave economic and social effects for considerable numbers in the nation at large. Even then the improved machinery cannot be fought; but it plainly matters greatly to the nation that many of its citizens should be thus financially disabled. The welfare of the nation is involved both in the gain and in the loss. It is

bound to have, as to both loss and gain, a definite, intelligent, and consistently democratic policy, based upon this large community interest. The community has a right to share in the gain from invention, and to require that the added profit from invention do something to make good any evil economic and social consequences that may result. Many more are concerned than simply inventors, manufacturers, and owners or operators, or even employees.

The right of the community to strict control of all power, at this initial point of its derivation from nature, must be clearly recognized; and it demands a consistent national policy that can be applied, with thoughtful discrimination, without nagging and unnecessarily hampering conditions, and with generous recognition, of the service of the thinkers and executors involved, and yet unhesitatingly and thoroughly. Indeed, it is only in this way that the full value of the new force or device can be brought out, and its largest and highest service rendered.

II

A DEMOCRATIC POLICY IN THE USE OF NATURAL
RESOURCES

In a similar way, a consistent national policy, whether expressed through the state governments or through the national government, should be developed as to the use of all natural resources. Very obviously, there must be a limit to the monopolizing, by private individuals or corporations, of natural resources. Very few would to-day deny a community's right to secure, for example, an uncontaminated water supply. Can it be finally doubted that the community has a similar right to natural sources of water for power and for irrigation, to natural sources of light, of heat, and of indispensable minerals? The individual's right of discovery, or the exploiter's or combination's right of reward for service rendered, are — no one of them — exclusive rights. They are very seriously limited by the much larger right of the whole community. The reward in many of these cases has been extravagant beyond estimate, — an almost unconditioned permission to place a perpetual tax upon the whole community, for what ought to

have been considered in large measure the property of the community from the start.

It is peculiarly incumbent on America, just because it is bound to stand for democratic ideals, and because its economic development has been the most swift and intense of all, to work out a thoroughgoing and consistent national policy for dealing with all newly discovered natural forces, and with all the great natural resources, in such a way as to insure both the encouragement of individual initiative and of the development of all latent capacity, and the fair sharing by the community as a whole in all gains made. The national conservation of natural resources is, so far, but a very short and timid step in the direction in which the nation must travel, if a true democracy is to be attained. Earlier mistakes must be corrected, and earlier injustices, so far as possible, made good, and the interest of the whole people be clearly constituted, all along the line, the dominant interest. This need not necessarily mean public ownership of the great natural resources. But it will ultimately mean just that, if strict and just control cannot be secured, and the community interest conserved, in any other way. For steady ignoring of the interests of the people as a whole,

at even so difficult a point as this, no democracy can permanently endure. One of the most threatening elements in the situation to-day, both in England — where one hundred thousand railway workmen have been earning less than five dollars a week — and America is the almost absolute blindness to any community interest, on the part of those who have most profited by the selfish exploitation of natural resources. Their utterances are too often worthy only of an unhampered and unscrupulous oligarchy.

III

A DEMOCRATIC POLICY IN THE CONTROL OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

The community's dominant right, also, to the strict control of all public utilities, and a steady sharing directly or indirectly in all profits from them, cannot much longer be questioned. Here, just as in the case of its immense natural resources, the nation and its constituent parts have proceeded with reckless waste. In a short-sighted haste to develop their resources and to get easy and quick results in public service, the people flung away untold sources of wealth, and put

themselves, at most vital points, in the power of monopolistic combinations. They were too engrossed in their individual enterprises to study conditions, to prevent the grossest political jobbery, or to develop true leaders of the people. Material success so held the attention of all, as individuals, that it was punished by great material loss on the part of the community, as a whole. The history of water, gas, and transportation companies in our great cities is almost uniformly a record of shame, both to the community and to the company. Much the same thing must be said as to the manipulation of railway interests in the country at large. That a true democracy has been here expressing itself, no one could dream. Good service in any of these lines should be reasonably, even generously, rewarded, and daring individual enterprise, out-running public willingness to act, fully recognized; but the wealth accruing from public utilities is still very largely a direct public product; and the public cannot be justly shut out from control of policy and profits. Here, too, a general national policy — the result of careful study and just consideration of all interests — should be adopted, in place of all kinds of haphazard experiments, that

issue in justice neither to the investor nor to the public. And some gratifying progress has been made toward the outlines, at least, of such a policy, that recognizes at every point the community interest.

IV

A DEMOCRATIC POLICY CONCERNING CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH AND POWER

The enormous increase in wealth that has come in this generation, and the unprecedented extent to which this wealth and the power of control involved in gigantic combinations of capital have been concentrated in the hands of a comparatively small group of men, bring to America, in peculiar degree, problems of the gravest import. If there had been a consistent and truly democratic national policy in the handling of the problems already considered, this problem could have assumed no such threatening proportions. But it is not strange that, in the marvelously rapid economic development of the country, the present outcome should not have been anticipated and reckoned with. Given the conditions, the result was practically inevitable. And it does not necessarily imply any direct scheming, on the part of

any men or group of men, for such unexampled power over the life of the nation as now exists. The vast waste of universal competition in industrial and commercial enterprises was certain soon to force itself upon men's minds, as also the great possibilities of minute savings on a large scale; and gigantic combinations of capital inevitably result. They cannot be fought simply as evil. They contain the possibility of larger and better community service. Moreover, the blindness of the nation in its recklessly wasteful policy concerning power from nature, natural resources, and public utilities, directly and steadily promoted such immense aggregations of wealth. Tariff legislation, also, has been persistently used, sometimes in an honestly mistaken policy, sometimes with deliberate intention, to levy a tax upon all the people for the exclusive benefit of a small class, in the building up of enormous fortunes. And this has been accompanied by the influence of selfish sectional interests, and by a baleful exercise of political power on the part of the financial interests, for the defeat of legislation looking to the good of the whole people. In the rapid growth of our cities, too, prodigious increments in land values have come in, still further to increase these

aggregations of wealth, and to widen the dangerous gap between the few and the many.

The final outcome is not only private incomes that rival in extent national revenues, but such combinations of capital and of lines of industry, as leave the nation almost literally at the mercy of the will of a few men. Small groups of men have practically the power to levy a tax on the whole people, and to determine the amount of that tax, in the case of many of the virtual necessities of life. An absolutely unprecedented concentration of power over the life of the nation in the hands of a few private individuals has taken place. Monopolistic control is more and more asserting itself, and an aristocracy of wealth arising. Now it need not be contended that this power has been shamelessly abused, that conspicuous ability has not been shown, and marked economic efficiency not displayed, or that large public service has not been rendered. Nor is it to be denied that, by many, there have been stupendous gifts intended for the public good, and honest concern for the interests of their employees. But all these things and many others of like import scarcely affect the seriousness of the situation for a democracy. If the possessors of this enormous

wealth and power had been, all of them, heroes and saints, a democracy must still ask, Do such power and privileges, under any conditions, belong in private hands? There is one sole reason for special privilege in a democracy — a correspondingly great special service to the community; and special privileges even so earned must be absolutely subject to public control; — they must not usurp at any point public functions.

With the greatest desire to do justice to the holders of these gigantic American fortunes, it can hardly be affirmed that these fortunes were simply adequate reward for service rendered. Where they may be considered as under the given conditions legitimate, they are very largely the product of the exploitation of the forces of nature, of natural resources, or of public utilities; or the product of tariff legislation, of unearned land increments, or of gigantic monopolies. Now at every one of these points, the community had not only a paramount interest, but, as the chief owners or producers of the wealth, a paramount right. This was not fully realized beforehand by any. There were plain historical reasons — that need not be here rehearsed — why it would have seemed, at an earlier period in American life, an abridg-

ment of liberty, and so essentially undemocratic, for the community to have asserted its right at most of these points.

Nevertheless, this should not now blind us to the fact that the outcome is essentially and inherently undemocratic, and fraught with the gravest danger to our national life. There must be no chance for doubt, in the minds of any, that the interests and power of the nation, — of the people as a whole, are absolutely dominant; that special privileges of any kind have always at their root proportionate service, and continue only so long as that service continues; that, everywhere, persons are more than things, the rights of persons above the rights of property, and the principle of reverence for personality the determining consideration in all policies adopted. Can it be truly affirmed that these principles have controlled in the building up of these barbarically stupendous fortunes? or can it be claimed that the nation has here any consistent policy, still less a consistently democratic policy? Would not, indeed, the single principle of reward according to service, have essentially changed conditions at multiplied points? And yet, is it not unmistakably clear that the health of the nation, even the possible

future of any true democracy, depends upon the adoption and application of a consistent democratic national policy in the treatment of wealth and its present stupendous power?

This is not the concern only of the depressed and impoverished classes; it concerns every man, rich or poor, who believes in democracy and in its underlying Christian principles, and who wishes to see America increasingly embodying such a democracy. Invective of the rich is little to the point, and the stirring of class hatred is only a hindrance to a rational and just procedure. The present conditions, we have amply seen, are good for neither rich nor poor. Unearned special privileges cannot prove ultimately either an honor or a blessing. They tend to disintegrate the life, both of the individual who has them and of the nation that allows them. And the perpetual sense of an essentially unjust distribution of wealth inevitably breeds bitter discontent, and is made to justify a growing hatred of the rich, and all kinds of attacks upon them. The language of the times concerning labor and capital is, one fears it must be said, increasingly that of warfare. And the ethical standards on both sides are far too largely simply those of war for the mastery. In-

creasing combination on one side has been met by increasing combination on the other, and neither side has given much consideration to the common good. Now, if this nation is to be a democracy at all, the public cannot permanently consent to live between two warring camps. The interest of the whole people is greater than that of either capital or labor and must rule; but it does not rule, wherever injustice still remains. But it peculiarly concerns the privileged classes to remember that, in a democracy, arrogance is the forerunner of destruction, and nothing so surely makes for their downfall as the sense of essential injustice.

All alike, therefore, — the general community, the laborer, the capitalist, — are concerned that the many ugly facts in the life of the American nation, that show plainly enough that we have not yet attained a true democracy, should be changed. It is these rank inconsistencies in the life of a professedly democratic people, that so fire the hearts of the laboring classes, and make them feel that, in their own fight, they are fighting the battle of humanity. It is these that arouse the growing indignation of the great body of the people, not primarily connected with either the capitalistic or

the laboring classes. It is these that, when ignored or unremedied, constitute capital's own greatest enemy. From every point of view, the whole nation is concerned that the injustices of the present situation be set right. They are not the work of one class alone. The whole people have been largely at fault; and it is for the whole people to repent, and to turn from shortsightedness, and from individual and class selfishness, to a deep-going justice, that forgets not "one of these least."

It is, therefore, wholesome and necessary for us all that we should have clearly in mind those various ugly facts, that illustrate so fully how far short we still come, on the economic side, of a genuine democracy. These facts, ugly as they are, are not to be reviewed in a spirit of rancor, but with national shamefacedness and the determination to press steadily forward to the correction of such abuses, and of such gross inconsistencies in the life of a democratic people. Slavery itself was hardly more inconsistent with democracy than is no small part of our economic situation.

V

A DEMOCRATIC POLICY CONCERNING SOCIAL MAL-
ADJUSTMENTS

1. At the bottom of all, perhaps, lies a body of *legal, legislative, and judicial tradition*, that has arisen naturally enough out of certain historical conditions, and that has honestly misled almost all concerned. But, however it has come about, it must probably be recognized that legal practice, common legislation, and court decisions have, as a whole, been far more concerned for the rights of property than for the rights of persons; and have tended pretty steadily to favor, almost unconsciously, the property-owning and capitalistic classes, as over against the laboring classes. They have felt themselves bound by precedents that belong to a far earlier and far different time; and a procedure has gradually arisen that has made much of legal technicalities, which, in their turn, have led to repeated defeats of justice, and to insufferable delays. These delays inevitably favor the rich rather than the poor. For, especially for the poor, justice long delayed is essential injustice. The injustice of this general situation has been almost certainly, though again unconsciously,

augmented by the extent to which legislation has been in the hands of the legal profession, that sets such store by precedent. There has been some gain in the enlightenment of intelligence and conscience at this point. But probably very few recognize the extent to which the vastly changed conditions of our time demand changes in legal enactment, procedure, and decision. We are living in an age separated, in many of its features, by an immeasurable gulf from any preceding age. It is a time to make precedents, not simply to follow them. Our legal precedents, too, are in no small degree distinctly aristocratic, not democratic; and a true democracy cannot be expressed or interpreted in their terms.

Now, it is hardly possible to work a deeper injury to the life of a nation than is wrought by a growing conviction, on the part of the great masses of the people, that real and prompt justice cannot be obtained under its laws and legal and judicial procedure. For this strikes at the foundation of all peace and order and growth and good will, and directly promotes, instead, a persistent lawlessness. It deeply concerns the whole people, therefore, that they should not be blinded at this most vital point by custom, convention, or precedent; but

should be prepared for changes that may seem even revolutionary, in the direction of guarding everywhere the rights of the individual person as a person, and the interests of the people as a whole. Partial attempts to secure these aims are to be found in the principles of the initiative, referendum, and recall, and related reforms. Even the attempt to apply the principle of recall to judges is probably to be interpreted as only a vigorous protest against the extent to which judicial decisions have been guided by purely legal precedent rather than essential justice. There is, undoubtedly, a growing and not wholly unjustified distrust of the ability of the legal mind to discern common human justice. Fortunately, there are, also, encouraging signs that a new conception of the legal profession is arising in the minds of many of that profession itself.

2. If one turns, now, from this general legal situation to specific evidences of economic abuses and conditions that a democratic people ought not to tolerate, he has not far to go for illustration. First of all, there stands glaringly out *the extent to which national and state legislation has been controlled by business interests*. The enormous abuses of the tariff, that have wrought widespread and

unmeasured injustice to the masses of the people, need only be mentioned. The tremendous difficulty with which any pure food laws have been obtained is a standing national disgrace, and clear proof of the persistent subordination of the good of the people to commercial interests. And it is hard to speak with patience of the steady refusal to give an adequate parcels post; of the obstacles constantly put in the way of legislation for the protection of laborers, of children, and of women; of the slowness of any large constructive legislation for the national conservation of natural resources, for the protection of the health of the nation, or for the building up of a worthy national department of education. Commercial interests have been so dominant that legislation has been very largely a series of compromises between the various business interests of different sections; and the large problems concerning the welfare of the people as a whole have been grossly neglected. The most encouraging element in the situation to-day is the evidence of an increasing number of national legislators who are interpreting their trust in truly national terms.

The betrayal of public interests has been quite as manifest in the legislation of the states and of

the cities as in that of the nation. And the cities have especially shown that the business interests were very generally corrupting agencies, and direct opponents of all true reform. Fortunately, in both cities and states, some decided gains have recently been achieved, that point the way to distinctly better and more representative service of the people. But it is still true that only the barest beginning has been made of what a true democracy ought to demand. There is, as yet, no approach to a comprehensive mastery of our startlingly new conditions.

3. Quite outside the sphere of legislation, also, *economic abuses* that fairly threaten the life of a democracy have existed. The almost universal practice of prodigious watering of stocks — a direct defrauding of the people as a whole; the careful keeping of all real power of control of corporations in the hands of a mere handful of men — giving them in the end practically public functions; the abuse of public confidence in the great insurance companies, and in other lines of investment; the general obliviousness of capital to public interests; and the prevalent determination on all sides, and by all kinds of expedients, to “charge all that the traffic will bear,” that is pushing up at a thousand

points the cost of living for the ordinary man — all these and similar phenomena make unmistakably plain again that the interests of all the people are not in any of these things dominant, and that the nation is failing here to fulfill its trust as a democratic government. Conditions do not allow to a democracy in all this either a mere let-alone policy, or a policy of timid and ineffective tinkering. They demand, once more, a broad, constructive, and consistently democratic national policy, that shall grapple intelligently and effectively with these evils.

4. To all this must be added, as still further fomenting the sense of injustice and unrest on the part of the poorer classes, the stupendous "conspicuous waste" and "conspicuous leisure" of many of the very rich; their cynical indifference to the burdens of others, and especially of those concerned in producing their own wealth; the way in which we all find it so easy to take it for granted that it is quite as it should be, that all the hard, dirty, disagreeable tasks should be done by others. That there is an increasing number of men and women of wealth of the highest ideals, and who themselves deplore present conditions, and would do all in their power to remedy them, is never to be forgotten. But *the contrasts between the economic conditions of the*

very rich and the poor are so immense and so awful, that it is impossible for any true democracy to view them with equanimity. And they cannot be necessary, in an age with the staggering resources of wealth and power possessed by this age. As a democracy we have no right to peace, until conditions, now taken as a matter of course, if not as naturally inevitable, are thoroughly remedied.

Let one bring home to his own consciousness what it means that, in a highly protected industry, such conditions for the laborer can prevail as both the "Pittsburg Survey" and the inspection of the Federal Bureau of Labor brought out: one man in three working seven days a week; very many having a regular twelve hour working day; and a large proportion of low-pay laborers. Let him visualize the abject and awful miseries of the sixteen months strike in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, and think what has made it possible. Let him remember the helplessness of the individual laborer who attempts to stand alone in his dealings with capital, and yet the essentially war conditions under which he is coerced by the Unions. Let him honestly ask himself whether he is not bound to know that there are thousands in this land of the free who have, under present economic condi-

tions, no fair chance to live a man's life; who are early worked out; whose working conditions are such that they lack not only leisure, but nerve, for any possible growth; who, so far as they can stop to think at all, must think of themselves as mere *means* for the life of others. And then let him remind himself that this is a Christian democracy, in an age of resources of wealth and power beyond the dreams of previous ages. No! Such conditions are not necessary. They can be cured; and a democracy must cure them or belie its name.

The nation is the chief factor in every strike, and in all those conditions that lead to strikes. Its good offices must begin with remedial, protective, and constructive legislation that make such laboring conditions as those reviewed impossible anywhere in all this land. And, as surely as the nation has a right to demand that its courts shall be used to replace primitive strife between individuals; so surely has it the right to demand, also, that arbitration by the courts or through some other legally recognized tribunal shall replace industrial warfare. The community is generally the chief sufferer in a prolonged industrial conflict, and its interest is paramount; but it must pursue that general interest in a spirit of full justice to all, and

in clear view of the markedly new conditions of our time, and not fall back upon outworn precedents. In the end both labor and capital will best profit by such absolute community control; for they are engaged in a great common task, and all are indissolubly knit up in the fabric of one national life, where one cannot suffer and not all the rest suffer at the same time.

Every social maladjustment, in fact, is just so far an indictment of a democracy. We must bring all our science, all our inventive skill, all our social feeling to bear. We must seriously raise the question whether the laborer is now having his fair share of the wealth which is the joint product of capital and labor. We need deep-going search for some less primitive methods of determining wages than those which now prevail. We need honestly to ask whether we have at all made good the narrowing effects on the workmen of the extreme division of labor. In a still larger way, we must recognize that the real wealth of the nation is persons; and, therefore, we need broad constructive national policies for the better health, the normal growth, and the wiser and completer education of all. There can be no doubt, for one thing, that the community must demand far greater protection against the

ravages of sexual diseases. We have already seen that great achievements have been made in all these lines; and yet for vast multitudes if not for all, very much yet remains to be done. This demands, throughout our national life, "investigation, education, legislation — a program for adjustment."

And we may undertake such a program with courage; for we have such possibilities as the world has never before seen to bring to actuality what Devine calls the "normal community." The wealth of both the new outer and inner world of our times is available for us as a people, in perhaps greater degree than for any other nation. The resources of wealth and power over nature have increased more rapidly, probably, than in any other people. And we are less bound by precedent than the older nations. If our democracy has grave inconsistencies, democracy is still honestly our national ideal, passionately desired and pursued. We have the right to expect that the new world — of modern science and evolution, of the historical spirit, of psychology, of sociology, and of comparative religion — has not been opened to us in vain; but that its full intellectual and moral contributions, as seen in our earlier study, are not to be denied to

us. We may justly hope that our science, our inventive skill in meeting emergencies, and our social feeling, may prove adequate to the many and grave problems involved in the attainment of a true democracy.

In the specific questions¹ now before us and certain to arise—in the family, in household management, in industry, in education, in charity, in politics—the guiding clue is quite certain to be found in that fundamental reverence for the person as such, that is basic to any true democracy. It will particularly enable us to see that, while, undoubtedly, the general community interest is always supreme, yet community control, for the very sake of the common good, needs so to be exercised as not only not needlessly to interfere with individual initiative, but distinctly and painstakingly to guard and encourage it. For community development depends on individual initiative and variation. This is that socialized individualism to which the future surely belongs.

Where the spirit of reverence for personality thoroughly permeates all policies and all conduct, and is accompanied by scientific study of con-

¹ Cf. e.g. Croly, *The Promise of American Life*; Nearing, *Social Adjustment*; Jane Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*.

ditions, neither the individual nor the nation can fail. But its full triumph, and its triumph at the points most vital to the inner happiness of the race, can never come simply by legislation, but only when this spirit actually commands the conscience and the will of each individual, in realms that no legislation can ever reach. For such a triumph, deep religious conviction is necessary. For democracy is both an ideal and a faith. The honest, earnest, unselfish pursuit of a democracy, thus everywhere reverent of personality — even long before its fulfillment — would bring healing and health to our national life; enable it to render by example its largest possible service to the world's civilization; and best fit it, at the same time, for sharing directly and worthily in the triumph of ethical ideals in all international relations.

CHAPTER X

THE PROGRAM OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN ITS SPREAD OVER THE WORLD: THE GUIDING PRIN- CIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE

WHEN one turns from the life of the nation to that of the world, to see what the challenge of present-day conditions there involves, he is forced to consider the actual course which Western civilization has taken in its spread over the world; to ask at what points it has been untrue to its great source in the Christian principle of reverence for personality; and so to determine the definite demands made to-day upon nations and individuals by loyalty to this supreme guiding principle. Our discussion may, perhaps, best take the form of a succession of closely related propositions.

I

THE INTERACTION OF THE ECONOMIC AND THE RELIGIOUS

I. "*The two great forming agencies in the world's history,*" writes Marshall, in his *Principles of*

Economics, "have been the religious and economic." On the one hand, the economic is everywhere required as basis for civilization, — for man's entire spiritual life. There is no need to deny or to underestimate the immense place of the economic. And, on the other hand, "religion," as Principal Fairbairn says, "is the supreme factor in the organizing and regulating of our individual and collective life." We have seen many illustrations of this supremacy of religion in the survey already made, and have been compelled to recognize how absolutely basic in our civilization have been the great moral-religious convictions.

2. It is natural, therefore, that it should be especially *on these two lines — economic and religious — that Western civilization has spread over the world.* It has been, that is, either for economic or religious reasons that the West has gone to the East. Each movement has sought a world conquest. Each has moved forward to such world conquest with its own aims and methods and spirit, practically independent of the other. But they have inevitably interacted, generally to the advantage of commerce, — the economic, — but often to the decided disadvantage of the religious, — the missionary movement.

There has been no concerted movement, it should be noticed, to introduce Western civilization as an entirety into the East. So far as its complete impression has been made upon the oriental mind at all, it has been rather incidental than directly purposed.

3. As to motives, *the economic, the commercial motive*, in this world extension has been, of course, private gain. But there are three reasons why the extension of commerce has also tended to forward the general progress of civilization. First, because all legitimate commerce has its basis in the sense of mutual advantage, and something of valuable service can hardly fail thus to have been rendered in these commercial transactions between the East and the West. Commerce has, also, naturally cultivated the sense of many new wants; and while, doubtless, some of these have been injurious rather than helpful, many of them have been of a kind to further a higher type of civilization. Moreover, commerce requires for its successful persistence commercial honor and trust in conspicuous degree. At all these points, then, we may believe that the extension of Western commerce has had distinctly civilizing contributions to make in the Orient.

The religious — the missionary — motive, in this

extension over the world has been love, — the spirit of “humanity,” the desire on the part of Western peoples to share their best with all. The ethical significance of such a world movement as this of foreign missions is profound, as Wundt pointed out, in the passage earlier quoted from him. Moreover, since the fundamental convictions of Christianity really underlie, as we have seen, the great principles of Western civilization, the civilizing contribution to the East made by the religious — the missionary — movement is basic and essential. Without this, indeed, the inner reality of Western civilization would not be introduced into the Orient at all, but only its outer shell. The painfully conscientious scruples about introducing the religious side of our civilization into the Orient, on the part of those who enthusiastically approve a vigorous governmental commercial propaganda, must seem to the dispassionate observer something akin to a joke.

4. *The religious world movement*, it should, therefore, be clearly recognized, *must accompany the economic*. And this must be seen not only by the man of supreme religious interest, but by all who are sincerely interested in the progress of civilization at all. For, otherwise, as has been implied,

in the first place, Western civilization will be seriously misrepresented in the East. In the second place, we shall be bringing to the Orient serious problems, without the help of the great principles necessary to their solution. And just as surely, in the third place, we shall not be truly sharing with the East our best, but only the lower and more material aspects of our civilization; and thus the real roots of that civilization will not have been given at all.

5. *European civilization was originally set free for this spreading over the world*, because it needed no longer to fear that it should be overrun by barbarism. Now this fear was banished simply because of scientific achievement, in the discovery and use of the great forces of nature through mechanical invention and scientific organization. But science, as we have seen, is "the child of duties," — the child of that freedom of investigation and of all individual initiative, that roots in the moral-religious convictions of freedom of conscience and reverence for personality. European civilization, therefore, needed no longer to fear barbaric overthrow from without; for it could fall only through failure in individual initiative and invention, and through failure in the moral-reli-

gious convictions out of which they grew. European civilization, that is, could fail only from within; and it was thus set free from the fear of barbarism, for its spread over the world.

6. Western civilization was *introduced* into the Orient, it should also be noted, *for commercial reasons*, and in almost all cases practically by force. This was true even in the particularly favorable case of America's opening of Japan. Japan's Prime Minister gracefully referred recently, in private conversation, to Japan's indebtedness to America for "gently waking it," as he said, "out of a dream life." Nevertheless, we must clearly see that that awakening was for commercial reasons and was practically forced.

Now, so far as the progress of civilization was concerned, there were clear dangers in both aspects of this introduction of Western civilization to the East. In the first place, a merely commercial interest was quite too liable to become simply selfish exploitation of the less advanced peoples. And, in the second place, the method of force was at obvious variance with the underlying principles of the civilization so introduced. It was not a persuasive introduction to a civilization having a really moral basis. In the spread of Western

civilization, then, the commercial movement in almost all cases preceded; the religious movement followed.

7. But that means that *the West has forced upon the East* and upon all less advanced peoples, judged by the Western standard, either *the adoption of Western education, inventions, and organization, or definite political subordination and commercial exploitation* in varying degrees. There has been no other alternative. Japan took the only possible way to a recognized place among the independent nations of the world to-day, by the adoption of Western education. And she followed literally, meanwhile, Herbert Spencer's confidential advice: "Keep other races at arm's length as much as possible." Japan thereby avoided in large degree immediate exploitation in the transition period. China has now seen the same necessity for taking on Western education, inventions, and organization. For no nation, that has not learned scientific mastery of the forces of nature and the resulting secret of steady achievement and progress, can stand against nations that have learned that lesson. That is, the adoption of Western education is ultimately forced upon all those peoples with whom Western civilization comes into contact.

The adoption of Western education is necessary to preserve the very existence of the people so approached.

This very fact, it should be noticed, of the forced adoption of Western education by the East through the commercial pressure of the West, tends to produce a more superficial and external type of Western civilization, and is, therefore, unfortunate from the point of view of a world-civilization, when compared with a movement coming more from within. That is, from the point of view of the ultimate ends of civilization, it would have been better for the Orient that the religious movement of Western civilization should have preceded the economic.

II

HOW FAR THE FAR EAST HAS TAKEN ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION

It becomes then of importance to see just how far the Far East in its most advanced example — Japan — has actually taken on Western civilization.

It is always difficult for an outsider rightly to estimate the stage of advancement reached by another nation; and in attempting any judgment we may

well remember, first of all, that the likenesses between the East and the West are, after all, far greater than the differences; and that the judgment of the average stage reached by the nation as a whole is no denial of the far greater achievements of multitudes of individuals. In the case of the Japanese, too, their noteworthy and constant courtesy may well keep us from rash judgment; though this in itself may make an accurate estimate somewhat more difficult. For, as one long resident in Japan has said, "there are perhaps no people under Heaven who know better the happy art of entertaining their guests, and none, perhaps, who succeed better in preoccupying them with their views." Moreover, in attempting an appraisal of Japan's present achievement, it is only fair to recognize that she is probably suffering now in the West from an exaggerated underestimate, as the natural reaction from an earlier exaggerated overestimate. There has been exaggeration as to the amount accomplished in the new period;—a Japanese is quite likely to assume as indisputable that Japan has reached in fifty years what it took Europe two thousand to attain. There has been exaggeration as to the suddenness of the accomplishment, ignoring the long preparatory causes.

There has been exaggeration, also, as to the extent to which the new era was an inner movement, due simply to the Japanese themselves, — underrating the depth of the debt to foreign stimulus.

The truest friend of Japan to-day, it would seem, is the man who neither fulsomely praises nor unsympathetically censures, but who tries to tell the real truth as to Japan's present condition. Lafcadio Hearn's estimate, in his *Japan, an Interpretation* — which may be said to lie midway between the exaggerated estimate of his earlier sketches and the equally exaggerated contempt of his latest writing on Japan, his letters to Mr. Chamberlain — seems to express a singularly just and admirably balanced judgment. He asks himself what the old Greek or Egyptian states would have done in Japan's situation, when confronted by the commercial pressure of the West; and implies that what they would have done, Japan actually did. "They would have speedily reconstructed their patriarchal society to meet the sudden peril; they would have adopted with astonishing success all the scientific machinery that they could use; they would have created a formidable army and a highly efficient navy; they would have sent their young aristocrats abroad to study alien convention

and to qualify for diplomatic duty; they would have established a new system of education, and obliged their children to study many new things; but toward the higher emotional and intellectual life of that alien civilization, they would naturally exhibit indifference: its best literature, its philosophy, its broader forms of tolerant religion could make no profound appeal to their moral and social experience.”¹

This judgment recognizes both the prodigious achievement of Japan's last fifty years, and its real limitations. For it must be probably recognized, that, outside the comparatively small number in Japan's fifty millions who have entered somewhat profoundly into appreciation of the essentially Christian sources of Western civilization, that civilization in Japan is more an external garb than an inner disposition and conviction. Nothing more was to be expected in so brief a period. Nothing more has been accomplished for the nation as a whole,—though multitudes of individuals have gone further. This conviction grows on one, as he sees more clearly Japan's present situation. No thoughtful man can wonder at this inner limitation in Japan's taking on of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 482.

Western civilization, when he remembers to how small an extent many, even in Western nations, have entered into the fundamental principles of a democratic civilization.

The surest touchstone of a civilization probably is that principle of the social consciousness, — reverence for the person as such, and its outcome, — the scientific spirit; and, judged by the social consciousness and the scientific spirit, it can hardly be doubted that Japan, as a whole, has still far to travel. The Orientals may be said to be our contemporary ancients. It is exceedingly interesting to see that exactly the moral-religious exclusive state of the ancient world, Old Japan had only fifty years ago; exactly the same strenuously communal type of civilization; exactly the same absolute domination of the individual by the state. Hearn points out in detail, "how small were the chances for personality to develop and assert itself" in Old Japan. There was no distinction between religion and ethics, nor between ethics and custom. Government and religion were the same. Custom and law were identified. "A man's life was regulated even to the least particulars — even to the quality of his footgear and headgear, the cost of his wife's hairpins and the price of his

child's doll." And he says of the period under the Shogunate: "This means something incomparably harsher than the socialistic tyranny of early Greek society; it means religious communism doubled with a military despotism of the most terrible kind." Under the Tokugawa rule, "there was little or nothing to strive after: for the majority of the people, there were no prizes to win."

This was Japan's inheritance fifty years ago. Great and striking changes she has made: in the abolition, both of the shogun and of the daimios; in the abolition of slavery; in the raising of all outcast classes; in the enactment of liberal legislation; and in the adoption of widespread education. But she has not escaped — and it could not be expected that she should escape — the pressure of her immediate inheritance of a crushingly communal type of civilization. It is not strange, therefore, that she should not have been able to enter, in anything like full measure, into either the scientific spirit or the social consciousness. The place of science, in its technical aspect, in education, and as the basis of industrial development, has been, of course, assured by commercial pressure; but it seems to be the material fruit of science that excites enthusiasm, rather than the scientific spirit

as such. And for the development of the social consciousness in the Orient, commerce will still less suffice. The dependence here must be almost wholly upon the religious factor in Western civilization.

For one, therefore, who has held somewhat roseate views of Japan's achievement, and has even wondered whether the work of the missionary in Japan might not be already accomplished, certain disappointment is in store, as he looks more closely into the national life. For phenomena like these confront him, upon such a closer view: the distinctly subordinate position of women; the backward condition of women's education, even to-day; the practically total absence of what can fairly be called liberal education in the Government system;¹ the marked limitation in the educational opportunities offered by the Government, in all but the lowest grades;

¹ Upon this point Mr. Hearn testifies: "The aim of Western education is the cultivation of individual ability and personal character, the creation of an independent and forceful being. Now Japan's education has always been conducted, and, in spite of superficial appearances, is still being conducted, mostly upon the reverse plan. Its object never has been to train the individual for independent action, but to train him for coöperative action, — to fit him to occupy an exact place in the mechanism of a rigid society." (*Op. cit.*, p. 460.)

the practically military oligarchy in its government; the pitifully limited suffrage (1.6 per cent of the total population);¹ the absolute power of the Emperor or of his little circle of advisers, even with the Constitution; the ominous lack of any true and vigorous political parties; the absolute want of representation in the Government by the great mass of the common people;² the enormous burden of taxation;³ the extent to which the old communalism still prevails, both in the attitude of the Government and among the people at large, even in spite of liberalizing legislation;⁴

¹ Cf. Millard, *America and the Far Eastern Question*, p. 90.

² "It is difficult to determine this matter with exactness, but I believe that the segment of the Japanese people which has no vote pays 80 per cent of the national and local taxes. The proletariat in Japan to-day is in a state of political and industrial peonage, and really has less influence in the Government than has the moujik in Russia or the coolie in China." (Millard, *Op. cit.*, p. 96.)

³ "The average Japanese now pays 40 per cent of his total earnings in taxes." In the decade 1898-1908, population increased 8 per cent; the average increase of earnings was 30 per cent; and the increase of taxation was 400 per cent. (Millard, *Op. cit.*, p. 109.)

⁴ "As for the tribal or clan law, it survives to the degree of remaining almost omnipotent in administrative circles, and in all politics." "Independence of personal action, in the Western sense, is still almost inconceivable." Hearn speaks of "the old communistic organization which is yet maintained in a hundred

the lack of true academic freedom, of freedom of investigation, or of freedom of speech, especially where certain governmental historical theories are involved, like that underlying the Emperor cult; and the enormous amount of espionage.¹ These are some of the evidences that show that the social consciousness and the scientific spirit can hardly be regarded to be as yet regnant in the life of Japan. That is to say, Western civilization has by no means won its full victory, even in the most advanced nation of the Orient.

III

COMPLETION OF THE WORLD-WIDE EXTENSION OF COMMERCE AND RELIGION

Now, the world-wide extension of commerce — the economic side of Western civilization — is prac-

forms." "The persistence of old sentiment and custom nullifies many of the rights legally conferred." "In Japan, the peculiar constitution of society lends excessive power to social intrigues directed against obscure ability." "The most sinister circumstance of official life is the absence of moral freedom — the absence of right to act according to one's own convictions of justice." (Hearn, *Op. cit.*, pp. 428, 427, 443, 448, 449, 468.)

¹ Weale speaks of the "Japanese police system" as "undoubtedly one of the most detestable in existence." (*The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia*, p. 368.)

tically complete in our day, as Mr. Bryce has borne witness. Western religion, too, is now at work in virtually every land; here, too, there are no closed doors. That is, from now on, the movement of Western civilization in both lines must be intensive rather than extensive. There are no wholly new lands or peoples for either Western commerce or Western religion to enter. And that means that the world is one world as never before, both economically and religiously. There is now opportunity, such as the world has never before seen, for the world-wide diffusion both of Western goods and Western ideas. Commercial enterprises at all capable of such extension tend more and more to become world-wide; and a similar statement may be made concerning religious ideas.

And this oneness of the world means, not only opportunity for world-wide diffusion, — commercially and religiously, — but means, also, that the rivalry of both goods and ideas is now for the first time world-wide, and therefore keener than ever. Changes in method or ideal anywhere, whether in business or in religion, make a difference everywhere. That is, both commercially and religiously, the world tends increasingly toward equalization of standards; and this cannot be

ignored by either the commercial or the religious forces. No people can be any longer a dumping ground for cast-off goods or cast-off ideas from the West, whether in the interests of commerce or in the conceived interests of orthodoxy. No community may now be shut away from the tides of the world life.

IV

WHY THE ORIENT MUST GO FURTHER

The very fact that if Western civilization is further to advance in its conquest of the world, it must be an intensive rather than an extensive advance, leads us to ask why, in the rivalry of the occidental and oriental civilizations, the Orient must go further than even its most advanced nation — Japan — has yet gone, if its nations are to be able to maintain their place among the leading nations in this intense and world-wide rivalry of the present day. This cannot be a question merely of armies and navies. It cannot be a question merely of numbers or of cheap labor, even on the commercial side. For even military efficiency, when measured in conflict with the nations of the most advanced civilization, demands more

than the qualities of a merely communal civilization, as we have already seen. And in the modern world, power to make war goes back ultimately to ability to borrow money, and must bank on economic progress; and this, also, in the stern rivalry of the unified world, demands more than the qualities of a communal civilization.

All this means that finally it must be seen that the Orient must take on generally, and in its inner spirit, the great fundamental moral and religious convictions and ideals of Western civilization, if it is steadily to reap its fruits. Even from the point of view simply of civilization, it must be seen that Western civilization will not have really come into the Orient, apart from such underlying Christian convictions. Even her most advanced nation — Japan — needs Christianity preëminently, both on the economic and on the religious side.

Even *commercially* she needs these deeper aspects of Western civilization. She needs them, first, to correct her prevailingly low type of commercial morality; but she needs them still more to fit her continuously for the intenser and world-wide industrial rivalry of our time. For success in such industrial rivalry can only depend ultimately on

the freedom of individual initiative; and Japan's tendency to override the individual by her communal type of civilization will put her finally at serious disadvantage in industrial competition with nations of a more individualistic type. For this individual initiative has full scope only in a country where it is conserved by a deep moral-religious conviction, not where it is mechanically taken on for present policy. Here, too, it would seem that Mr. Hearn has admirably stated the essence of the matter when he says: "Now the absence of individual liberty as in modern Japan would certainly appear to be nothing less than a national danger." "Only races long accustomed to personal liberty, — liberty to think about matters of ethics apart from matters of government, — liberty to consider questions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, independently of political authority, — are able to face without risk the peril now menacing Japan." For "the disintegration of the patriarchal system" (which in ancient Europe occupied centuries and was "slow and normal" and from within) in Japan "is taking place under enormous outside pressure, operating with the rapidity of electricity and steam." "The capacity for industrial competition cannot be made

to depend upon the misery of women and children; it must depend upon the intelligent freedom of the individual; and the society which represses this freedom, or suffers it to be repressed, must remain too rigid for competition with societies in which the liberties of the individual are strictly maintained.”¹

This judgment of Mr. Hearn seems to put its finger upon the exact source of the industrial weakness of states having a dominantly communal type of civilization, when brought into rivalry with states of the individualistic type. And it gives assurance that ultimately, in the world-wide rivalry, the states of Western civilization — so long as they remain absolutely true to their own fundamental principles — may be expected to maintain themselves to the end, even in spite of greater numbers and cheap labor in the rival states.

But if the Orient, as represented in Japan, needs fundamental Christian convictions even commercially, still more does she need the help of Christianity *religiously*. For Japan has already taken on enough of science to threaten all her

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 492, 496. Cf. Griffis, *The Japanese Nation in Evolution*, p. 118.

older religious faiths; and the same statement holds for India, and in only less degree for China. Moreover, it is impossible in the case of Japan, for the same reason, that the present Emperor-cult should stand. It furnishes an utterly impossible religious basis for the ethical life of a nation in this day of the world, — having no possibility of universal extension. That is, Japan's ethics are not built on a universal human basis, but upon a purely Japanese historical fiction. Nothing in Japan seemed to the writer so utterly pathetic and pitiful as to see a great people so try to found their ethical life. The very possibility of the attempt, and its present temporary success, demonstrate how communal still is the civilization of Japan, and make clear the close kinship of even its present attitude with the moral-religious ancestral exclusive state of the ancient world. The conscience of Japan, too, as the conscience of India, and in only less degree of China, has been already really carried for many Christian ideals.

The Orient must have, therefore, in Japan, not less, but even more, than in any other part of it, a religion that will stand the rational and ethical test of the scientific spirit and of the social consciousness. It is hardly open to doubt, that that

religion for Japan, as for the rest of the Orient, must be Christianity. Certainly the West has no better religious basis to offer for the moral life or for the foundation of civilization. And our whole discussion goes to show how profoundly such a moral-religious basis is needed in the intenser struggle of our times, and of the already fore-shadowed future.

Japan's danger, as that of the other oriental peoples, is, that she should fail to realize how unified a thing, after all, Western civilization is; and how impossible, therefore, it becomes permanently to reap its fruits and reject its roots. She is in danger, thus, of being satisfied with the machinery, the methods, the externals, and the signs of Western civilization, and so of losing its inner fructifying spirit, which alone insures steady advance in civilization.

V

WHY THE WEST MUST BE MORE CHRISTIAN IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE EAST

But, once more, just as surely as the Orient must go much further in taking on the basic moral-religious convictions of the West, if it is to come into the higher reaches of civilization at all; even

so surely and for like reasons must the West be more genuinely Christian in its dealings with the East, if it is to maintain the position already reached and go forward to further achievement.

For our own civilization roots ultimately, as we have seen, in the great moral-religious and Christian conviction of reverence for the person as such. This is its real source, and this its highest test. It is the highest civilization — if it be so, indeed — just because it best stands this test of reverence for the value and sacredness of the individual person, and builds on this principle most clearly and consciously. The great and rapid progress of its later years all goes back to this. It has amply proved itself the great condition of social efficiency, of scientific, economic, and social progress, — never to be safely violated. Western civilization, therefore, cannot with impunity ignore this root principle of its own life; but must be consciously and energetically guided by it, in its entire spread over the world and to the Orient, whether on the commercial or on the religious side.

Here, China is just at present the center of interest on the commercial side. For a disinterested observer to note carefully the situation in China — the enormous extent of foreign domina-

tion, the fact that all its best ports are in foreign hands, the constant aggressions, the bulldozing methods, the systematic exploitation — is to have his blood boil, and not only to cease to wonder at the Boxer revolution and the unrest in China, but rather to marvel that the anti-foreign spirit is not much stronger and more manifest than it is. For, as *The World's Chinese Students' Journal*, for July, 1910, says, the immediate cause of the Boxer revolution "was the partition rumors engendered by greedy foreign powers and encouraged by the foreign press." An English admiral had even published a great work on *The Break-up of China*; and the *Journal* goes on to add: "Although the rumor of partition has subsided, yet foreign aggressions are as strong, if not stronger, than ever. Japan by her cunning, unexpected by the Chinese, has despoiled China of her fairest Northern territory for commercial and political exploitations. Russia, though defeated, still continues her menacing activities in the North; France is encroaching upon the South, while Germany still continues her imperialistic policy in Shantung." One is glad to recognize that there has been some moderating of the aggressive attitude toward China on the part of some of the Powers.

On the *religious* side, in the approach of Western civilization to the East, there is a similar danger, from lack of reverence for the best in the peoples to whom the missionary goes. Here, too, the most thorough and delicate application of the principle of reverence for personality is demanded. It may well be doubted, for example, whether it was not a mistake in both China and Japan to have fought ancestor worship as idolatry, so making a sin of what may have been no sin, instead of permeating it with a worthy interpretation that should preserve its best; though the ominous power of the dead hand in both countries is not to be forgotten. In any case this purpose, on the part of the missionary, of sympathetically appreciating and sacredly guarding and preserving the best in the whole historical inheritance of the people to whom he goes — not even allowing them to lose it where they themselves would lightly let it go — must be a ruling purpose in missionary policy. For it is a profoundly serious matter to cut a people off from its historical inheritance. It tends to make Christian converts, strangers and exotics in their own land. It makes them Christians, as it were, by preserving them in individual test tubes, and so prevents them from being true

leaven in the midst of their own people. One is glad to recognize that this reverent attitude is to be found in all the best missionaries.

Now, the policy of simple commercial exploitation has calamitous effects both commercially and religiously. In the first place, it is a short-sighted policy, even on the commercial side, as Mr. Taft's words at Shanghai, earlier quoted, clearly show. Japan has already experienced in China's boycott how costly may be the commercial penalty of ruthless dealing with another people. And Sir Harry H. Johnston's remark upon the African situation is also illuminating in this connection: "It is a grave mistake to suppose that negro Africa has been *conquered* — the ease with which the white man has implanted himself in Africa as governor, exploiter, and teacher is due much more to the work of the missionary societies than to the use of machine guns."

But the policy of mere exploitation is not only short-sighted commercially, it has a plainly disastrous effect on the religious campaign as well. Basil Hall Chamberlain's sober words, in the midst of his prismatic discussion of "Things Japanese," bring a serious challenge to the advancing forces of Western civilization, whether commercial or re-

ligious: "We feel absolutely certain of one thing, namely, that missionary enterprise is impeded by the openly immoral politics of the (so-called) Christian nations. When Protestant England grabs at Hongkong, Weihaiwei and Thibet, while 'Holy Russia' grabs at sundry other provinces of a country which has never done either of the aggressors any harm; when France and Germany, anti-clerical at home, eagerly avail themselves of each bespattered priest or battered mission house to exact some commercial advantage or snatch some strip of territory abroad, what is the Far-Eastern to think?" "They feel that physical compulsion and spiritual influence cannot be successfully yoked together, that what has come to be known as the 'Gospel and Gunboat policy' is a contradiction in terms." And he adds his belief that "the naturalization of the missionaries in the land of their labors, their complete subjection to native law and rejection of all diplomatic interference on their behalf, would at once enormously increase their influence." ¹

All this means, then, that the policy of simple exploitation applied by the West to the East defeats the true spread of Western civilization on

¹ *Things Japanese*, p. 334.

both sides. And, once more, one cannot do better than to allow Mr. Hearn to voice one's own conviction, while rejoicing in the moral fervor of his words: "Those races which lead are the races who first learned that the highest power is acquired by the exercise of forbearance, and that liberty is best maintained by the protection of the weak, and by the strong repression of injustice. Unless we be ready to deny the whole of the moral experience thus gained, — unless we are willing to assert that the religion in which it has been expressed is only the creed of a particular civilization, and not a religion of humanity, — it were difficult to imagine any ethical justification for the aggressions made upon alien peoples in the name of Christianity and enlightenment." "The plain teaching of sociology is that the higher races cannot with impunity cast aside their moral experience in dealing with feebler races, and that Western civilization will have to pay, sooner or later, the full penalty of its deeds of oppression."¹

The question, therefore, is not so much whether we can exploit the Orient, as whether in the exploitation we are to lose our own best, fritter away our own life, sap the foundations of all our

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 521, 522.

own advance, by allowing the commercial and material aspects of our civilization to dominate the spiritual. For all this is to build, here too, only "greater barns," while we forget the intolerable irony of the voice that shall yet be borne in upon us, "Thou Fool." Is the progressive wider and wider sale of "pinhead" and "peacock" cigarettes, of kerosene oil, and of corrugated iron, even if it end finally in their world-wide conquest, the ultimate end of Western civilization and the meaning of life? To violate those high spiritual convictions and ideals that are the very soul of our civilization in our dealings with any people is to lose our own life. For Booker Washington's principle holds for nations as well as for men, that you cannot hold another in the ditch without staying in the ditch yourself.

And the matter goes still deeper. Nothing is more clear in the history of the progress of the race than that the great steps have not been taken without sacrifice, without long, steady, patient, unselfish leadership; and the movements that have been so led have commanded the future. A rational, ethical democracy, toward which our sociologists tell us the trend is steadily setting the world over, even in a single state requires unselfish

leadership. Still more must leadership in this constantly more and more unified world-civilization demand such unselfishness, — genuine loyalty to the moral-religious ideals of that social consciousness that voices the inner meaning of Western civilization. That alone will determine whether the leadership is to remain on the whole with the Teutonic races as an entirety, or with the English-speaking peoples, or to pass to some other. The conditions of leadership are known. They are not obscure. Just now, for this very moral reason, America has something like a genuine potential leadership in determining oriental policy; though her hands have not been wholly clean. Such leadership cannot be chosen selfishly and schemed for. It will cost the nation, to whom it ultimately comes, sacrifice, willingness to stand for principles at any cost, persistent, reverent regard for the best growth of others, loyalty everywhere to the guiding principle of reverence for personality. Of such is the kingdom that is to be, — the moral leadership that shall come of right and inevitably and without claim. "Whosoever would be first among you, shall be servant of all."

In other words, that one of the strong nations that most steadily, most genuinely, most inwardly,

and most delicately applies in all its international relations the principle of reverence for the person, as the truest man applies it in relations to his fellow-men, — that nation will ultimately have and deserve the moral leadership of the peoples in the advancing civilization of the world. This is God's world.

VI

TRANSFER OF SPIRIT, NOT FORMS, OF CIVILIZATION

Now, if there is to be loyalty to this great guiding principle of reverence for personality, it will follow inevitably that the ultimate world goal in civilization cannot mean that the West should merely press in upon the Orient and the less advanced peoples, as something fully completed and final, the precise forms of its own civilization, whether on its economic or religious side.

In the first place, we may not calmly assume that we have exhausted the content of the underlying principles of our civilization, or have embodied them in any sphere in their sole or final forms. In the second place, the very ground principle of our civilization — reverence for personality — forbids such an assumption, and should

make us certain rather that the other peoples to whom we go will have much to contribute to the civilization of the world, through their own natural unforced reaction upon those moral and religious principles that underlie our whole civilization. Is it possible for any one but the fool to doubt, however clearly one may see their deep need of the Christian faith, that the great civilizations of India and China and Japan shall have most significant contributions to make to the ultimate world civilization? Though this will not be by the mechanical transplantation of their philosophical and religious systems and resulting institutions; but by a reaction, as natural and as completely free as our own, upon those great moral and religious principles which have proved themselves essential and determining in the progress of the race.

In all our own intercourse, therefore, whether commercial or religious, with the Orient and with all the less advanced peoples, we are to be scrupulously guided at every point by this principle of reverence for personality.

This will mean, first of all, scrupulous respect for the liberty and person of the individuals concerned, and may lead to some such surprises as

those that have arisen in the labor situation in the Philippines, of which Millard says: "Large employers of labor in the Islands will now discharge a foreign superintendent or foreman who shows a disposition to be arrogant and truculent. To strike a native workman means instant discharge. Men who direct this work have come to realize that patience and consideration will go much further in handling native labor than rough displays of authority, and a foreign foreman or superintendent who cannot adapt his conduct to this theory is useless." And, he adds: "I regard it as an encouraging sign that of the many Americans who employ Filipinos on a large scale, whom I questioned about their capacity, not one gave a pessimistic account of them."¹

This guiding principle of reverence for personality would, also, mean that all our dealings with the Orient would be characterized by that sympathetic entering into their history and civilization and ideals, and that appreciation and careful preservation of the best in their historical inheritance, to which reference has already been made. Indeed, the immense importance of preserving this best in the inheritance of any people

¹ *America and the Far Eastern Question*, pp. 471, 474.

may well make us patient even with those reactionary movements, like that of the Arya Somaj in India, that sometimes seem to impede the progress of the newer ideas.

It is important, also, that the representative of Western civilization, and particularly the missionary, should realize, as has already, perhaps, been sufficiently implied, that the best of a people's past cannot be preserved merely by the selection of the outsider, however sympathetic he strives to make his approach; but that the people themselves must have the largest opportunity for honest, unforced individual and national reaction upon their own past, and upon the facts and ideals of historical civilization and of Christianity. Here again, it is obvious that the missionary cannot fairly or honestly withhold from those to whom he ministers the results of scientific and Biblical scholarship.

This scrupulous and delicate reverence for personality should, above all, characterize our missionary effort, for the very reason that one cannot be disloyal to this central principle of Christ's, without disloyalty to Christ himself. He lays no religion upon men from without; he invokes it from within men. He compels by no external authority; he calls out the free assent. He

reigns truly only where he is chosen to reign. Absolute loyalty to Christ's principle of the priceless value and sacredness of the individual person — this is the true white man's burden in the advancing civilization of the world.

"Take up the white man's burden —
 In patience to abide,
 To veil the threat of terror
 And check the show of pride;
 By open speech and simple,
 An hundred times made plain,
 To seek another's profit,
 And work another's gain.

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"Take up the white man's burden —
 Ye dare not stoop to less —
 Nor call too loud on Freedom
 To cloak your weariness;
 By all ye cry or whisper,
 By all ye leave or do,
 The silent, sullen peoples
 Shall weigh your Gods and you."

VII

RELIGIOUS CONVICTION NEEDED IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

But all this we shall not be able to do, unless we hold this *principle of reverence for personality*,

not only as an ethical but also *as a deeply religious conviction*.

In this world-task we need peculiarly an unshaken faith, permeating our whole life. We need the conviction that "the universe is on the side of the will," that God wills that which we seek. And we need this, not merely because this principle of the priceless value and sacredness of the individual person first came into the world, as a matter of fact, from Christ; but because for him it did, and for us it must, root in the sense of God as Father of all. Only if we believe that, can we also believe that every man is a child of God with the will of God revealed in his very nature; that each has his own divine calling involved in that God-given individuality; that never may even the weakest individual, therefore, be merely dominated by another; and that every soul has its own partial but unique revelation of God, as well as, and therefore, its own unique service of men.

Only such a vital religious faith can give a permanent and fundamental reason for reverence for the individual person, and Eucken is right in his insistence that any philosophical theory of personalism is quite insufficient that is not re-

ligiously based. The final duty of the individual, thus, is that he should be absolutely and completely faithful to the calling of God involved in his own individuality, and vigorously coöperate with God in the performance of that calling. And all society must coöperate with the individual to the same end. All our democratic principles go back to this. For the most fruitful coöperation, as we have seen, there must be the honest, complete contribution of each individual; and that there should be full freedom for this complete contribution of the individual, all must coöperate, in the religious feeling that the divine voice in every man must have its hearing.

The same principle holds for the individual peoples and nations. The ultimate world's civilization should not lose the peculiar contribution of each. But we shall not be deeply concerned therewith unless we see, here too, the will of God. The men who know what reverence for personality means cannot see treatment like that of Finland by Russia, or even much milder blottings out of a people, without the sense of something essentially irreligious and even blasphemous. In all high patriotism there is a genuine religious element; for every people worth while has had some sense

of divine calling and destiny. To that divine calling and destiny not only are they bound to be true; but every other people is bound also to help them to fulfill that calling and destiny; for if that fails, not only will this particular people lose, but the whole world-life.

It is, perhaps, not too much to say that the calling of America connects, most closely of all, with thoroughgoing recognition of this principle which is the root of all our civilization and of all our advance, — reverence for personality. It has probably had its way in American life more completely than in the life of any other great nation. We have been again and again inconsistent enough in our expression of it, and seem many times, rather unconsciously, to have done its bidding. However, it is difficult to doubt that Kidd is right in seeing something far more than mere nationalism at work in the development of the United States. "The cause is, we see, simply the same deep-lying organic cause which has made the population of the United States a single people; which decided at the beginning that the original States should not set up barriers against each other; which later, and at a supreme crisis of their existence, prevented them from breaking up

into two separate nationalities. It is the cause which has driven the same people to absorb into this unity, and to digest with a rapidity and completeness elsewhere unknown the various fragments of the Latin civilizations with which they were originally surrounded. It is the cause which has driven them to absorb with equal rapidity, and to build up into a new social order, the millions which Europe has continued to pour upon them. But in all this we must realize that it is no mere expansion of a race or of a nationality we are watching here. It is the *conquering march of principles becoming conscious* — the principles born into the world through the long stress of the process we have been describing throughout.”¹ The principles of which Mr. Kidd here speaks may be best expressed in the great single guiding principle of reverence for personality, as expressed both in the sense of the organic unity of men, and in respect for the freedom and individuality of the single person.

John Hay’s insistence that American diplomacy intends to be a diplomacy simply of the Golden Rule voices a like conviction; and led naturally to his declaration of American policy in the Far

¹ *Principles of Western Civilization*, pp. 392, 393.

East as that of the Open Door, and of respect for the integrity of China. It was supplemented by the conviction, underlying the American policy in the Philippines, that no nation had the right merely to exploit another people for its own benefit, but must pledge itself to bring that other people as rapidly as possible to the largest measure of self-government. Whatever failures there may have been on the part of individuals or of the nation in the expression of this guiding principle, it remains true that the secret of our very life lies hid in it. Let us be sure that without persistent religious faith in this principle of reverence for the person, and faith that God himself has called us in peculiar degree to lead in its embodiment, we shall fail in our true task as a nation.

But we cannot be true to it without purging ourselves of many inconsistencies of which at present we are paradoxically proud. It can hardly be true, for example, that that people that has within itself the largest area of free trade on the surface of the earth, should continue forever to erect great tariff barriers between itself and other peoples. It is hardly possible that the people, the root principle of whose civilization is reverence for the person as such, should continue

forever to be moved by mean and petty race prejudice. And it is hardly conceivable, either, that the people whose unique freedom has made possible the intensest and most rapid economic development the world has seen, should in the outcome find itself dominated by an oligarchy of wealth; though that oligarchical control may have been nowhere directly sought. Doubtless we have mistaken, at many points, the real meaning and application of the principles by which we have supposed ourselves to be moved; but we may still have religious faith to believe that in a larger sense than men have ever yet conceived, government of the people and by the people and for the people, is not to perish from the earth.

But whether or not it is to be given to America, or to the English-speaking peoples as a whole, or to the still broader Teutonic races, or to some other people or group of peoples, — to lead in the world's civilization of the future; we may not doubt that reverence for personality will continue the guiding principle of all human progress, and that we are advancing toward the goal of the civilization in which that principle shall be completely regnant.

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